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BL  240  .R6  1895 

Romanes,  George  John, 

1848J 

1894. 

Thoughts  on  religion 

THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION 


0jforb 

HORACE  HART,    PRINTER  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY 


t*3>. 


Thoughts  on  Religion 


BY   THE   LATE 


GEORGE   JOHN   ROMANES 

.M.A.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S. 


EDITED    BY 

CHARLES    GORE,    M.A. 

CANON  OF  WESTMINSTER 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1895 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Editor's  Preface     .  5 


PART   I. 

The  Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion. 

Essay  I 37 

Essay  II 56 

PART    II. 

Notes  for  a  Work  on  a  Candid  Examination 
of  Religion. 

Introductory  Note  by  the  Editor     ....        91 

§  1.  Introductory 98 

§  2.  Definition    of    Terms    and    PuRrosE    of    this 

Treatise 104 

§  3.  Causality 116 

§  4.  Faith  ....:....      131 

§  5.  Faith  in  Christianity 154 

Concluding  Note  by  the  Editor         ....      184 
A  2 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE 


The  late  Mr.  George  John  Romanes — the  author 
within  the  last  few  years  of  Darzvin  and' After 
Darwin )  and  of  the  Examination  of  Weismannism 
— occupied  a  distinguished  place  in  contemporary 
biology.  But  his  mind  was  also  continuously  and 
increasingly  active  on  the  problems  of  meta- 
physics and  theology.  And  at  his  death  in  the 
early  summer  of  this  year  (1894),  he  left  among 
his  papers  some  notes,  made  mostly  in  the 
previous  winter,  for  a  work  which  he  was  in- 
tending to  write  on  the  fundamental  questions 
of  religion.  He  had  desired  that  these  notes 
should  be  given  to  me  and  that  I  should  do  with 
them  as  I  thought  best.  His  literary  executors 
accordingly  handed  them  over  to  me,  in  company 
with  some  unpublished  essays,  two  of  which  form 
the  first  part  of  the  present  volume. 

After  reading  the  notes  myself,  and  obtaining 
the  judgement  of  others  in  whom  I  feel  confidence 
upon  them,  I  have  no  hesitation  either  in  publishing 


6  Thoughts  on  Religion 

by  far  the  greater  part  of  them,  or  in  publishing 
them  with  the  author's  name  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  book  as  originally  projected  was  to  have  been 
anonymous.  From  the  few  words  which  George 
Romanes  said  to  me  on  the  subject,  I  have  no  doubt 
that  he  realized  that  the  notes  if  published  after 
his  death  must  be  published  with  his  name. 

I  have  said  that  after  reading  these  notes 
1  feel  no  doubt  that  they  ought  to  be  published. 
They  claim  it  both  by  their  intrinsic  value  and 
by  the  light  they  throw  on  the  religious  thought 
of  a  scientific  man  who  was  not  only  remarkably 
able  and  clear-headed,  but  also  many-sided,  as 
few  men  are,  in  his  capacities,  and  singularly 
candid  and  open-hearted.  To  all  these  qualities 
the  notes  which  are  now  offered  to  the  public 
will  bear  unmistakable  witness. 

With  more  hesitation  it  has  been  decided  to 
print  also  the  unpublished  essays  already  referred 
to.  These,  as  representing  an  earlier  stage  of 
thought  than  is  represented  in  the  notes,  naturally 
appear  first. 

Both  Essays  and  Notes  however  represent  the 
same  tendency  of  a  mind  from  a  position  of  unbelief 
in  the  Christian  Revelation  toward  one  of  belief  in  it. 
They  represent,  I  say,  a  tendency  of  one  '  seeking 
after  God  if  haply  he  might  feel  after  Him  and 


Editor  s  Preface  7 

find  Him,'  and  not  a  position  of  settled  orthodoxy. 
Even  the  Notes  contain  in  fact  many  things  which 
could  not  come  from  a  settled  believer.  This 
being  so  it  is  natural  that  I  should  say  a  word 
as  to  the  way  in  which  I  have  understood  my 
function  as  an  editor.  I  have  decided  the  question 
of  publishing  each  Note  solely  by  the  consideration 
whether  or  no  it  was  sufficiently  finished  to  be 
intelligible.  I  have  rigidly  excluded  any  question 
of  my  own  agreement  or  disagreement  with  it. 
In  the  case  of  one  Note  in  particular,  I  doubt 
whether  I  should  have  published  it,  had  it  not  been 
that  my  decided  disagreement  with  its  contents 
made  me  fear  that  I  might  be  prejudiced  in 
withholding  it. 

The  Notes,  with  the  papers  which  precede  them, 
will,  I  think,  be  better  understood  if  I  give  some 
preliminary  account  of  their  antecedents,  that  is 
of  Romanes'  previous  publications  on  the  subject 
of  religion. 

In  1873  an  essay  of  George  Romanes  gained  the 
Burney  Prize  at  Cambridge,  the  subject  being 
Christian  Prayer  considered  in  relation  to  the 
belief  that  the  Almighty  governs  the  world  by 
general  laws.  This  was  published  in  1874,  with 
an  appendix  on  The  Physical  Efficacy  of  Prayer. 
In  this  essay,  written  when  he  was  twenty-five  years 


8  Thoughts  on  Religion 

old,  Romanes  shows  the  characteristic  qualities 
of  his  mind  and  style  already  developed.  The 
sympathy  with  the  scientific  point  of  view  is 
there,  as  might  be  expected  perhaps  in  a  Cam- 
bridge '  Scholar  in  Natural  Science ' :  the  logical 
acumen  and  love  of  exact  distinctions  is  there : 
there  too  the  natural  piety  and  spiritual  appre- 
ciation of  the  nature  of  Christian  prayer — a  piety 
and  appreciation  which  later  intellectual  habits  of 
thought  could  never  eradicate.  The  essay,  as 
judged  by  the  standard  of  prize  compositions,  is  of 
remarkable  ability,  and  strictly  proceeds  within 
the  limits  of  the  thesis.  On  the  one  side,  for  the 
purpose  of  the  argument,  the  existence  of  a  Per- 
sonal God  is  assumed 1,  and  also  the  reality  of  the 
Christian  Revelation  which  assures  us  that  we  have 
reason  to  expect  real  answers,  even  though  con- 
ditionally and  within  restricted  limits,  to  prayers  for 
physical  goods  2.  On  the  other  side,  there  is  taken 
for  granted  the  belief  that  general  laws  pervade 
the  observable  domain  of  physical  nature.  Then 
the  question  is  considered — how  is  the  physical 
efficacy  of  prayer  which  the  Christian  accepts  on 
the  authority  of  revelation  compatible  with  the 
scientifically  known  fact  that  God  governs  the 
world  by  general  laws?  The  answer  is  mainly 
1  p.  7-  2  p.  173- 


Editor  s  Preface  9 

found  in  emphasizing  the  limited  sphere  within 
which  scientific  inquiry  can  be  conducted  and 
scientific  knowledge  can  obtain.  Special  divine 
acts  of  response  to  prayer,  even  in  the  physical 
sphere,  may  occur — force  may  be  even  originated 
in  response  to  prayer — and  still  not  produce  any 
phenomenon  such  as  science  must  take  cognizance 
of  and  regard  as  miraculous  or  contrary  to  the 
known  order. 

On  one  occasion  the  Notes  refer  back  to  this 
essay1,  and  more  frequently,  as  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  notice,  they  reproduce  thoughts  which 
had  already  been  expressed  in  the  earlier  work  but 
had  been  obscured  or  repudiated  in  the  interval. 
I  have  no  grounds  for  knowing  whether  in  the  main 
Romanes  remained  satisfied  with  the  reasoning  and 
conclusion  of  his  earliest  essay,  granted  the  theistic 
hypothesis  on  which  it  rests.  But  this  hypothesis 
itself,  very  shortly  after  publishing  this  essay,  he 
was  led  to  repudiate.  In  other  words,  his  mind 
moved  rapidly  and  sharply  into  a  position  of 
reasoned  scepticism  about  the  existence  of  God 
at  all.  The  Burney  Essay  was  published  in 
1874.  Already  in  1876  at  least  he  had  written 
an  anonymous  work  with  a  wholly  sceptical  con- 
clusion, entitled  'A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism' 
1  See  p.  no. 


to  Thoughts  on  Religion 

by  Pkysicus1.  As  the  Notes  were  written  with 
direct  reference  to  this  work,  some  detailed  account 
of  its  argument  seems  necessary ;  and  this  is  to  be 
found  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  work  itself,  where 
the  author  summarizes  his  arguments  and  draws 
his  conclusions.  I  venture  therefore  to  reproduce 
this  chapter  at  length  2. 


'§i.  Our  analysis  is  now  at  an  end,  and  a  very 
few  words  will  here  suffice  to  convey  an  epitomized 
recollection  of  the  numerous  facts  and  conclusions 
which  we  have  found  it  necessary  to  contemplate. 
We  first  disposed  of  the  conspicuously  absurd 
supposition  that  the  origin  of  things,  or  the  mystery 
of  existence  [i.  e.  the  fact  that  anything  exists  at 
all],  admits  of  being  explained  by  the  theory  of 
Theism  in  any  further  degree  than  by  the  theory 
of  Atheism.  Next  it  was  shown  that  the  argument 
"  Our  heart  requires  a  God  "  is  invalid,  seeing  that 
such  a  subjective  necessity,  even  if  made  out,  could 
not    be    sufficient    to    prove — or    even   to   render 

1  Published  in  Triibner's  English  a?id  Foreign  Philosophical 
Library  in  1878,  but  written  '  several  years  ago '  (preface).  *  I  have 
refrained  from  publishing  it,'  the  author  explains,  '  lest,  after  having 
done  so,  I  should  find  that  more  mature  thought  had  modified  the 
conclusions  which  the  author  sets  forth.' 

2  At  times  I  have  sought  to  make  the  argument  of  the  chapter 
more  intelligible  by  introducing  references  to  earlier  parts  of  the  book 
or  explanations  in  my  own  words.  These  latter  I  have  inserted  in 
square  brackets. 


Editor  s  Preface  n 

probable — an  objective  existence.  And  with  regard 
to  the  further  argument  that  the  fact  of  our  theistic 
aspirations  points  to  God  as  to  their  explanatory 
cause,  it  became  necessary  to  observe  that  the 
argument  could  only  be  admissible  after  the  possi- 
bility of  the  operation  of  natural  causes  [in  the 
production  of  our  theistic  aspirations]  had  been 
excluded.  Similarly  the  argument  from  the  sup- 
posed intuitive  necessity  of  individual  thought  [i.  e. 
the  alleged  fact  that  men  find  it  impossible  to  rid 
themselves  of  the  persuasion  that  God  exists]  was 
found  to  be  untenable,  first,  because,  even  if  the 
supposed  necessity  were  a  real  one,  it  would  only 
possess  an  individual  applicability ;  and  second, 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  extremely  improbable 
that  the  supposed  necessity  is  a  real  necessity  even 
for  the  individual  who  asserts  it,  while  it  is  abso- 
lutely certain  that  it  is  not  such  to  the  vast 
majority  of  the  race.  The  argument  from  the 
general  consent  of  mankind,  being  so  obviously 
fallacious  both  as  to  facts  and  principles,  was  passed 
over  without  comment ;  while  the  argument  from 
a  first  cause  was  found  to  involve  a  logical  suicide. 
Lastly,  the  argument  that,  as  human  volition  is 
a  cause  in  nature,  therefore  all  causation  is  probably 
volitional  in  character,  was  shown  to  consist  in 
a  stretch  of  inference  so  outrageous  that  the  argu- 
ment had  to  be  pronounced  worthless. 

6  §  2.  Proceeding  next  to  examine  the  less  super- 
ficial arguments  in  favour  of  Theism,  it  was  first 
shown  that  the  syllogism,  All  known  minds  are 
caused  by  an  unknown  mind  ;  our  mind  is  a  known 


12 


Thoughts  on  Religion 


mind  ;  therefore  our  mind  is  caused  by  an  unknown 
mind. — is  a  syllogism  that  is  inadmissible  for  two 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  it  does  not  account  for 
mind  (in  the  abstract)  to  refer  it  to  a  prior  mind  for 
its  origin  ;  and  therefore,  although  the  hypothesis, 
if  admitted,  would  be  an  explanation  of  known 
mind,  it  is  useless  as  an  argument  for  the  existence 
of  the  unknown  mind,  the  assumption  of  which 
forms  the  basis  of  that  explanation.  Again,  in  the 
next  place,  if  it  be  said  that  mind  is  so  far  an 
entity  sui  generis  that  it  must  be  either  self-existing 
or  caused  by  another  mind,  there  is  no  assignable 
warrant  for  the  assertion.  And  this  is  the  second 
objection  to  the  above  syllogism  ;  for  anything 
within  the  whole  range  of  the  possible  may,  for 
aught  that  we  can  tell,  be  competent  to  produce 
a  self-conscious  intelligence.  Thus  an  objector  to 
the  above  syllogism  need  not  hold  any  theory 
of  things  at  all  ;  but  even  as  opposed  to  the  definite 
theory  of  materialism,  the  above  syllogism  has 
not  so  valid  an  argumentative  basis  to  stand  upon. 
We  know  that  what  we  call  matter  and  force 
are  to  all  appearance  eternal,  while  we  have  no 
corresponding  evidence  of  a  mind  that  is  even 
apparently  eternal.  Further,  within  experience 
mind  is  invariably  associated  with  highly  differ- 
entiated collocations  of  matter  and  distributions  of 
force,  and  many  facts  go  to  prove,  and  none  to  nega-. 
tive,  the  conclusion  that  the  grade  of  intelligence 
invariably  depends  upon,  or  at  least  is  associated 
with,  a  corresponding  grade  of  cerebral  development. 
There  is  thus  both  a  qualitative  and  a  quantitative 


Editor  5  Preface  13 

relation  between  intelligence  and  cerebral  organ- 
isation.    And  if  it  is  said  that  matter  and  motion 
cannot  produce  consciousness  because  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  they  should,  we  have  seen  at  some 
length  that  this  is  no  conclusive  consideration  as 
applied  to  a  subject  of  a  confessedly  transcendental 
nature,  and  that  in  the  present  case  it  is  particularly 
inconclusive,  because,  as  it  is  speculatively  certain 
that  the  substance  of  mind  must  be  unknowable, 
it   seems  a  priori  probable  that,  whatever  is  the 
cause  of  the  unknowable  reality,  this  cause  should 
be   more  difficult  to  render  into  thought  in  that 
relation     than     would     some    other    hypothetical 
substance  which  is  imagined  as  more  akin  to  mind. 
And  if  it  is  said  that  the  more  conceivable  cause 
is  the  more  probable  cause,  we  have  seen  that  it 
is  in  this  case  impossible  to  estimate  the  validity 
of  the   remark.     Lastly,   the   statement   that   the 
cause   must   contain    actually   all    that   its   effects 
can  contain,  was  seen  to  be  inadmissible  in  logic 
and  contradicted  by  everyday  experience  ;    while 
the  argument  from  the  supposed  freedom  of  the  will 
and  the  existence  of  the  moral  sense  was  negatived 
both  deductively  by  the  theory  of  evolution,  and 
inductively    by    the     doctrine     of    utilitarianism.' 
The  theory  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  indeed 
at  this  stage  of  thought  utterly  untenable l ;    the 
evidence  is  overwhelming  that  the  moral  sense  is 
the  result  of  a  purely  natural  evolution2,  and  this 
result,  arrived  at  on  general  grounds,  is  confirmed 
with  irresistible  force  by  the  account  of  our  human 
1  p.  24.  3  p.  28. 


14  Thoughts  on  Religion 

conscience  which  is  supplied  by  the  theory  of 
utilitarianism,  a  theory  based  on  the  widest  and 
most  unexceptionable  of  inductions l.  '  On  the 
whole,  then,  with  regard  to  the  argument  from 
the  existence  of  the  human  mind,  we  were  com- 
pelled to  decide  that  it  is  destitute  of  any 
assignable  weight,  there  being  nothing  more  to 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  our  mind  has  been 
caused  by  another  mind,  than  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  has  been  caused  by  anything  else  what- 
soever. 

'  §  3.  With  regard  to  the  argument  from  Design, 
it  was  observed  that  Mill's  presentation  of  it  [in 
his  Essay  on  Theisin\  is  merely  a  resuscitation  of 
the  argument  as  presented  by  Paley,  Bell,  and 
Chalmers.  And  indeed  we  saw  that  the  first- 
named  writer  treated  this  whole  subject  with 
a  feebleness  and  inaccuracy  very  surprising  in 
him  ;  for  while  he  has  failed  to  assign  anything 
i  like  due  weight  to  the  inductive  evidence  of  or- 
ganic evolution,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  rush  into 
a  supernatural  explanation  of  biological  phenomena. 
Moreover,  he  has  failed  signally  in  his  analysis 
of  the  Design  argument,  seeing  that,  in  common 
with  all  previous  writers,  he  failed  to  observe  that 
it  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  know  the  relations 
in  which  the  supposed  Designer  stands  to  the 
Designed, — much  less  to  argue  from  the  fact  that 
the  Supreme  Mind,  even  supposing  it  to  exist, 
caused  the  observable  products  by  any  particular 
intellectual  process.  In  other  words,  all  advocates 
1  p.  28. 


Editor  s  Preface  15 

of  the  Design  argument  have  failed  to  perceive 
that,  even  if  we  grant  nature  to  be  due  to  a  creating 
Mind,  still  we  have  no  shadow  of  a  right  to  con- 
clude that  this  Mind  can  only  have  exerted  its 
creative  power  by  means  of  such  and  such  cogi- 
tative operations.  How  absurd,  therefore,  must 
it  be  to  raise  the  supposed  evidence  of  such 
cogitative  operations  into  evidences  of  the  existence 
of  a  creating  Mind !  If  a  theist  retorts  that  it  is, 
after  all,  of  very  little  importance  whether  or  not 
we  are  able  to  divine  the  methods  of  creation,  so 
long  as  the  facts  are  there  to  attest  that,  in  some 
way  or  other,  the  observable  phenomena  of  nature 
must  be  due  to  Intelligence  of  some  kind  as  their 
ultimate  cause,  then  I  am  the  first  to  endorse  this 
remark.  It  has  always  appeared  to  me  one  of  the 
most  unaccountable  things  in  the  history  of  specu- 
lation that  so  many  competent  writers  can  have 
insisted  upon  Design  as  an  argument  for  Theism, 
when  they  must  all  have  known  perfectly  well 
that  they  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the 
subjective  psychology  of  that  Supreme  Mind 
whose  existence  the  argument  is  adduced  to 
demonstrate.  The  truth  is,  that  the  argument 
from  teleology  must,  and  can  only,  rest  upon  the 
observable  facts  of  nature,  without  reference  to 
the  intellectual  processes  by  which  these  facts 
may  be  supposed  to  have  been  accomplished.  But, 
looking  to  the  "  present  state  of  our  knowledge," 
this  is  merely  to  change  the  teleological  argument 
in  its  gross  Paleyian  form,  into  the  argument  from 
the  ubiquitous  operation  of  general  laws.' 


16  Thoughts  on  Religion 

'  §  4.'  This  argument  was  thus *  stated  in  contrast 
with  the  argument  from  design.  '  The  argument 
from  design  says,  there  must  be  a  God,  because 
such  and  such  an  organic  structure  must  have  been 
due  to  such  and  such  an  intellectual  process.  The 
argument  from  general  laws  says,  There  must  be 
a  God,  because  such  and  such  an  organic  structure 
must  in  some  way  or  other  have  been  ultimately 
due  to  intelligence.'  Every  structure  exhibits  with 
more  or  less  of  complexity  the  principle  of  order ; 
it  is  related  to  all  other  things  in  a  universal  order. 
This  universality  of  order  renders  irrational  the 
hypothesis  of  chance  in  accounting  for  the  universe. 
1  Let  us  think  of  the  supreme  causality  as  we 
may,  the  fact  remains  that  from  it  there  emanates 
a  directive  influence  of  uninterrupted  consistency, 
on  a  scale  of  stupendous  magnitude  and  exact  pre- 
cision worthy  of  our  highest  conceptions  of  deity  V 
The  argument  was  developed  in  the  words  of  Pro- 
fessor Baden  Powell.  '  That  which  requires  reason 
and  thought  to  understand  must  be  itself  thought 
and  reason.  That  which  mind  alone  can  investi- 
gate or  express  must  be  itself  mind.  And  if  the 
highest  conception  attained  is  but  partial,  then 
the  mind  and  reason  studied  is  greater  than  the 
mind  and  reason  of  the  student.  If  the  more  it 
is  studied  the  more  vast  and  complex  is  the  ne- 
cessary connection  in  reason  disclosed,  then  the 
more  evident  is  the  vast  extent  and  compass  of  the 
reason  thus  partially  manifested  and  its  reality  as 
existing  in  the  immutably  connected  order  of  objects 


Editor  5  Preface  17 

examined,  independently  of  the  mind  of  the  investi- 
gator.' This  argument  from  the  universal  Kosmos 
has  the  advantage  of  being  wholly  independent  of 
the  method  by  which  things  came  to  be  what  they 
are.  It  is  unaffected  by  the  acceptance  of  evolution. 
Till  quite  recently  it  seemed  irrefutable  x. 

'  But  nevertheless  we  are  constrained  to  acknow- 
ledge that  its  apparent  power  dwindles  to  nothing  in 
view  of  the  indisputable  fact  that,  if  force  and  matter 
have  been  eternal,  all  and  every  natural  law  must 
have  resulted  by  way  of  necessary  consequence.  .  .  . 
It  does  not  admit  of  one  moment's  questioning  that 
it  is  as  certainly  true  that  all  the  exquisite  beauty 
and  melodious  harmony  of  nature  follows  necessarily 
as  inevitably  from  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter  as  it  is  certainly  true  that 
force  is  persistent  or  that  matter  is  extended  or  im- 
penetrable2. ...  It  will  be  remembered  that  I  dwelt 
at  considerable  length  and  with  much  earnestness 
upon  this  truth,  not  only  because  of  its  enormous 
importance  in  its  bearing  upon  our  subject,  but  also 
because  no  one  has  hitherto  considered  it  in  that 
relation.'  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  the  coherence 
and  correspondence  of  the  macrocosm  of  the  universe 
with  the  microcosm  of  the  human  mind  can  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  fact  that  the  human  mind  is  only 
one  of  the  productsof  general  evolution,  its  subjective 
relations  necessarily  reflectingthose  external  relations 
of  which  they  themselves  are  the  product 3. 

'  §  5.  The  next  step,  however,  was  to  mitigate  the 
severity  of  the  conclusion  that  was  liable  to  be  formed 

1  p-  50.  2  P-  63.  3  pp.  5s  ff. 

B 


18  Thoughts  on  Religion 

upon  the  utter  and  hopeless  collapse  of  all  the  pos- 
sible arguments  in  favour  of  Theism.  Having  fully 
demonstrated  that  there  is  no  shadow  of  a  positive 
argument  in  support  of  the  theistic  theory,  there 
.  arose  the  danger  thatsome  persons  might  erroneously 
conclude  that  for  this  reason  the  theistic  theory  must 
be  untrue.  It  therefore  became  necessary  to  point 
out,  that  although,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  nature  does 
not  require  an  Intelligent  Cause  to  account  for  any 
of  her  phenomena,  yet  it  is  possible  that,  if  we  could 
see  farther,  we  should  see  that  nature  could  not  be 
what  she  is  unless  she  had  owed  her  existence  to  an 
Intelligent  Cause.  Or,  in  other  words,  the  proba- 
bility there  is  that  an  Intelligent  Cause  is  unneces- 
sary to  explain  any  of  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
is  only  equal  to  the  probability  there  is  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  force  is  everywhere 
and  eternally  true. 

'As  a  final  step  in  our  analysis,  therefore,  we  alto- 
gether quitted  the  region  of  experience,  and  ignoring 
even  the  very  foundations  of  science,  and  so  all  the 
most  certain  of  relative  truths,  we  carried  the  discus- 
sion into  the  transcendental  region  of  purely  formal 
considerations.  And  here  we  laid  down  the  canon, 
"that  the  value  of  any  probability,  in  its  last  analysis,  is 
determined  by  the  number,  the  importance,  and  the 
defmiteness  of  the  relations  known,  as  compared  with 
those  of  the  relations  unknown ;"  and,  consequently, 
that  in  cases  where  the  unknown  relations  are  more 
numerous, more  important, ormore  indefinite  than  are 
the  known  relations,  the  value  of  our  inference  varies 
inversely  as  the  difference  in  these  respects  between 


Editor  s  Preface  19 

the  relations  compared.  From  which  canon  it 
followed,  that  as  the  problem  of  Theism  is  the  most 
ultimate  of  all  problems,  and  so  contains  in  its  un- 
known relations  all  that  is  to  man  unknown  and 
unknowable,  these  relations  must  be  pronounced 
the  most  indefinite  of  all  relations  that  it  is  possible 
for  man  to  contemplate  ;  and,  consequently,  that 
although  we  have  here  the  entire  range  of  experience 
from  which  to  argue,  we  are  unable  to  estimate  the 
real  value  of  any  argument  whatsoever.  The  un- 
known relations  in  our  attempted  induction  being 
wholly  indefinite,  both  in  respect  of  their  number 
and  importance,  as  compared  with  the  known 
relations,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  any 
definite  probability  either  for  or  against  the  being  of 
I  a  God.  Therefore,  although  it  is  true  that,  so  far 
as  human  science  can  penetrate  or  human  thought 
infer,  we  can  perceive  no  evidence  of  God,  yet  we 
have  no  right  on  this  account  to  conclude  that  there 
is  no  God.  The  probability,  therefore,  that  nature 
is  devoid  of  Deity,  while  it  is  of  the  strongest  kind 
if  regarded  scientifically — amounting,  in  fact,  to 
a  scientific  demonstration, — is  nevertheless  wholly 
worthless  if  regarded  logically.  Although  it  is 
as  true  as  is  the  fundamental  basis  of  all  science 
and  of  all  experience  that,  if  there  is  a  God,  His 
existence,  considered  as  a  cause  of  the  universe,  is 
superfluous,  it  may  nevertheless  be  true  that,  if  there 
had  never  been  a  God,  the  universe  could  never  have 
existed. 

'  Hence  these  formal  considerations  proved  con- 
clusively that,  no  matter  how  great  the  probability 
B  2 


20  Thoughts  on  Religion 

of  Atheism  might  appear  to  be  in  a  relative  sense, 
we  have  no  means  of  estimating  such  probability 
in  an  absolute  sense.  From  which  position  there 
emerged  the  possibility  of  another  argument  in 
favour  of  Theism — or  rather  let  us  say,  of  a  re- 
appearance of  the  teleological  argument  in  another 
form.  For  it  may  be  said,  seeing  that  these  formal 
considerations  exclude  legitimate  reasoning  either 
for  or  against  Deity  in  an  absolute  sense,  while 
they  do  not  exclude  such  reasoning  in  a  relative 
sense,  if  there  yet  remain  any  theistic  deductions 
which  may  properly  be  drawn  from  experience, 
these  may  now  be  adduced  to  balance  the  atheistic 
deductions  from  the  persistence  of  force.  For 
although  the  latter  deductions  have  clearly  shown 
the  existence  of  Deity  to  be  superfluous  in  a 
scientific  sense,  the  formal  considerations  in  question 
have  no  less  clearly  opened  up  beyond  the  sphere 
of  science  a  possible  locus  for  the  existence  of 
Deity ;  so  that  if  there  are  any  facts  supplied  by 
experience  for  which  the  atheistic  deductions  appear 
insufficient  to  account,  we  are  still  free  to  account 
for  them  in  a  relative  sense  by  the  hypothesis  of 
Theism.  And,  it  may  be  urged,  we  do  find  such 
an  unexplained  residuum  in  the  correlation  of 
general  laws  in  the  production  of  cosmic  harmony. 
It  signifies  nothing,  the  argument  may  run,  that 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  methods  whereby 
the  supposed  Mind  operates  in  producing  cosmic 
harmony  ;  nor  does  it  signify  that  its  operation 
must  now  be  relegated  to  a  super-scientific  province. 
What  does  signify  is  that,  taking  a  general  view 


Editor's  Preface  21 

of  nature,  we  find  it  impossible  to  conceive  of  the 
extent  and  variety  of  her  harmonious  processes  as 
other  than  products  of  intelligent  causation.  Now 
this  sublimated  form  of  the  teleological  argument, 
it  will  be  remembered,  I  denoted  a  metaphysical 
teleology,  in  order  sharply  to  distinguish  it  from 
all  previous  forms  of  that  argument,  which,  in 
contradistinction  I  denoted  scientific  teleologies. 
And  the  distinction,  it  will  be  remembered,  con- 
sisted in  this — that  while  all  previous  forms  of 
teleology,  by  resting  on  a  basis  which  was  not 
beyond  the  possible  reach  of  science,  laid  themselves 
open  to  the  possibility  of  scientific  refutation,  the 
metaphysical  system  of  teleology,  by  resting  on 
a  basis  which  is  clearly  beyond  the  possible  reach 
of  science,  can  never  be  susceptible  of  scientific 
refutation.  And  that  this  metaphysical  system  of 
teleology  does  rest  on  such  a  basis  is  indisputable ; 
for  while  it  accepts  the  most  ultimate  truths  of 
which  science  can  ever  be  cognizant — viz.  the 
persistence  of  force  and  the  consequently  necessary 
genesis  of  natural  law, — it  nevertheless  maintains 
that  the  necessity  of  regarding  Mind  as  the  ultimate 
cause  of  things  is  not  on  this  account  removed  ; 
and,  therefore,  that  if  science  now  requires  the 
operation  of  a  Supreme  Mind  to  be  posited  in 
a  super-scientific  sphere,  then  in  a  super-scientific 
sphere  it  ought  to  be  posited.  No  doubt  this 
hypothesis  at  first  sight  seems  gratuitous,  seeing 
that,  so  far  as  science  can  penetrate,  there  is  no 
need  of  any  such  hypothesis  at  all— cosmic  harmony 
resulting   as    a   physically  necessary   consequence 


22  Thoughts  on  Religion 

from  the  combined  action  of  natural  laws,  which  in 
turn  result  as  a  physically  necessary  consequence 
of  the  persistence  of  force  and  the  primary  qualities 
of  matter.  But  although  it  is  thus  indisputably 
true  that  metaphysical  teleology  is  wholly  gratuitous 
if  considered  scientifically,  it  may  not  be  true  that 
it  is  wholly  gratuitous  if  considered  psychologically. 
In  other  words,  if  it  is  more  conceivable  that  Mind 
should  be  the  ultimate  cause  of  cosmic  harmony 
than  that  the  persistence  of  force  should  be  so,  then 
it  is  not  irrational  to  accept  the  more  conceivable 
hypothesis  in  preference  to  the  less  conceivable 
one,  provided  that  the  choice  is  made  with  the 
diffidence  which  is  required  by  the  considerations 
adduced  in  Chapter  V  [especially  the  Canon  of 
probability  laid  down  in  the  second  paragraph  of  this 
section,  §  5]. 

'I  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  hypothesis  of 
metaphysical  teleology,  although  in  a  physical 
sense  gratuitous,  may  be  in  a  psychological  sense 
legitimate.  But  as  against  the  fundamental  position 
on  which  alone  this  argument  can  rest — viz.  the 
position  that  the  fundamental  postulate  of  Atheism 
is  more  inconceivable  than  is  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  Theism — we  have  seen  two  important 
objections  to  lie. 

'  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  sense  in  which  the 
word  "  inconceivable  "  is  here  used  is  that  of  the 
impossibility  of  framing  realizable  relations  in  the 
thought ;  not  that  of  the  impossibility  of  framing 
abstract  relations  in  thought.  In  the  same  sense, 
though    in    a   lower   degree,    it    is    true    that    the 


Editor  s  Preface  23 

complexity  of  the  human  organization  and  its 
functions  is  inconceivable ;  but  in  this  sense  the 
word  £i  inconceivable"  has  much  less  weight  in  an 
argument  than  it  has  in  its  true  sense.  And,  without 
waiting  again  to  dispute  (as  we  did  in  the  case  of 
the  speculative  standing  of  Materialism)  how  far 
even  the  genuine  test  of  inconceivability  ought  to 
be  allowed  to  make  against  an  inference  which 
there  is  a  body  of  scientific  evidence  to  substantiate, 
we  went  on  to  the  second  objection  against  this 
fundamental  position  of  metaphysical  teleology. 
This  objection,  it  will  be  remembered,  was,  that  it 
is  as  impossible  to  conceive  of  cosmic  harmony  as 
an  effect  of  Mind  [i.  e.  Mind  being  what  we  know  it 
in  experience  to  be],  as  it  is  to  conceive  of  it  as  an 
effect  of  mindless  evolution.  The  argument  from 
inconceivability,  therefore,  admits  of  being  turned 
with  quite  as  terrible  an  effect  on  Theism,  as  it  can 
possibly  be  made  to  exert  on  Atheism. 

1  Hence  this  more  refined  form  of  teleology  which 
we  are  considering,  and  which  we  saw  to  be  the 
last  of  the  possible  arguments  in  favour  of  Theism, 
is  met  on  its  own  ground  by  a  very  crushing 
opposition  :  by  its  metaphysical  character  it  has 
escaped  the  opposition  of  physical  science,  only 
to  encounter  a  new  opposition  in  the  region  of 
pure  psychology  to  which  it  fled.  As  a  conclu- 
sion to  our  whole  inquiry,  therefore,  it  devolved 
on  us  to  determine  the  relative  magnitudes  of 
these  opposing  forces.  And  in  doing  this  we 
first  observed  that,  if  the  supporters  of  meta- 
physical teleology  objected  a  priori  to  the  method 


24  Thoughts  on  Religion 

whereby  the  genesis  of  natural  law  was  deduced 
from  the  datum  of  the  persistence  of  force,  in 
that  this  method  involved  an  unrestricted  use 
of  illegitimate  symbolic  conceptions  ;  then  it  is 
no  less  open  to  an  atheist  to  object  a  priori  to 
the  method  whereby  a  directing  Mind  was  inferred 
from  the  datum  of  cosmic  harmony,  in  that  this 
method  involved  the  postulation  of  an  unknowable 
cause, — and  this  of  a  character  which  the  whole 
history  of  human  thought  has  proved  the  human 
mind  to  exhibit  an  overweening  tendency  to 
postulate  as  the  cause  of  natural  phenomena. 
On  these  grounds,  therefore,  I  concluded  that, 
so  far  as  their  respective  standing  a  priori  is 
concerned,  both  theories  may  be  regarded  as 
about  equally  suspicious.  And  similarly  with  regard 
to  their  standing  a  posteriori ;  for  as  both  theories 
require  to  embody  at  least  one  infinite  term,  they 
must  each  alike  be  pronounced  absolutely  incon- 
ceivable. But,  finally,  if  the  question  were  put 
to  me  which  of  the  two  theories  I  regarded  as 
the  more  rational,  I  observed  that  this  is  a  question 
which  no  one  man  can  answer  for  another.  For  as 
the  test  of  absolute  inconceivability  is  equally 
destructive  of  both  theories,  if  a  man  wishes  to 
choose  between  them,  his  choice  can  only  be 
determined  by  what  I  have  designated  relative 
inconceivability — i.e.  in  accordance  with  the  verdict 
given  by  his  individual  sense  of  probability  as 
determined  by  his  previous  habit  of  thought.  And 
forasmuch  as  the  test  of  relative  inconceivability 
may  be  held  in  this  matter   legitimately  to    vary 


Editor  s  Preface  25 

with  the  character  of  the  mind  which  applies  it, 
the  strictly  rational  probability  of  the  question 
to  which  it  is  applied  varies  in  like  manner.  Or 
otherwise  presented,  the  only  alternative  for  any 
man  in  this  matter  is  either  to  discipline  himself 
into  an  attitude  of  pure  scepticism,  and  thus  to 
refuse  in  thought  to  entertain  either  a  probability 
or  an  improbability  concerning  the  existence  of 
a  God  ;  or  else  to  incline  in  thought  towards  an 
affirmation  or  a  negation  of  God,  according  as  his 
previous  habits  of  thought  have  rendered  such 
an  inclination  more  facile  in  the  one  direction  than 
in  the  other.  And  although,  under  such  circum- 
stances, I  should  consider  that  man  the  more 
rational  who  carefully  suspended  his  judgement, 
I  conclude  that  if  this  course  is  departed  from, 
neither  the  metaphysical  teleologist  nor  the  scien- 
tific atheist  has  any  perceptible  advantage  over 
the  other  in  respect  of  rationality.  For  as  the 
formal  conditions  of  a  metaphysical  teleology  are 
undoubtedly  present  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
formal  conditions  of  a  speculative  atheism  are  as 
undoubtedly  present  on  the  other,  there  is  thus 
in  both  cases  a  logical  vacuum  supplied  wherein 
the  pendulum  of  thought  is  free  to  swing  in  which- 
ever direction  it  may  be  made  to  swing  by  the 
momentum  of  preconceived  ideas. 

'  §  6.  Such  is  the  outcome  of  our  investigation, 
and  considering  the  abstract  nature  of  the  subject, 
the  immense  divergence  of  opinion  which  at 
the  present  time  is  manifested  with  regard  to  it, 
as   well    as    the   confusing   amount   of  good,    bad 


26  Thoughts  on  Religion 

and  indifferent  literature  on  both  sides  of  the 
controversy  which  is  extant ; — considering  these 
things,  I  do  not  think  that  the  result  of  our  inquiry 
can  be  justly  complained  of  on  the  score  of  its 
lacking  precision.  At  a  time  like  the  present, 
when  traditional  beliefs  respecting  Theism  are 
so  generally  accepted,  and  so  commonly  concluded 
as  a  matter  of  course  to  have  a  large  and  valid 
basis  of  induction  whereon  to  rest,  I  cannot  but 
feel  that  a  perusal  of  this  short  essay,  by  showing 
how  very  concise  the  scientific  status  of  the  subject 
really  is,  will  do  more  to  settle  the  minds  of  most 
readers  as  to  the  exact  standing  at  the  present 
time  of  all  the  probabilities  of  the  question,  than 
could  a  perusal  of  all  the  rest  of  the  literature  upon 
this  subject.  And,  looking  to  the  present  condition 
of  speculative  philosophy,  I  regard  it  as  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  have  clearly  shown  that  the 
advance  of  science  has  now  entitled  us  to  assert, 
without  the  least  hesitation,  that  the  hypothesis 
of  Mind  in  nature  is  as  certainly  superfluous  to 
account  for  any  of  the  phenomena  of  nature,  as 
the  scientific  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  force 
and  the  indestructibility  of  matter  is  certainly  true. 
'  On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  is  inclined  to 
complain  that  the  logical  aspect  of  the  question 
has  not  proved  itself  so  unequivocally  definite  as 
has  the  scientific,  I  must  ask  him  to  consider  that, 
in  any  matter  which  does  not  admit  of  actual 
demonstration,  some  margin  must  of  necessity  be 
left  for  variations  of  individual  opinion.  And,  if  he 
bears  this  consideration  in  mind,  I  feel  sure  that 


Editor  s  Preface  27 

he  cannot  properly  complain  of  my  not  having 
done  my  utmost  in  this  case  to  define  as  sharply 
as  possible  the  character  and  the  limits  of  this 
margin. 

'  §  7.  And  now,  in  conclusion,  I  feel  it  is  desirable 
to  state  that  any  antecedent  bias  with  regard  to 
Theism  which  I  individually  possess  is  un- 
questionably on  the  side  of  traditional  beliefs.  It 
is  therefore  with  the  utmost  sorrow  that  I  find 
myself  compelled  to  accept  the  conclusions  here 
worked  out ;  and  nothing  would  have  induced  me 
to  publish  them,  save  the  strength  of  my  conviction 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  member  of  society 
to  give  his  fellows  the  benefit  of  his  labours  for 
whatever  they  may  be  worth.  Just  as  I  am  con- 
fident that  truth  must  in  the  end  be  the  most 
profitable  for  the  race,  so  I  am  persuaded  that 
every  individual  endeavour  to  attain  it,  provided 
only  that  such  endeavour  is  unbiassed  and  sincere, 
ought  without  hesitation  to  be  made  the  common 
property  of  all  men,  no  matter  in  what  direction 
the  results  of  its  promulgation  may  appear  to  tend. 
And  so  far  as  the  ruination  of  individual  happiness 
is  concerned,  no  one  can  have  a  more  lively  per- 
ception than  myself  of  the  possibly  disastrous 
tendency  of  my  work.  So  far  as  I  am  individually 
concerned,  the  result  of  this  analysis  has  been  to 
show  that,  whether  I  regard  the  problem  of  Theism 
on  the  lower  plane  of  strictly  relative  probability, 
or  on  the  higher  plane  of  purely  formal  consider- 
ations, it  equally  becomes  my  obvious  duty  to 
stifle  all  belief  of  the  kind  which  I  conceive  to  be 


28  Thoughts  on  Religion 

the  noblest,  and  to  discipline  my  intellect  with 
regard  to  this  matter  into  an  attitude  of  the  purest 
scepticism.  And  forasmuch  as  I  am  far  from 
being  able  to  agree  with  those  who  affirm  that  the 
twilight  doctrine  of  the  "  new  faith  "  is  a  desirable 
substitute  for  the  waning  splendour  of  "  the  old," 
I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess  that  with  this  virtual 
negation  of  God  the  universe  to  me  has  lost  its 
soul  of  loveliness ;  and  although  from  henceforth 
the  precept  to"  work  while  it  is  day"  will  doubtless 
but  gain  an  intensified  force  from  the  terribly 
intensified  meaning  of  the  words  that  "the  night 
cometh  when  no  man  can  work,"  yet  when  at  times 
I  think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of  the  appalling 
contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory  of  that  creed 
which  once  was  mine,  and  the  lonely  mystery  of 
existence  as  now  I  find  it, — at  such  times  I  shall 
ever  feel  it  impossible  to  avoid  the  sharpest  pang 
of  which  my  nature  is  susceptible.  For  whether 
it  be  due  to  my  intelligence  not  being  sufficiently 
advanced  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  age, 
or  whether  it  be  due  to  the  memory  of  those 
sacred  associations  which  to  me  at  least  were  the 
sweetest  that  life  has  given,  I  cannot  but  feel  that 
for  me,  and  for  others  who  think  as  I  do,  there 
is  a  dreadful  truth  in  those  words  of  Hamilton, — 
Philosophy  having  become  a  meditation,  not 
merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation,  the  precept 
know  thyself  has  become  transformed  into  the 
terrific  oracle  to  CEdipus — 

"  Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what  thou  art." ' 


Editor  s  Preface  29 

This  analysis  will  have  been  at  least  sufficient 
to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  general  argument  of  the 
Candid  Examination  and  of  its  melancholy  con- 
clusions. What  will  most  strike  a  somewhat 
critical  reader  is  perhaps  (1)  the  tone  of  certainty, 
and  (2)  the  belief  in  the  almost  exclusive  right  of 
the  scientific  method  in  the  court  of  reason. 

As  evidence  of  (1)  I  would  adduce  the  following 
brief  quotations  : — 

P.  xi.  'Possible  errors  in  reasoning  apart,  the 
rational  position  of  Theism  as  here  defined  must 
remain  without  material  modification  as  long  as 
our  intelligence  remains  human.' 

P.  24.  '  I  am  quite  unable  to  understand  how 
any  one  at  the  present  day,  and  with  the  most 
moderate  powers  of  abstract  thinking,  can  possibly 
bring  himself  to  embrace  the  theory  of  Free-will.' 

P.  64.  '  Undoubtedly  we  have  no  alternative 
but  to  conclude  that  the  hypothesis  of  mind  in 
nature  is  now  logically  proved  to  be  as  certainly 
superfluous  as  the  very  basis  of  all  science  is 
certainly  true.  There  can  no  longer  be  any  more 
doubt  that  the  existence  of  a  God  is  wholly  un- 
necessary to  explain  any  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  universe,  than  there  is  doubt  that  if  I  leave  go 
of  my  pen  it  will  fall  upon  the  table.' 

As  evidence  of  (2)  I  would  adduce  from  the 
preface — 

'  To    my   mind,    therefore,   it   is    impossible    to 


30  Thoughts  on  Religion 

resist  the  conclusion  that,  looking  to  this  undoubted 
pre-eminence  of  the  scientific  methods  as  ways  to 
truth,  whether  or  not  there  is  a  God,  the  question 
as  to  his  existence  is  both  more  morally  and 
more  reverently  contemplated  if  we  regard  it 
purely  as  a  problem  for  methodical  analysis  to 
solve,  than  if  we  regard  it  in  any  other  light' 

It  is  in  respect  both  of  (i)  and  (2)  that  the  change 
in  Romanes'  thought  as  exhibited  in  his  later 
Notes  is  most  conspicuous  1. 

At  what  date  George  Romanes'  mind  began  to 
react  from  the  conclusions  of  the  Candid  Examina- 
tion I  cannot  say.  But  after  a  period  of  ten  years — 
in  his  Rede  lecture  of  1885 2— we  find  his  frame 
of  mind  very  much  changed.  This  lecture,  on 
Mind  and  Motion,  consists  of  a  severe  criticism 
of  the    materialistic    account   of    mind.     On    the 

1  With  reference  to  the  views  and  arguments  of  the  Candid 
Examination,  it  may  be  interesting  to  notice  here  in  detail  that 
George  Romanes  (i)  came  to  attach  much  more  importance  to  the  sub- 
jective religious  needs  and  intuitions  of  the  human  spirit  (pp.  131  ff.); 

(2)  perceived  that  the  subjective  religious  consciousness  can  be 
regarded  objectively  as   a   broad  human  phenomenon  (pp.  147  f.)  ; 

(3)  criticized  his  earlier  theory  of  causation  and  returned  towards  the 
theory  that  all  causation  is  volitional  (pp.  102,  118)  ;  (4)  definitely 
repudiated  the  materialistic  account  of  the  origin  of  mind  (pp.  30,  31)  ; 
(5)  returned  to  the  use  of  the  expression  'the  argument  from 
design,'  and  therefore  presumably  abandoned  his  strong  objection 
to  it ;  (6)  '  saw  through '  Herbert  Spencer's  refutation  of  the  wider 
teleology  expressed  by  Baden  Powell,  and  felt  the  force  of  the 
teleology  again  (p.  72) ;  (7)  recognized  that  the  scientific  objections 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  are  not  finally  valid  (p.  128). 

2  See  Contemporary  Review,  July  1885,  p.  93. 


Editor  s  Preface  31 

other  hand  c  spiritualism ' — or  the  theory  which 
would  suppose  that  mind  is  the  cause  of  motion — 
is  pronounced  from  the  point  of  view  of  science  not 
impossible  indeed  but  'unsatisfactory,'  and  the 
more  probable  conclusion  is  found  in  a  '  monism ' 
like  Bruno's — according  to  which  mind  and  motion 
are  co-ordinate  and  probably  co-extensive  aspects 
of  the  same  universal  fact — a  monism  which  may 
be  called  Pantheism,  but  may  also  be  regarded  as 
an  extension  of  contracted  views  of  Theism  K  The 
position  represented  by  this  lecture  may  be  seen 
sufficiently  from  its  conclusion  : — 

1  If  the  advance  of  natural  science  is  now  steadily 
leading  us  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no 
motion  without  mind,  must  we  not  see  how  the 
independent  conclusion  of  mental  science  is  thus 
independently  confirmed — the  conclusion,  I  mean, 
that  there  is  no  being  without  knowing?  To  me, 
at  least,  it  does  appear  that  the  time  has  come 
when  we  may  begin,  as  it  were  in  a  dawning  light, 

1  In  some  '  Notes'  of  the  Summer  of  1893  I  find  the  statement, 
'The  result  (of  philosophical  inquiry)  has  been  that  in  his  millen- 
nial contemplation  and  experience  man  has  attained  certainty  with 
regard  to  certain  aspects  of  the  world  problem,  no  less  secure  than 
that  which  he  has  gained  in  the  domain  of  physical  science,  e.g. 

Logical  priority  of  mind  over  matter. 

Consequent  untenability  of  materialism. 

Relativity  of  knowledge. 

The  order  of  nature,  conservation  of  energy  and  indestructibility 
of  matter  within  human  experience,  the  principle  of  evolution 
and  survival  of  the  fittest.' 


32  Thoughts  on  Religion 

to  see  that  the  study  of  Nature  and  the  study  of 
Mind  are  meeting  upon  this  greatest  of  possible 
truths.  And  if  this  is  the  case — if  there  is  no 
motion  without  mind,  no  being  without  knowing — 
shall  we  infer,  with  Clifford,  that  universal  being 
is  mindless,  or  answer  with  a  dogmatic  negative 
that  most  stupendous  of  questions, — Is  there  know- 
ledge with  the  Most  High?  If  there  is  no  motion 
without  mind,  no  being  without  knowing,  may 
we  not  rather  infer,  with  Bruno,  that  it  is  in  the 
medium  of  mind,  and  in  the  medium  of  knowledge, 
we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being  ? 

'This,  I  think,  is  the  direction  in  which  the 
inference  points,  if  we  are  careful  to  set  out  the 
logical  conditions  with  complete  impartiality.  But 
the  ulterior  question  remains,  whether,  so  far  as 
science  is  concerned,  it  is  here  possible  to  point  any 
inference  at  all :  the  whole  orbit  of  human  know- 
ledge may  be  too  narrow  to  afford  a  parallax  for 
measurements  so  vast.  Yet  even  here,  if  it  be  true 
that  the  voice  of  science  must  thus  of  necessity 
speak  the  language  of  agnosticism,  at  least  let  us 
see  to  it  that  the  language  is  pure 1 ;  let  us  not 
tolerate  any  barbarisms  introduced  from  the  side  of 
aggressive  dogma.  So  shall  we  find  that  this  new 
grammar  of  thought  does  not  admit  of  any  con- 
structions radically  opposed  to  more  venerable 
ways  of  thinking ;  even  if  we  do  not  find  that  the 
often-quoted  words  of  its  earliest  formulator  apply 
with  special  force  to  its  latest  dialects — that  if  a 

1  For  the  meaning  of  'pure  '  agnosticism  see  below,  p.  107  ff. 


Editor's  Preface  33 

little  knowledge  of  physiology  and  a  little  know- 
ledge of  psychology  dispose  men  to  atheism,  a 
deeper  knowledge  of  both,  and,  still  more,  a  deeper 
thought  upon  their  relations  to  one  another,  will 
lead  men  back  to  some  form  of  religion,  which 
if  it  be  more  vague,  may  also  be  more  worthy  than 
that  of  earlier  days.' 

Some  time  before  1889  three  articles  were 
written  for  the  Nineteenth  Century  on  the  Influence 
of  Science  upon  Religion.  They  were  never  pub- 
lished, for  what  reason  I  am  not  able  to  ascertain. 
But  I  have  thought  it  worth  while  to  print  the  first 
two  of  them  as  a  '  first  part '  of  this  volume,  both 
because  they  contain — written  in  George  Romanes' 
own  name — an  important  criticism  upon  the  Candid 
Examination  which  he  had  published  anonymously, 
and  also  because,  with  their  entirely  sceptical  result, 
they  exhibit  very  clearly  a  stage  in  the  mental 
history  of  their  author.  The  antecedents  of  these 
papers  those  who  have  read  this  Introduction 
will  now  be  in  a  position  to  understand.  What 
remains  to  be  said  by  way  of  further  introduction 
to  the  Notes  had  better  be  reserved  till  later. 

C.  G. 


PART   I 


C    2 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE 
UPON  RELIGION. 


I. 


I  PROPOSE  to  consider,  in  a  series  of  three  papers, 
the  influence  of  Science  upon  Religion.  In  doing 
this  I  shall  seek  to  confine  myself  to  the  strictly 
rational  aspect  of  the  subject,  without  travelling 
into  any  matters  of  sentiment.  Moreover,  I  shall 
aim  at  estimating  in  the  first  instance  the  kind 
and  degree  of  influence  which  has  been  exerted 
by  Science  upon  Religion  in  the  past,  and  then 
go  on  to  estimate  the  probable  extent  of  this 
influence  in  the  future.  The  first  two  papers  will 
be  devoted  to  the  past  and  prospective  influence 
of  Science  upon  Natural  Religion,  while  the  third 
will  be  devoted  to  the  past  and  prospective  influence 
of  Science  upon  Revealed  Religion  1. 

Few  subjects  have  excited  so  much  interest  of 
late  years  as  that  which  I  thus  mark  out  for  dis- 
cussion.    This  can  scarcely  be  considered  a  matter 

1  [The  third  paper  is  not  published  because  Romanes'  views 
on  the  relation  between  science  and  faith  in  Revealed  Religion  arc- 
better  and  more  maturely  expressed  in  the  Notes. — Ed.] 


38  Thoughts  on  Religion 

of  surprise,  seeing  that  the  influence  in  question 
is  not  only  very  direct,  but  also  extremely  im- 
portant from  every  point  of  view.  For  generations 
and  for  centuries  in  succession  Religion  maintained 
an  undisputed  sway  over  men's  minds — if  not 
always  as  a  practical  guide  in  matters  of  conduct, 
at  least  as  a  regulator  of  belief.  Even  among  the 
comparatively  few  who  in  previous  centuries  pro- 
fessedly rejected  Christianity,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  their  intellectual  conceptions  were 
largely  determined  by  it :  for  Christianity  being 
then  the  only  court  of  appeal  with  reference  to 
all  these  conceptions,  even  the  few  minds  which 
were  professedly  without  its  jurisdiction  could 
scarcely  escape  its  indirect  influence  through  the 
minds  of  others.  But  as  side  by  side  with  the 
venerable  institution  a  new  court  of  appeal  was 
gradually  formed,  we  cannot  wonder  that  it  should 
have  come  to  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  a  rival 
to  the  old — more  especially  as  the  searching 
methods  of  its  inquiry  and  the  certain  character 
of  its  judgements  were  much  more  in  consonance 
with  the  requirements  of  an  age  disposed  to  scep- 
ticism. And  this  spirit  of  rivalry  is  still  further 
fostered  by  the  fact  that  Science  has  unquestionably 
exerted  upon  Religion  what  Mr.  Fiske  terms  a 
'purifying  influence.'  That  is  to  say,  not  only 
are  the  scientific  methods  of  inquiry  after  truth 
more  congenial  to  sceptical  minds  than  are  the 
religious  methods  (which  may  broadly  be  defined 
as  accepting  truth  on  authority),  but  the  results 
of  the  former  have  more  than  once  directly  con- 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    39 

tradicted  those  of  the  latter  :  science  has  in  several 
cases  incontestably  demonstrated  that  religious 
teaching  has  been  wrong  as  to  matters  of  fact. 
Further  still,  the  great  advance  of  natural  know- 
ledge which  has  characterized  the  present  century, 
has  caused  our  ideas  upon  many  subjects  connected 
with  philosophy  to  undergo  a  complete  meta- 
morphosis. A  well-educated  man  of  the  present 
day  is  absolutely  precluded  from  regarding  some 
of  the  Christian  dogmas  from  the  same  intellectual 
standpoint  as  his  forefathers,  even  though  he  may 
still  continue  to  accept  them  in  some  other  sense. 
In  short,  our  whole  key  of  thinking  or  tone  of 
thought  having  been  in  certain  respects  changed, 
we  can  no  longer  anticipate  that  in  these  respects 
it  should  continue  to  harmonize  with  the  unalterable 
system  of  theology. 

Such  I  conceive  to  be  the  ways  in  which 
Science  has  exerted  her  influence  upon  Religion, 
and  it  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  potency 
of  their  united  effect.  No  one  can  read  even 
a  newspaper  without  perceiving  how  great  this 
effect  has  been.  On  the  one  hand,  sceptics  are 
triumphantly  confident  that  the  light  of  dawning 
knowledge  has  begun  finally  to  dispel  the  darkness 
of  superstition,  while  religious  persons,  on  the 
other  hand,  tremble  to  think  what  the  future, 
if  judged  by  the  past,  is  likely  to  bring  forth. 
On  both  sides  we  have  free  discussion,  strong 
language,  and  earnest  canvassing.  Year  by  year 
stock  is  taken,  and  year  by  year  the  balance  is 
found  to  preponderate  in  favour  of  Science. 


40  Thoughts  on  Religion 

This  being  the  state  of  things  of  the  present 
.time,  I  think  that  with  the  experience  of  the  kind 
and  decree  of  influence  which  Science  has  exerted 

o 

upon  Religion  in  the  past,  we  have  material  enough 
whereby  to  estimate  the  probable  extent  of  such 
influence  in  the  future.  This,  therefore,  I  shall 
endeavour  to  do  by  seeking  to  define,  on  general 
principles,  the  limits  within  which  it  is  antecedently 
possible  that  the  influence  in  question  can  be 
exercised.  But  in  order  to  do  this,  it  is  necessary 
to  begin  by  estimating  the  kind  and  degree  of  the 
influence  which  has  been  exerted  by  Science  upon 
Religion  in  the  past. 

Thus  much  premised,  we  have  in  the  first  place 
to  define  the  essential  nature  both  of  Science  and 
of  Religion  :  for  this  is  clearly  the  first  step  in  an 
analysis  which  has  for  its  object  an  estimation 
of  the  actual  and  possible  effects  of  one  of  these 
departments  of  thought  upon  the  other. 

Science,  then,  is  essentially  a  department  of 
thought  having  exclusive  reference  to  the  Proxi- 
mate. More  particularly,  it  is  a  department  of 
thought  having  for  its  object  the  explanation 
of  natural  phenomena  by  the  discovery  of  natural 
(or  proximate)  causes.  In  so  far  as  Science  ventures 
to  trespass  beyond  this  her  only  legitimate  domain, 
and  seeks  to  interpret  natural  phenomena  by  the 
immediate  agency  of  supernatural  or  ultimate 
causes,  in  that  degree  has  she  ceased  to  be  physical 
science,  and  become  ontological  speculation.  The 
truth  of  this  statement  has  now  been  practically 
recognized    by  all   scientific  workers  ;    and    terms 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    41 

describing  final  causes  have  been  banished  from 
their  vocabulary  in  astronomy,  chemistry,  geology, 
biology,  and  even  in  psychology. 

Religion,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  department 
of  thought  having  no  less  exclusive  reference  to 
the  Ultimate.  More  particularly,  it  is  a  depart- 
ment of  thought  having  for  its  object  a  self-conscious 
and  intelligent  Being,  which  it  regards  as  a  Personal 
God,  and  the  fountain-head  of  all  causation.  I  am, 
of  course,  aware  that  the  term  Religion  has  been 
of  late  years  frequently  used  in  senses  which  this 
definition  would  not  cover ;  but  I  conceive  that 
this  only  shows  how  frequently  the  term  in  question 
has  been  abused.  To  call  any  theory  of  things 
a  Religion  which  does  not  present  any  belief  in 
any  form  of  Deity,  is  to  apply  the  word  to  the 
very  opposite  of  that  which  it  has  hitherto  been 
used  to  denote.  To  speak  of  the  Religion  of  the 
Unknowable,  the  Religion  of  Cosmism,  the  Religion 
of  Humanity,  and  so  forth,  where  the  personality 
of  the  First  Cause  is  not  recognized,  is  as  unmeaning 
as  it  would  be  to  speak  of  the  love  of  a  triangle, 
or  the  rationality  of  the  equator.  That  is  to  say, 
if  any  meaning  is  to  be  extracted  from  the  terms 
at  all,  it  is  only  to  be  so  by  using  them  in  some 
metaphorical  sense.  We  may,  for  instance,  say 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  Religion  of  Humanity, 
because  we  may  begin  by  deifying  Humanity  in 
our  own  estimation,  and  then  go  on  to  worship 
our  ideal.  But  by  thus  giving  Humanity  the  name 
of  Deity  we  are  not  really  creating  a  new  religion  : 
we    are    merely  using  a  metaphor,  which  may  or 


42  Thoughts  on  Religion 

may  not  be  successful  as  a  matter  of  poetic  diction, 
but  which  most  assuredly  presents  no  shred  of 
value  as  a  matter  of  philosophical  statement.  In- 
deed, in  this  relation  it  is  worse  than  valueless : 
it  is  misleading.  Variations  or  reversals  in  the 
meanings  of  words  are  not  of  uncommon  occurrence 
in  the  ordinary  growth  of  languages  ;  but  it  is  not 
often  that  we  find,  as  in  this  case,  the  whole 
meaning  of  a  term  intentionally  and  gratuitously 
changed  by  the  leaders  of  philosophical  thought. 
Humanity,  for  example,  is  an  abstract  idea  of  our 
own  making  :  it  is  not  an  object  any  more  than 
the  equator  is  an  object.  Therefore,  if  it  were 
possible  to  construct  a  religion  by  this  curious 
device  of  metaphorically  ascribing  to  Humanity 
the  attributes  of  Deity,  it  ought  to  be  as  logically 
possible  to  construct,  let  us  say,  a  theory  of 
brotherly  regard  towards  the  equator,  by  meta- 
phorically ascribing  to  it  the  attributes  of  man. 
The  distinguishing  features  of  any  theory  which 
can  properly  be  termed  a  Religion,  is  that  it  should 
refer  to  the  ultimate  source,  or  sources,  of  things : 
and  that  it  should  suppose  this  source  to  be  of  an 
objective,  intelligent,  and  personal  nature.  To 
apply  the  term  Religion  to  any  other  theory  is 
merely  to  abuse  it. 

From  these  definitions,  then,  it  appears  that  the 
aims  and  methods  of  Science  are  exclusively  con- 
cerned with  the  ascertaining  and  the  proof  of  the 
proximate  How  of  things  and  processes  physical : 
her  problem  is,  as  Mill  states  it,  to  discover  what 
are  the  fewest  number  of  (phenomenal)  data  which, 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    43 

being  granted,  will  explain  the  phenomena  of 
experience.  On  the  other  hand,  Religion  is  not  in 
any  way  concerned  with  causation,  further  than  to 
assume  that  all  things  and  all  processes  are 
ultimately  due  to  intelligent  personality.  Religion 
is  thus,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says,  '  an  a  priori  theory  of 
the  universe' — to  which,  however,  we  must  add, '  and 
a  theory  which  assumes  intelligent  personality  as 
the  originating  source  of  the  universe.'  Without 
this  needful  addition,  a  religion  would  be  in  no 
way  logically  distinguished  from  a  philosophy. 

From  these  definitions,  then,  it  clearly  follows 
that  in  their  purest  forms,  Science  and  Religion 
really  have  no  point  of  logical  contact.  Only  if 
Science  could  transcend  the  conditions  of  space 
and  time,  of  phenomenal  relativity,  and  of  all 
human  limitations,  only  then  could  Science  be  in 
a  position  to  touch  the  supernatural  theory  of 
Religion.  But  obviously,  if  Science  could  do  this, 
she  would  cease  to  be  Science.  In  soaring  above 
the  region  of  phenomena  and  entering  the  tenuous 
aether  of  noumena,  her  present  wings,  which  we 
call  her  methods,  would  in  such  an  atmosphere  be 
no  longer  of  any  service  for  movement.  Out  of 
time,  out  of  place,  and  out  of  phenomenal  relation, 
Science  could  no  longer  exist  as  such. 

On  the  other  hand,  Religion  in  its  purest  form  is 
equally  incompetent  to  affect  Science.  For,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  Religion  as  such  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  phenomenal  sphere :  her  theory  of 
ontology  cannot  have  any  reference  to  the  How 
of   phenomenal    causation.     Hence   it    is    evident 


44  Thoughts  on  Religion 

that,  as  in  their  purest  or  most  ideal  forms  they 
move  in  different  mental  planes,  Science  and 
Religion  cannot  exhibit  interference. 

Thus  far  the  remarks  which  I  have  made  apply 
equally  to  all  forms  of  Religion,  as  such,  whether 
actual  or  possible,  and  in  so  far  as  the  Religion  is 
pure.  But  it  is  notorious  that  until  quite  recently 
Religion  did  exercise  upon  Science,  not  only  an 
influence,  but  an  overpowering  influence.  Belief 
in  divine  agency  being  all  but  universal,  while  the 
methods  of  scientific  research  had  not  as  yet  been 
distinctly  formulated,  it  was  in  previous  generations 
the  usual  habit  of  mind  to  refer  any  natural 
phenomenon,  the  physical  causation  of  which  had 
not  been  ascertained,  to  the  more  or  less  imme- 
diate causal  action  of  the  Deity.  But  we  now  see 
that  this  habit  of  mind  arose  from  a  failure  to 
distinguish  between  the  essentially  distinct  char- 
acters of  Science  and  Religion  as  departments  of 
thought,  and  therefore  that  it  was  only  so  far  as 
the  Religion  of  former  times  was  impure — or 
mixed  with  the  ingredients  of  thought  which 
belong  to  Science — that  the  baleful  influence  in 
question  was  exerted.  The  gradual,  successive, 
and  now  all  but  total  abolition  of  final  causes  from 
the  thoughts  of  scientific  men,  to  which  allusion 
has  already  been  made,  is  merely  an  expression  of 
the  fact  that  scientific  men  as  a  body  have  come 
fully  to  recognize  the  fundamental  distinction  be- 
tween Science  and  Religion  which  I  have  stated. 

Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  another  way,  scientific 
men  as  a  body— and,   indeed,   all  persons  whose 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    45 

ideas  on  such  matters  are  abreast  of  the  times — 
perceive  plainly  enough  that  a  religious  explanation 
of  any  natural  phenomenon  is,  from  a  scientific 
point  of  view,  no  explanation  at  all.  For  a 
religious  explanation  consists  in  referring  the 
observed  phenomenon  to  the  First  Cause — i.e.  to 
merge  that  particular  phenomenon  in  the  general 
or  final  mystery  of  things.  A  scientific  explana- 
tion, on  the  other  hand,  consists  in  referring  the 
observed  phenomenon  to  its  physical  causes,  and 
in  no  case  can  such  an  explanation  entertain  the 
hypothesis  of  a  final  cause  without  abandoning  its 
character  as  a  scientific  explanation.  For  example, 
if  a  child  brings  me  a  flower  and  asks  why  it  has 
such  a  curious  form,  bright  colour,  sweet  perfume, 
and  so  on,  and  if  I  answer,  Because  God  made  it 
so,  I  am  not  really  answering  the  child's  question : 
I  am  merely  concealing  my  ignorance  of  Nature 
under  a  guise  of  piety,  and  excusing  my  indolence 
in  the  study  of  botany.  It  was  the  appreciation 
of  this  fact  that  led  Mr.  Darwin  to  observe  in  his 
Origin  of  Species  that  the  theory  of  creation  does 
not  serve  to  explain  any  of  the  facts  with  which  it 
is  concerned,  but  merely  re-states  these  facts  as 
they  are  observed  to  occur.  That  is  to  say,  by 
thus  merging  the  facts  as  observed  into  the  final 
mystery  of  things,  we  are  not  even  attempting  to 
explain  them  in  any  scientific  sense :  for  it  would 
be  obviously  possible  to  get  rid  of  the  necessity 
of  thus  explaining  any  natural  phenomenon  what- 
soever by  referring  it  to  the  immediate  causal 
action  of  the    Deity.     If  any   phenomenon   were 


46  Thoughts  on  Religion 

actually  to  occur  which  did  proceed  from  the 
immediate  causal  action  of  the  Deity,  then  ex 
Jirpot/iesi,  there  would  be  no  physical  causes  to 
investigate,  and  the  occupation  of  Othello,  in  the 
person  of  a  man  of  science,  would  be  gone.  Such 
a  phenomenon  would  be  miraculous,  and  therefore 
from  its  very  nature  beyond  the  reach  of  scientific 
investigation. 

Properly  speaking,  then,  the  religious  theory  of 
final  causes  does  not  explain  any  of  the  phenomena 
of  Nature :  it  merely  re-states  the  phenomena  as 
observed — or,  if  we  prefer  so  to  say,  it  is  itself  an 
ultimate  and  universal  explanation  of  all  possible 
phenomena  taken  collectively.  For  it  must  be 
admitted  that  behind  all  possible  explanations  of  a 
scientific  kind,  there  lies  a  great  inexplicable,  which 
just  because  of  its  ultimate  character,  cannot  be 
merged  into  anything  further — that  is  to  say, 
cannot  be  explained.  '  It  is  what  it  is,'  is  all  that 
we  can  say  of  it :  'I  am  that  I  am '  is  all  that  it 
could  say  of  itself.  And  it  is  in  referring  phe- 
nomena to  this  inexplicable  source  of  physical 
causation  that  the  theory  of  Religion  essentially 
consists.  The  theory  of  Science,  on  the  other  hand, 
consists  in  the  assumption  that  there  is  always 
a  practically  endless  chain  of  physical  causation  to 
investigate — i.e.  an  endless  series  of  phenomena  to 
be  explained.  So  that,  if  we  define  the  process  of 
explanation  as  the  process  of  referring  observed 
phenomena  to  their  adequate  causes,  we  may  say 
that  Religion,  by  the  aid  of  a  general  theory  of 
things    in   the  postulation   of  an  intelligent   First 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    47 

Cause,  furnishes  to  her  own  satisfaction  an  ultimate 
explanation  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  and 
therefore  is  not  concerned  with  any  of  those  proxi- 
mate explanations  or  discovery  of  second  causes, 
which  form  the  exclusive  subject-matter  of  Science. 
In  other  words,  we  recur  to  the  definitions  already 
stated,  to  the  effect  that  Religion  is  a  department 
of  thought  having,  as  such,  exclusive  reference  to 
the  Ultimate,  while  Science  is  a  department  of 
thought  having,  as  such,  no  less  exclusive  reference 
to  the  Proximate.  When  these  two  departments 
of  thought  overlap,  interference  results,  and  we 
find  confusion.  Therefore  it  was  that  when  the 
religious  theory  of  final  causes  intruded  upon  the 
field  of  scientific  inquiry,  it  was  passing  beyond  its 
logical  domain ;  and  seeking  to  arrogate  the  function 
of  explaining  this  or  that  phenomenon  in  detail, 
it  ceased  to  be  a  purely  religious  theory,  while  at 
the  same  time  and  for  the  same  reason  it  blocked 
the  way  of  scientific  progress 1. 

This  remark  serves  to  introduce  one  of  the  chief 
topics  with  which  I  have  to  deal — viz.  the  doctrine 
of  Design  in  Nature,  and  thus  the  whole  question 
of  Natural  Religion  in  its  relation  to  Natural 
Science.     In  handling  this  topic  I  shall  endeavour 

1  To  avoid  misunderstanding  I  may  observe  that  in  the  above 
definitions  I  am  considering  Religion  and  Science  under  the  condi- 
tions in  which  they  actually  exist.  It  is  conceivable  that  under 
other  conditions  these  two  departments  of  thought  might  not  be  so 
sharply  separated.  Thus,  for  instance,  if  a  Religion  were  to  appear 
carrying  a  revelation  to  Science  upon  matters  of  physical  causation, 
such  a  Religion  (supposing  the  revelation  were  found  by  experiment 
to  be  true)  ought  to  be  held  to  exercise  upon  Science  a  strictly 
legitimate  influence. 


48  Thoughts  on  Religion 

to  take  as  broad  and  deep  a  view  as  I  can  of  the 
present  standing  of  Natural  Religion,  without 
waiting  to  show  step  by  step  the  ways  and  means 
by  which  it  has  been  brought  into  this  position,  by 
the  influence  of  Science. 

In    the    earliest    dawn    of    recorded     thought, 
teleology   in  some  form  or  another  has  been  the 
most  generally  accepted  theory  whereby  the  order 
of  Nature  is  explained.     It  is  not,   however,   my 
object  in  this  paper  to   trace  the   history  of  this 
theory  from  its  first  rude  beginnings  in  Fetishism 
to  its  final  development  in  Theism.     I  intend  to 
devote  myself  exclusively  to  the  question  as  to  the 
present  standing  of  this  theory,  and  I  allude  to  its 
past  history  only  in   order  to  examine  the  state- 
ment which  is  frequently  made,  to  the  effect  that 
its   general  prevalence  in  all  ages  and  among  all 
peoples  of  the  world  lends  to  it  a  certain  degree  of 
'  antecedent  credibility.'     With    reference   to   this 
point,  I  should  say,  that,  whether  or  not  the  order 
of  Nature  is  due  to  a  disposing  Mind,  the  hypo- 
thesis  of   mental   agency   in    Nature — or,   as    the 
Duke    of    Argyll    terms    it,    the    hypothesis     of 
'  anthropopsychism  ' — must  necessarily  have   been 
the  earliest  hypothesis.     What  we  find  in  Nature 
is  the  universal  prevalence  of  causation,  and  long 
before   the  no  less  universal  equivalency  between 
causes  and  effects — i.e.  the  universal  prevalence  of 
natural  law — became  a  matter  of  even  the  [vaguest] 
appreciation,  the  general  fact  that  nothing  happens 
without  a  cause  of  some  kind  was  fully  recognized. 
Indeed,  the  recognition  of  this  fact  is  not  only  pre- 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   49 

sented  by  the  lowest  races  of  the  present  day,  but, 
as  I  have  myself  given  evidence  to  show,  likewise 
by  animals  and  infants  \  And  therefore,  it  appears 
to  me  probable  that  those  psychologists  are  right 
who  argue  that  the  idea  of  cause  is  intuitive,  in  the 
same  sense  that  the  ideas  of  space  and  time  are 
intuitive — i.  e.  the  instinctive  or  [inherited]  effect  of 
ancestral  experience. 

Now  if  it  is  thus  a  matter  of  certainty  that  the 
recognition  of  causality  in  Nature  is  co-extensive 
with,  and  even  anterior  to,  the  human  mind,  it 
appears  to  me  no  less  certain  that  the  first  attempt 
at  assigning  a  cause  of  this  or  that  observed  event 
in  Nature — i.  e.  the  first  attempts  at  a  rational 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  Nature — must 
have  been  of  an  anthropopsychic  kind.  No  other 
explanation  was,  as  it  were,  so  ready  to  hand  as 
that  of  projecting  into  external  Nature  the  agency 
of  volition,  which  was  known  to  each  individual  as 
the  apparent  fountain-head  of  causal  activity  so  far 
as  he  and  his  neighbours  were  concerned.  To 
reach  this  most  obvious  explanation  of  causality  in 
Nature,  it  did  not  require  that  primitive  man 
should  know,  as  we  know,  that  the  very  conception 
of  causality  arises  out  of  our  sense  of  effort  in 
voluntary  action  ;  it  only  required  that  this  should 
be  the  fact,  and  then  it  must  needs  follow  that 
when  any  natural  phenomenon  was  thought  about 
at  all  with  reference  to  its  causality,  the  cause 
inferred  should  be  one  of  a  psychical  kind.  I  need 
not  wait   to  trace  the  gradual  integration  of  this 

1  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals,  pp.  155-8. 
D 


50  Thoughts  on  Religion 

anthropopsychic  hypothesis  from  its  earliest  and 
most  diffused  form  of  what  we  may  term  poly- 
psychism  (wherein  the  causes  inferred  were  almost 
as  personally  numerous  as  the  effects  contem- 
plated), through  polytheism  (wherein  many  effects 
of  a  like  kind  were  referred  to  one  deity,  who,  as 
it  were,  took  special  charge  over  that  class),  up  to 
monotheism  (wherein  all  causation  is  gathered  up 
into  the  monopsychism  of  a  single  personality) :  it  is 
enough  thus  briefly  to  show  that  from  first  to  last  the 
hypothesis  of  anthropopsychism  is  a  necessary  phase 
of  mental  evolution  under  existing  conditions,  and 
this  whether  or  not  the  hypothesis  is  true. 

Thus  viewed,  I  do  not  think  that  '  the  general 
consent  of  mankind '  is  a  fact  of  any  argumentative 
weight  in  favour  of  the  anthropopsychic  theory — so 
far,  I  mean,  as  the  matter  of  causation  is  con- 
cerned— whether  this  be  in  fetishism  or  in  the 
teleology  of  our  own  day :  the  general  consent  of 
mankind  in  the  larger  question  of  theism  (where 
sundry  other  matters  besides  causation  fall  to  be 
considered)  does  not  here  concern  us.  Indeed,  it 
appears  to  me  that  if  we  are  to  go  back  to  the 
savages  for  any  guarantee  of  our  anthropopsychic 
theory,  the  pledge  which  we  receive  is  of  worse 
than  no  value.  As  well  might  we  conclude  that  a 
match  is  a  living  organism,  because  this  is  to  the 
mind  of  a  savage  the  most  obvious  explanation  of 
its  movements,  as  conclude  on  precisely  similar 
grounds  that  our  belief  in  teleology  derives  any 
real  support  from  any  of  the  more  primitive  phases 
of  anthropopsychism. 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   51 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  in  seeking  to 
estimate  the  evidence  of  design  in  Nature,  we  must 
as  it  were  start  de  novo,  without  reference  to 
anterior  beliefs  upon  the  subject  The  question  is 
essentially  one  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  all 
the  latest  knowledge  that  we  possess,  and  by  the 
best  faculties  of  thinking  that  we  (the  heirs  of  all 
the  ages)  are  able  to  bring  to  bear  upon  it.  I  shall, 
therefore,  only  allude  to  the  history  of  anthropo- 
psychism  in  so  far  as  I  may  find  it  necessary  to  do 
so  for  the  sake  of  elucidating  my  argument. 

And  here  it  is  needful  to  consider  first  what  Paley 
called  'the  state  of  the  argument'  before  the 
Darwinian  epoch.  This  is  clearly  and  tersely 
presented  by  Paley  in  his  classical  illustration  of 
finding  a  watch  upon  a  heath — an  illustration  so 
well  known  that  I  need  not  here  re-state  it.  I  will 
merely  observe,  therefore,  that  it  conveys,  as  it 
were  in  one's  watch-pocket,  the  whole  of  the 
argument  from  design ;  and  that  it  is  not  in 
my  opinion  open  to  the  stricture  which  was 
passed  upon  it  by  Mill  where  he  says, — 'The 
inference  would  not  be  from  marks  of  design,  but 
because  I  already  know  by  direct  experience  that 
watches  are  made  by  men.'  This  appears  to  me 
to  miss  the  whole  point  of  Paley 's  meaning,  for 
there  would  be  obviously  no  argument  at  all  unless 
he  be  understood  to  mean  that  the  evidence  of 
design  which  is  supposed  to  be  afforded  by 
examination  of  the  watch,  is  supposed  to  be 
afforded  by  this  examination  only,  and  not  from 
any  of  the  direct  knowledge  alluded  to  by  Mill. 
D  2 


52  Thoughts  on  Religion 

For  the  purposes  of  the  illustration,  it  must  clearly 
be  assumed  that  the  finder  of  the  watch  has  no 
previous  or  direct  knowledge  touching  the  manu- 
facture of  watches.  Apart  from  this  curious 
misunderstanding,  Mill  was  at  one  with  Paley 
upon  the  whole  subject. 

Again,  it  is  no  real  objection  to  the  argument 
or  illustration  to  say,  as  we  often  have  said,  that  it 
does  not  account  for  the  watchmaker.  The  object 
of  the  argument  from  design  is  to  prove  the  ex- 
istence of  a  designer:  not  to  explain  that  existence. 
Indeed,  it  would  be  suicidal  to  the  whole  argument 
in  its  relation  to  Theism,  if  the  possibility  of 
any  such  explanation  were  entertained  ;  for  such 
a  possibility  could  only  be  entertained  on  the 
supposition  that  the  being  of  the  Deity  admits 
of  being  explained — i.e.  that  the  Deity  is  not 
ultimate. 

Lastly,  the  argument  is  precisely  the  same 
as  that  which  occurs  in  numerous  passages  of 
Scripture  and  in  theological  writings  all  over  the 
world  down  to  the  present  time.  That  is  to  say, 
everywhere  in  organic  nature  we  meet  with  in- 
numerable adaptations  of  means  to  ends,  which 
in  very  many  cases  present  a  degree  of  refinement 
and  complexity  in  comparison  with  which  the 
adaptations  of  means  to  ends  in  a  watch  are  but 
miserable  and  rudimentary  attempts  at  mechanism. 
No  one  can  know  so  well  as  the  modern  biologist 
in  what  an  immeasurable  degree  the  mechanisms 
which  occur  in  such  profusion  in  nature  surpass, 
in  every  form  of  excellence,  the  highest  triumphs 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   53 

of  human  invention.  Hence  at  first  sight  it  does 
unquestionably  appear  that  we  could  have  no 
stronger  or  better  evidence  of  purpose  than  is  thus 
afforded.  In  the  words  of  Paley :  'arrangement, 
disposition  of  parts,  subserviency  of  means  to  an 
end,  relation  of  instruments  to  a  use,  imply  the 
presence  of  intelligence  and  mind.' 

But  next  the  question  arises,  Although  such 
things  certainly  [may]  1  imply  the  presence  of  mind 
as  their  explanatory  cause,  are  we  entitled  to 
assume  that  there  can  be  in  nature  no  other  cause 
competent  to  produce  these  effects?  This  is  a  ques- 
tion which  never  seems  to  have  occurred  to  Paley, 
Bell,  Chalmers,  or  indeed  to  any  of  the  natural 
theologians  up  to  the  time  of  Darwin.  This,  I  think, 
is  a  remarkable  fact,  because  the  question  is  one 
which,  as  a  mere  matter  of  logical  form,  appears 
to  lie  so  much  upon  the  surface.  But  nevertheless 
the  fact  remains  that  natural  theologians,  so  far 
as  I  know  without  exception,  were  satisfied  to 
assume  as  an  axiom  that  mechanism  could  have 
no  cause  other  than  that  of  a  designing  mind ; 
and  therefore  their  work  was  restricted  to  tracing 
out  in  detail  the  number  and  the  excellency  of  the 
mechanisms  which  were  to  be  met  with  in  nature. 
It  is,  however,  obvious  that  the  mere  accumulation 
of  such  cases  can  have  no  real,  or  logical,  effect  upon 
the  argument.  The  mechanisms  which  we  en- 
counter in  nature  are  so  amazing  in  their  perfections, 
that  the  attentive  study  of  any  one  of  them  would 
(as  Paley  in  his  illustration  virtually,  though  not 

1  [I  have  put  'may' in  place  of 'do 'for  the  sake  of  argument. — Ed.] 


54  Thoughts  on  Religion 

expressly,  contends)  be  sufficient  to  carry  the 
whole  position,  if  the  assumption  be  conceded 
that  mechanism  can  only  be  due  to  mind.  There- 
fore the  argument  is  not  really,  or  logically, 
strengthened  by  the  mere  accumulation  of  any 
number  of  special  cases  of  mechanism  in  nature, 
all  as  mechanisms  similar  in  kind.  Let  us  now 
consider  this  argument. 

If  we  are  disposed  to  wonder  why  natural 
theologians  prior  to  the  days  of  Darwin  were 
content  to  assume  that  mind  is  the  only  possible 
cause  of  mechanism,  I  think  we  have  a  ready- 
answer  in  the  universal  prevalence  of  their  belief 
in  special  creation.  For  I  think  it  is  unquestionable 
that,  upon  the  basis  of  this  belief,  the  assumption 
is  legitimate.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  start  with  the 
belief  that  all  species  of  plants  and  animals  were 
originally  introduced  to  the  complex  conditions 
of  their  several  environments  suddenly  and  ready 
made  (in  some  such  manner  as  watches  are  turned 
out  from  a  manufactory),  then  I  think  we  are 
reasonably  entitled  to  assume  that  no  conceivable 
cause,  other  than  that  of  intelligent  purpose,  could 
possibly  be  assigned  in  explanation  of  the  effects. 
It  is,  of  course,  needless  to  observe  that  in  so 
far  as  this  previous  belief  in  special  creation  was 
thus  allowed  to  affect  the  argument  from  design, 
that  argument  became  an  instance  of  circular 
reasoning.  And  it  is,  perhaps,  equally  needless  to 
observe  that  the  mere  fact  of  evolution,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  special  creation — or  of  the  gradual 
development  of  living  mechanisms,  as  distinguished 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    55 

from  their  sudden  and  ready-made  apparition — 
would  not  in  any  way  affect  the  argument  from 
design,  unless  it  could  be  shown  that  the  process 
of  evolution  admits  the  possibility  of  some  othcr 
cause  which  is  not  admitted  by  the  hypothesis 
of  special  creation.  But  this  is  precisely  what 
is  shown  by  the  theory  of  evolution  as  propounded 
by  Darwin.  That  is  to  say,  the  theory  of  the 
gradual  development  of  living  mechanisms  pro- 
pounded by  Darwin,  is  something  more  than 
a  theory  of  gradual  development  as  distinguished 
from  sudden  creation.  It  is  this,  but  it  is  also 
a  theory  of  a  purely  scientific  kind  which  seeks 
to  explain  the  purely  physical  causes  of  that 
development.  And  this  is  the  point  where  natural 
science  begins  to  exert  her  influence  upon  natural 
theology — or  the  point  where  the  theory  of 
evolution  begins  to  affect  the  theory  of  design. 
As  this  is  a  most  important  part  of  our  subject, 
and  one  upon  which  an  extraordinary  amount  of 
confusion  at  the  present  time  prevails,  I  shall  in 
my  next  paper  carefully  consider  it  in  all  its 
bearings. 


IL 


SUPPOSE  the  man  who  found  the  watch  upon 
a  heath  to  continue  his  walk  till  he  comes  down  to 
the  sea-shore,  and  suppose  further  that  he  is  as 
ignorant  of  physical  geography  as  he  is  of  watch- 
making. He  soon  begins  to  observe  a  number 
of  adaptations  of  means  to  ends,  which,  if  less 
refined  and  delicate  than  those  that  formed  the 
object  of  his  study  in  the  watch,  are  on  the  other 
hand  much  more  impressive  from  the  greatly 
larger  scale  on  which  they  are  displayed.  First, 
he  observes  that  there  is  a  beautiful  basin  hollowed 
out  in  the  land  for  the  reception  of  a  bay  ;  that 
the  sides  of  this  basin,  which  from  being  near  its 
opening  are  most  exposed  to  the  action  of  large 
rolling  billows,  are  composed  of  rocky  cliffs, 
evidently  in  order  to  prevent  the  further  encroach- 
ment of  the  sea,  and  the  consequent  destruction 
of  the  entire  bay ;  that  the  sides  of  the  basin, 
which  from  being  successively  situated  more  inland 
are  successively  less  and  less  exposed  to  the  action 
of  large  waves,  are  constituted  successively  of 
smaller  rocks,  passing  into  shingle,  and  eventually 
into  the  finest  sand  :  that  as  the  tides  rise  and  fall 
with  as  great  a  regularity  as  was  exhibited  by  the 
movements  of  the  watch,  the  stones  are  carefully 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    57 

separated  out  from  the  sand  to  be  arranged  in 
sloping  layers  by  themselves,  and  this  always 
with  a  most  beautiful  reference  to  the  places  round 
the  margin  of  the  basin  which  are  most  in  danger 
of  being  damaged  by  the  action  of  the  waves.  He 
would  further  observe,  upon  closer  inspection,  that 
this  process  of  selective  arrangement  goes  into 
matters  of  the  most  minute  detail.  Here,  for 
instance,  he  would  observe  a  mile  or  two  of  a 
particular  kind  of  seaweed  artistically  arranged  in 
one  long  sinuous  line  upon  the  beach  ;  there  he 
would  see  a  wonderful  deposit  of  shells  ;  in  another 
place  a  lovely  little  purple  heap  of  garnet  sand,  the 
minute  particles  of  which  have  all  been  carefully 
picked  out  from  the  surrounding  acres  of  yellow 
sand.  Again,  he  would  notice  that  the  streams 
which  come  down  to  the  bay  are  all  flowing  in 
channels  admirably  dug  out  for  the  purpose;  and, 
being  led  by  curiosity  to  investigate  the  teleology 
of  these  various  streams,  he  would  find  that  they 
serve  to  supply  the  water  which  the  sea  loses  by 
evaporation,  and  also,  by  a  wonderful  piece  of 
adjustment,  to  furnish  fresh  water  to  those  animals 
and  plants  which  thrive  best  in  fresh  water,  and 
yet  by  their  combined  action  to  carry  down 
sufficient  mineral  constituents  to  give  that  pre- 
cise degree  of  saltness  to  the  sea  as  a  whole  which 
is  required  for  the  maintenance  of  pelagic  life. 
Lastly,  continuing  his  investigations  along  this 
line  of  inquiry,  he  would  find  that  a  thousand 
different  habitats  were  all  thoughtfully  adapted 
to  the  needs  of  a  hundred  thousand  different  forms 


58  Thoughts  on  Religion 

of  life,  none  of  which  could  survive  if  these 
habitats  were  reversed.  Now,  I  think  that  our 
imaginary  inquirer  would  be  a  dull  man  if,  as  the 
result  of  all  this  study,  he  failed  to  conclude  that 
the  evidence  of  Design  furnished  by  the  marine 
bay  was  at  least  as  cogent  as  that  which  he  had 
previously  found  in  his  study  of  the  watch. 

But  there  is  this  great  difference  between  the 
two  cases.  Whereas  by  subsequent  inquiry  he 
could  ascertain  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  the  watch 
was  due  to  intelligent  contrivance,  he  could  make 
no  such  discovery  with  reference  to  the  marine 
bay:  in  the  one  case  intelligent  contrivance  as 
a  cause  is  independently  demonstrable,  while  in 
the  other  case  it  can  only  be  inferred.  What, 
then,  is  the  value  of  the  inference  ? 

If,  after  the  studies  of  our  imaginary  teleologist 
had  been  completed,  he  were  introduced  to  the 
library  of  the  Royal  Society,  and  if  he  were  then 
to  spend  a  year  or  two  in  making  himself 
acquainted  with  the  leading  results  of  modern 
science,  I  fancy  that  he  would  end  by  being  both 
a  wiser  and  a  sadder  man.  At  least  I  am  certain 
that  in  learning  more  he  would  feel  that  he  is 
understanding  less — that  the  archaic  simplicity  of 
his  earlier  explanations  must  give  place  to  a 
matured  perplexity  upon  the  whole  subject.  To 
begin  with,  he  would  now  find  that  every  one  of 
the  adjustments  of  means  to  ends  which  excited 
his  admiration  on  the  sea-coast  were  due  to 
physical  causes  which  are  perfectly  well  understood 
The  cliffs  stood  at  the  opening  of  the  bay  because 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    59 

the  sea  in  past  ages  had  encroached  upon  the 
coast-line  until  it  met  with  these  cliffs,  which  then 
opposed  its  further  progress  ;  the  bay  was  a 
depression  in  the  land  which  happened  to  be  there 
when  the  sea  arrived,  and  into  which  the  sea 
consequently  flowed  ;  the  successive  occurrence 
of  rocks,  shingle,  and  sand  was  due  to  the  actions 
of  the  waves  themselves  ;  the  segregation  of  sea- 
weeds, shells,  pebbles,  and  different  kinds  of  sand, 
was  due  to  their  different  degrees  of  specific 
gravity  ;  the  fresh-water  streams  ran  in  channels 
because  they  had  themselves  been  the  means 
of  excavating  them  ;  and  the  multitudinous  forms 
of  life  were  all  adapted  to  their  several  habitats 
simply  because  the  unsuited  forms  were  not  able 
to  live  in  them.  In  all  these  cases,  therefore,  our 
teleologist  in  the  light  of  fuller  knowledge  would 
be  compelled  to  conclude  at  least  this  much — that 
the  adaptations  which  he  had  so  greatly  admired 
when  he  supposed  that  they  were  all  due  to  con- 
trivance in  anticipation  of  the  existing  phenomena, 
cease  to  furnish  the  same  evidence  of  intelligent 
design  when  it  is  found  that  no  one  of  them 
was  prepared  beforehand  by  any  independent  or 
external  cause. 

He  would  therefore  be  led  to  conclude  that  if 
the  teleological  interpretation  of  the  facts  were 
to  be  saved  at  all,  it  could  only  be  so  by  taking 
a  much  wider  view  of  the  subject  than  was  afforded 
by  the  particular  cases  of  apparent  design  which 
at  first  appeared  so  cogent.  That  is  to  say,  he 
would  feel  that  he  must  abandon  the  supposition 


60  Thoughts  on  Religion 

of  any  special  design  in  the  construction  of  that 
particular  bay,  and  fall  back  upon  the  theory  of 
a  much  more  general  design  in  the  construction 
of  one  great  scheme  of  Nature  as  a  whole.  In 
short  he  would  require  to  dislodge  his  argument 
from  the  special  adjustments  which  in  the  first 
instance  appeared  to  him  so  suggestive,  to  those 
general  laws  of  Nature  which  by  their  united 
operation  give  rise  to  a  cosmos  as  distinguished 
from  a  chaos. 

Now  I  have  been  careful  thus  to  present  in  all  its 
more   important   details    an    imaginary    argument 
drawn  from  inorganic  nature,  because  it  furnishes 
a  complete  analogy  to  the  actual  argument  which 
is  drawn  from  organic  nature.     Without  any  ques- 
tion,  the  instances  of  apparent   design,  or  of  the 
apparently  intentional  adaptation  of  means  to  ends, 
which    we    meet     with    in     organic     nature,    are 
incomparably  more  numerous  and  suggestive  than 
anything  with  which  we  meet  in  inorganic  nature. 
But  if  once  we  find  good  reason  to  conclude  that 
the  former,  like  the  latter,  are  all  due,  not  to  the 
immediate,    special    and    prospective   action   of  a 
contriving    intelligence    (as    in    watch-making    or 
creation),    but    to    the    agency    of    secondary    or 
physical  causes  acting  under  the  influence  of  what 
we    call  general   laws,  then   it  seems  to  me  that 
no  matter  how  numerous  or  how   wonderful  the 
adaptations    of   means  to   ends   in  organic  nature 
may    be,    they   furnish    one    no    other    or   better 
evidence  of  design  than  is  furnished  by  any  of  the 
facts  of  inorganic  nature. 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    61 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  let  us  take  any  special 
case.  Paley  says,  '  I  know  of  no  better  method 
of  introducing  so  large  a  subject  than  that  of 
comparing  a  single  thing  with  a  single  thing  ;  an 
eye,  for  example,  with  a  telescope.'  He  then  goes 
on  to  point  out  the  analogies  between  these  two 
pieces  of  apparatus,  and  ends  by  asking,  '  How 
is  it  possible,  under  circumstances  of  such  close 
affinity,  and  under  the  operation  of  equal  evidence, 
to  exclude  contrivance  in  the  case  of  the  eye,  yet 
to  acknowledge  the  proof  of  contrivance  having 
been  employed,  as  the  plainest  and  clearest  of 
all  propositions  in  the  case  of  the  telescope  ? ' 

Well,  the  answer  to  be  made  is  that  only  upon 
the  hypothesis  of  special  creation  can  this  analogy 
hold  :  on  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  by  physical 
causes  the  evidence  in  the  two  cases  is  not  equal. 
For,  upon  this  hypothesis  we  have  the  eye  be- 
ginning, not  as  a  ready-made  structure  prepared 
beforehand  for  the  purposes  of  seeing,  but  as  a 
mere  differentiation  of  the  ends  of  nerves  in  the 
skin,  probably  in  the  first  instance  to  enable  them 
better  to  discriminate  changes  of  temperature. 
Pigment  having  been  laid  down  in  these  places 
the  better  to  secure  this  purpose  (I  use  teleological 
terms  for  the  sake  of  brevity),  the  nerve-ending 
begins  to  distinguish  between  light  and  darkness. 
The  better  to  secure  this  further  purpose,  the 
simplest  conceivable  form  of  lens  begins  to  appear 
in  the  shape  of  small  refractive  bodies.  Behind 
these  sensory  cells  are  developed,  forming  the 
earliest  indication  of  a  retina  presenting  a  single 


62  Thoughts  on  Religion 

layer.     And  so  on,  step  by  step,  till  we  reach  the 
eye  of  an  eagle. 

Of  course  the  teleologist  will  here  answer — 'The 
fact  of  such  a  gradual  building  up  is  no  argument 
against  design  :  whether  the  structure  appeared 
on  a  sudden  or  was  the  result  of  a  slow  elaboration, 
the  marks  of  design  in  either  case  occur  in  the 
structure  as  it  stands.'  All  of  which  is  very  true  ; 
but  I  am  not  maintaining  that  the  fact  of  a  gradual 
development  in  itself  does  affect  the  argument 
from  design.  I  am  maintaining  that  it  only  does 
so  because  it  reveals  the  possibility  (excluded  by 
the  hypothesis  of  sudden  or  special  creation)  of 
the  structure  having  been  proximately  due  to  the 
operation  of  physical  causes.  Thus,  for  the  value 
of  argument,  let  us  assume  that  natural  selection 
has  been  satisfactorily  established  as  a  cause 
adequate  to  account  for  all  these  effects.  Given 
the  facts  of  heredity,  variation,  struggle  for 
existence,  and  the  consequent  survival  of  the  fittest, 
what  follows  ?  Why  that  each  step  in  the  pro- 
longed and  gradual  development  of  the  eye  was 
brought  about  by  the  elimination  of  all  the  less 
adapted  structures  in  any  given  generation,  i.  e.  the 
selection  of  all  the  better  adapted  to  perpetuate 
the  improvement  by  heredity.  Will  the  teleologist 
maintain  that  this  selective  process  is  itself  in- 
dicative of  special  design?  If  so,  it  appears  to  me 
that  he  is  logically  bound  to  maintain  that  the  long 
line  of  seaweed,  the  shells,  the  stones  and  the  little 
heap  of  garnet  sand  upon  the  sea-coast  are  all 
equally  indicative  of  special  design.     The  general 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    63 

laws  relating  to  specific  gravity  are  at  least  of  as 
much  importance  in  the  economy  of  nature  as  are 
the  general  laws  relating  to  specific  differentiation  ; 
and  in  each  illustration  alike  we  find  the  result 
of  the  operation  of  known  physical  causes  to  be 
that  of  selection.  If  it  should  be  argued  in  reply 
that  the  selection  in  the  one  case  is  obviously 
purposeless,  while  in  the  other  it  is  as  obviously 
purposive,  I  answer  that  this  is  pure  assumption. 
It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  every 
geological  formation  on  the  face  of  the  globe  is 
either  wholly  or  in  part  due  to  the  selective  influ- 
ence of  specific  gravity,  and  who  shall  say  that  the 
construction  of  the  earth's  crust  is  a  less  important 
matter  in  the  general  scheme  of  things  (if  there  is 
such  a  scheme)  than  is  the  evolution  of  an  eye? 
Or  who  shall  say  that  because  we  see  an  ap- 
parently intentional  adaptation  of  means  to  ends 
as  the  result  of  selection  in  the  case  of  the  eye, 
there  is  no  intention  served  by  the  result  of 
selection  in  the  case  of  the  sea-weeds,  stones, 
sand,  mud  ?  For  anything  that  we  can  know  to 
the  contrary,  the  supposed  intelligence  may  take 
a  greater  delight  in  the  latter  than  in  the  former 
process. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  I  have  assumed  that 
the  physical  causes  with  which  we  are  already  ac- 
quainted are  sufficient  to  explain  the  observed 
phenomena  of  organic  nature.  But  it  clearly 
makes  no  difference  whether  or  not  this  assumption 
is  conceded,  provided  we  allow  that  the  observed 
phenomena  are  all  due  to  physical  causes  of  some 


64  Thoughts  on  Religion 

kind,  be  they  known  or  unknown.     That  is  to  say, 
in    whatever  measure  we  exclude  the  hypothesis 
of  the  direct  or  immediate  intervention  of  the  Deity 
in  organic  nature  (miracle),  in  that  measure  we  are 
reducing  the  evidence  of  design  in  organic  nature 
to  precisely  the  same  logical  position  as  that  which 
is  occupied  by  the  evidence  of  design  in  inorganic 
nature.     Hence  I  conceive  that  Mill  has  shown  a 
singular  want  of  penetration  where,  after  observing 
with  reference  to  natural  selection,  '  creative  fore- 
thought is  not  absolutely  the  only  link  by  which 
the  origin  of  the  wonderful  mechanism  of  the  eye 
may  be  connected  with  the  fact  of  sight,'  he  goes 
on  to  say,  '  leaving  this  remarkable  speculation  (i.  e. 
that    of  natural   selection)   to   whatever    fate   the 
progress  of  discovery  may  have  in  store  for  it,  in 
the   present   state  of  knowledge  the    adaptations 
in   nature   afford    a  large   balance   of  probability 
in  favour  of  creation  by  intelligence. '     I  say  this 
passage  seems  to  me  to  show  a  singular  want  of 
penetration,  and  I   say  so  because  it  appears  to 
argue   that  the  issue  lies  between  the  hypothesis 
of  special    design   and  the  hypothesis  of  natural 
selection.     But  it  does  not  do  so.    The  issue  really 
lies   between   special    design    and   natural    causes. 
Survival  of  the  fittest  is  one  of  these  causes  which 
has  been  suggested,  and  shown  by  a  large  accumu- 
lation   of  evidence  to  be  probably  a  true  cause. 
But  even  if  it  were  to  be  disproved  as  a  cause,  the 
real  argumentative  position  of  teleology  would  not 
thereby  be  effected,   unless   we  were  to  conclude 
that  there  can  be  no  other  causes  of  a  secondary 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   65 

or   physical  kind  concerned   in  the  production  of 
the  observed  adaptations. 

I  trust  that  I  have  now  made  it  sufficiently  clear 
why  I  hold  that  if  we  believe  the  reign  of  natural 
law,  or  the  operation  of  physical  causes,  to  extend 
throughout  organic  nature  in  the  same  universal 
manner  as  we  believe  this  in  the  case  of  inorganic 
nature,  then  we  can  find  no  better  evidence  of 
design  in  the  one  province  than  in  the  other.  The 
mere  fact  that  we  meet  with  more  numerous  and 
apparently  more  complete  instances  of  design  in 
the  one  province  than  in  the  other  is,  ex  hypothesi, 
merely  due  to  our  ignorance  of  the  natural  causa- 
tion in  the  more  intricate  province.  In  studying 
biological  phenomena  we  are  all  at  present  in  the 
intellectual  position  of  our  imaginary  teleologist 
when  studying  the  marine  bay  :  we  do  not  know  the 
natural  causes  which  have  produced  the  observed 
results.  But  if,  after  having  obtained  a  partial  key 
in  the  theory  of  natural  selection,  we  trust  to  the 
large  analogy  which  is  afforded  by  the  simpler 
provinces  of  Nature,  and  conclude  that  physical 
causes  arc  everywhere  concerned  in  the  production 
of  organic  structures,  then  we  have  concluded  that 
any  evidence  of  design  which  these  structures 
present  is  of  just  the  same  logical  value  as  that 
which  we  may  attach  to  the  evidence  of  design  in 
inorganic  nature.  If  it  should  still  be  urged  that 
the  adaptations  met  with  in  organic  nature  are 
from  their  number  and  unity  much  more  suggestive 
of  design  than  anything  met  with  in  inorganic 
nature,  I  must  protest  that  this  is  to  change  the 

E 


66  Thoughts  on  Religion 

ground  of  argument  and  to  evade  the  only  point  in 
dispute.  No  one-  denies  the  obvious  fact  stated  : 
the  only  question  is  whether  any  number  and  any 
quantity  of  adaptations  in  any  one  department  of 
nature  afford  other  or  better  evidence  of  design 
than  is  afforded  by  adaptations  in  other  depart- 
ments, when  all  departments  alike  are  supposed  to 
be  equally  the  outcome  of  physical  causation.  And 
this  question  I  answer  in  the  negative,  because 
we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  extent  to 
which  the  process  of  natural  selection,  or  any 
other  physical  cause,  is  competent  to  produce 
adaptations  of  the  kind  observed. 

Thus  to  take  another  instance  of  apparent  design 
from  inorganic  nature,  it  has  been  argued  that  the 
constitution  of  the  atmosphere  is  clearly  designed 
for  the  support  of  vegetable  and  animal  life.  But 
before  this  conclusion  can  be  established  upon  the 
facts,  it  must  be  shown  that  life  could  exist  under 
no  other  material  conditions  than  those  which  are 
furnished  to  it  by  the  elementary  constituents  of 
the  atmosphere.  This,  however,  it  is  clearly  im- 
possible to  show.  For  anything  that  we  can  know 
to  the  contrary,  life  may  actually  be  existing  upon 
some  of  the  other  heavenly  bodies  under  totally 
different  conditions  as  to  atmosphere ;  and  the 
fact  that  on  this  planet  all  life  has  come  to  be 
dependent  upon  the  gases  which  occur  in  our 
atmosphere,  may  be  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  it 
was  only  the  forms  of  life  which  were  able  to  adapt 
themselves  (through  natural  selection  or  other 
physical   causes)   to  these    particular  gases  which 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   67 

could  possibly  be  expected  to  occur — just  as  in 
matters  of  still  smaller  detail,  it  was  only  those 
forms  of  life  that  were  suited  to  their  several 
habitats  in  the  marine  bay,  which  could  possibly 
be  expected  to  be  found  in  these  several  situations. 
Now,  if  a  set  of  adjustments  so  numerous  and  so 
delicate  as  those  on  which  the  relations  of  every 
known  form  of  life  to  the  constituent  gases  of  the 
atmosphere  are  seen  to  depend,  can  thus  be  shown 
not  necessarily  to  imply  the  action  of  any  disposing 
intelligence,  how  is  it  possible  to  conclude  that 
any  less  general  exhibitions  of  adjustment  imply 
this,  so  long  as  every  case  of  adjustment,  whether 
or  not  ultimately  due  to  design,  is  regarded  as 
proximately  due  to  physical  causes  ? 

In  view  of  these  considerations,  therefore,  I  think 
it  is  perfectly  clear  that  if  the  argument  from 
teleology  is  to  be  saved  at  all,  it  can  only  be  so  by 
shifting  it  from  the  narrow  basis  of  special  adapta- 
tions, to  the  broad  area  of  Nature  as  a  whole.  And 
here  I  confess  that  to  my  mind  the  argument  does 
acquire  a  weight  which,  if  long  and  attentively 
considered,  deserves  to  be  regarded  as  enormous. 
For,  although  this  and  that  particular  adjustment 
in  Nature  may  be  seen  to  be  proximately  due  to 
physical  causes,  and  although  we  are  prepared  on 
the  grounds  of  the  largest  possible  analogy  to  infer 
that  all  other  such  particular  cases  are  likewise  due 
to  physical  causes,  the  more  ultimate  question 
arises,  How  is  it  that  all  physical  causes  conspire, 
by  their  united  action,  to  the  production  of  a  general 
order  of  Nature  ?  It  is  against  all  analogy  to  sup- 
E  2 


68  Thoughts  on  Religion 

pose  that  such  an  end  as  this  can  be  accomplished 
by  such  means  as  those,  in  the  way  of  mere  chance 
or  '  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms.'  We  are  led 
by  the  most  fundamental  dictates  of  our  reason  to 
conclude  that  there  must  be  some  cause  for  this  co- 
operation of  causes.  I  know  that  from  Lucretius' 
time  this  has  been  denied  ;  but  it  has  been  denied 
only  on  grounds  of  feeling.  No  possible  reason 
can  be  given  for  the  denial  which  does  not  run 
counter  to  the  law  of  causation  itself.  I  am  there- 
fore perfectly  clear  that  the  only  question  which, 
from  a  purely  rational  point  of  view,  here  stands 
to  be  answered  is  this — Of  v/hat  nature  are  we  to 
suppose  the  causa  causarum  to  be  ? 

On  this  point  only  two  hypotheses  have  ever  been 
advanced,  and  I  think  it  is  impossible  to  conceive 
that  any  third  one  is  open.  Of  these  two  hypotheses 
the  earliest,  and  of  course  the  most  obvious,  is  that 
of  mental  purpose.  The  other  hypothesis  is  one 
which  we  owe  to  the  far-reaching  thought  of 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  In  Chapter  VII  of  his  First 
Principles  he  argues  that  all  causation  arises  im- 
mediately out  of  existence  as  such,  or,  as  he  states 
it,  that  '  uniformity  of  law  inevitably  follows  from 
the  persistence  of  force.'  For  '  if  in  any  two  cases 
there  is  exact  likeness  not  only  between  those  most 
conspicuous  antecedents  which  we  distinguish  as 
the  causes,  but  also  between  those  accompanying 
antecedents  which  we  call  the  conditions,  we  cannot 
affirm  that  the  effects  will  differ,  without  affirming 
either  that  some  force  has  come  into  existence  or 
that  some  force   has  ceased  to  exist.     If  the  co- 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion  69 

operative  forces  in  the  one  case  are  equal  to  those  in 
the  other,  each  to  each,  in  distribution  and  amount ; 
then  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  product  of 
their  joint  action  in  the  one  case  as  unlike  that  in 
the  other,  without  conceiving  one  or  more  of  the 
forces  to  have  increased  or  diminished  in  quantity  ; 
and  this  is  conceiving  that  force  is  not  persistent' 

Now  this  interpretation  of  causality  as  the  im- 
mediate outcome  of  existence  must  be  considered 
first  as  a  theory  of  causation,  and  next  as  a  theory 
in  relation  to  Theism.  As  a  theory  of  causation  it 
has  not  met  with  the  approval  of  mathematicians, 
physicists,  or  logicians,  leading  representatives  of 
all  these  departments  of  thought  having  expressly 
opposed  it,  while,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  no  repre- 
sentative of  any  one  of  them  has  spoken  in  its 
favour1.  But  with  this  point  I  am  not  at  present 
concerned,  for  even  if  the  theory  were  admitted  to 
furnish  a  full  and  complete  explanation  of  caus- 
ality, it  would  still  fail  to  account  for  the  har- 
monious relation  of  causes,  or  the  fact  with  which 
we  are  now  alone  concerned.  This  distinction  is 
not  perceived  by  the  anonymous  author  '  Physicus,' 
who,  in  his  Candid  Examination  of  TJieism,  lays 

1  A  note  (of  1893)  contains  the  following  :  '  Being,  considered  in 
the  abstract,  is  logically  equivalent  to  Not-Being  or  Nothing.  For 
if  by  successive  stages  of  abstraction,  we  divest  the  conception  of 
Being  of  attribute  and  relation  we  reach  the  conception  of  that 
which  cannot  be,  i.e.  a  logical  contradiction,  or  the  logical  corre- 
lative of  Being  which  is  Nothing.  (All  this  is  well  expressed  in 
Caird's  Evolution  of  Religion?)  The  failure  to  perceive  this  fact 
constitutes  a  ground  fallacy  in  my  Candid  Examination  of  Theism, 
where  I  represent  Being  as  being  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the 
Order  of  Nature  or  the  law  of  Causation.' 


7o  Thoughts  on  Religion 

great  stress  upon  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  of  causa- 
tion as  subversive  of  Theism,  or  at  least  as  super- 
seding the  necessity  of  theistic  hypothesis  by 
furnishing  a  full  explanation  of  the  order  of  Nature 
on  purely  physical  grounds.  But  he  fails  to  per- 
ceive that  even  if  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  were  con- 
ceded fully  to  explain  all  the  facts  of  causality, 
it  would  in  no  wise  tend  to  explain  the  cosmos  in 
which  these  facts  occur.  It  may  be  true  that 
causation  depends  upon  the  'persistence  of  force': 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  manifestations  of  force 
should  on  this  account  have  been  directed  to 
occur  as  they  do  occur.  For,  if  we  follow  back 
any  sequence  of  physical  causation,  we  soon  .find 
that  it  spreads  out  on  all  sides  into  a  network  of 
physical  relations  which  are  literally  infinite  both 
in  space  (conditions)  and  in  time  (antecedent 
causes).  Now,  even  if  we  suppose  that  the  per- 
sistence of  force  is  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the 
occurrence  of  the  particular  sequence  contemplated 
so  far  as  the  exhibition  of  force  is  there  con- 
cerned, we  are  thus  as  far  as  ever  from  explain- 
ing the  determination  of  this  force  into  the 
particular  channel  through  which  it  flows.  It  may 
be  quite  true  that  the  resultant  is  determined  as 
to  magnitude  and  direction  by  the  components; 
but  what  about  the  magnitude  and  direction  of 
the  components?  If  it  is  said  that  they  in  turn 
were  determined  by  the  outcome  of  previous  sys- 
tems, how  about  these  systems  ?  And  so  on  till 
we  spread  away  into  the  infinite  network  already 
mentioned.     Only  if  we   knew   the   origin    of   all 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    71 

series  of  all  such  systems  could  we  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  say  that  an  adequate  intelligence  might 
determine  beforehand  by  calculation  the  state  of 
any  one  part  of  the  universe  at  any  given  instant 
of  time.  But,  as  the  series  are  infinite  both  in 
number  and  extent,  this  knowledge  is  clearly  out 
of  the  question.  Moreover,  even  if  it  could  be 
imagined  as  possible,  it  could  only  be  so  imagined 
at  the  expense  of  supposing  an  origin  of  physical 
causation  in  time ;  and  this  amounts  to  sup- 
posing a  state  of  things  prior  to  such  causation, 
and  out  of  which  it  arose.  But  to  suppose  this  is 
to  suppose  some  extra-physical  source  of  physical 
causation  ;  and  whether  this  supposition  is  made 
with  reference  to  a  physical  event  occurring  under 
immediate  observation  (miracle),  or  to  a  physical 
event  in  past  time,  or  to  the  origin  of  all  physical 
events,  it  is  alike  incompatible  with  any  theory  that 
seeks  to  give  a  purely  physical  explanation  of  the 
physical  universe  as  a  whole.  It  is,  in  short,  the 
old  story  about  a  stream  not  being  able  to  rise  above 
its  source.  Physical  causation  cannot  be  made  to 
supply  its  own  explanation,  and  the  mere  persistence 
of  force,  even  if  it  were  conceded  to  account  for 
particular  cases  of  physical  sequence,  can  give  no 
account  of  the  ubiquitous  and  eternal  direction  of 
force  in  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  univer- 
sal order. 

We  are  thus,  as  it  were,  driven  upon  the  theory 
of  Theism  as  furnishing  the  only  nameable  explana- 
tion of  this  universal  order.  That  is  to  say,  by 
no  logical  artifice  can  we  escape  from  the  conclu- 


72  Thoughts  on  Religion 

sion  that,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  this  universal  order 
must  be  regarded  as  due  to  some  one  integrating 
principle  ;  and  that  this,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  is 
most  probably  of  the  nature  of  mind.  At  least  it 
must  be  allowed  that  we  can  conceive  of  it  under  no 
other  aspect  ;  and  that  if  any  particular  adaptation 
in  organic  nature  is  held  to  be  suggestive  of  such  an 
agency,  the  sum  total  of  all  adaptations  in  the 
universe  must  be  held  to  be  incomparably  more 
so.  I  shall  not,  however,  dwell  upon  this  theme 
since  it  has  been  well  treated  by  several  modern 
writers,  and  with  special  cogency  by  the  Rev. 
Baden  Powell  I  will  merely  observe  that  I  do 
not  consider  it  necessary  to  the  display  of  this 
argument  in  favour  of  Theism  that  we  should 
speak  of  '  natural  laws.'  It  is  enough  to  take 
our  stand  upon  the  [broadest]  general  fact  that 
Nature  is  a  system,  and  that  the  order  observable 
in  this  system  is  absolutely  universal,  eternally  en- 
during, and  infinitely  exact  :  while  only  upon  the 
supposition  of  its  being  such  is  our  experience 
conceived  as  possible,  or  our  knowledge  conceived 
as  attainable. 

Having  thus  stated  as  emphatically  as  I  can  that 
in  my  opinion  no  explanation  of  natural  order  can 
be  either  conceived  or  named  other  than  that  of 
intelligence  as  the  supreme  directing  cause,  I  shall 
proceed  to  two  other  questions  which  arise  imme- 
diately out  of  this  conclusion.  The  first  of  these 
questions  is  as  to  the  presumable  character  of  this 
supreme  Intelligence  so  far  as  any  data  of  inference 
upon  this  point  are  supplied  by  our  observation  of 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    73 

Nature  ;  and  the  other  question  is  as  to  the  strictly 
formal  cogency  of  any  conclusions  either  with  refer- 
ence to  the  existence  or  the  character  of  such  an 
intelligence 1.  I  shall  consider  these  two  points 
separately. 

No  sooner  have  we  reached  the  conclusion  that 
the  only  hypothesis  whereby  the  general  order  of 
Nature  admits  of  being  in  any  degree  accounted 
for  is  that  it  is  due  to  a  cause  of  a  mental  kind, 
than  we  confront  the  fact  that  this  cause  must 
be  widely  different  from  anything  that  we  know 
of  Mind  in  ourselves.  And  we  soon  discover  that 
this  difference  must  be  conceived  as  not  merely  of 
degree,  however  great,  but  of  kind.  In  other  words, 
although  we  may  conclude  that  the  nearest  analogue 
of  the  causa  causarum  given  in  experience  is  the 
human  mind,  we  are  bound  to  acknowledge  that 
in  all  fundamental  points  the  analogy  is  so  remote 
that  it  becomes  a  question  whether  we  are  really 
very  much  nearer  the  truth  by  entertaining  it. 
Thus,  for  instance,  as  Mr.  Spencer  has  pointed 
out,  our  only  conception  of  that  which  we  know 
as  Mind  in  ourselves  is  the  conception  of  a  series 
of  states  of  consciousness.  But,  he  continues,  '  Put 
a  series  of  states  of  consciousness  as  cause  and 
the  evolving  universe  as  effect,  and  then  endeavour 
to  see  the  last  as  flowing  from  the  first.  I  find 
it  possible  to  imagine  in  some  dim  way  a  series 
of  states  of  consciousness  serving  as  antecedent 
to  any  one  of  the  movements  I  see  going  on  ;  for 

1  [This  promise  is  only  partially  fulfilled  in  the  penultimate  para- 
graph of  the  essay. — Ed.] 


74  Thoughts  on  Religion 

my  own  states  of  consciousness  are  often  indirectly 
the  antecedents  to  such  movements.  But  how  if 
I  attempt  to  think  of  such  a  series  as  antecedent 
to  all  actions  throughout  the  universe  .  .  .  ?  If  to 
account  for  this  infinitude  of  physical  changes  every- 
where going  on,  "  Mind  must  be  conceived  as  there," 
"  under  the  guise  of  simple  dynamics,"  then  the 
reply  is,  that,  to  be  so  conceived,  Mind  must  be 
divested  of  all  attributes  by  which  it  is  distinguished ; 
and  that,  when  thus  divested  of  its  distinguishing 
attributes  the  conception  disappears — the  word 
Mind  stands  for  a  blank.' 

Moreover,  'How  is  the  "originating  Mind"  to 
be  thought  of  as  having  states  produced  by 
things  objective  to  it,  as  discriminating  among 
these  states,  and  classing  them  as  like  and  unlike ; 
and  as  preferring  one  objective  result  to  another?1' 

Hence,  without  continuing  this  line  of  argument, 
which  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  trace  through 
every  constituent  branch  of  human  psychology, 
we  may  take  it  as  unquestionable  that,  if  there 
is  a  Divine  Mind,  it  must  differ  so  essentially  from 
the  human  mind,  that  it  becomes  illogical  to  de- 
signate the  two  by  the  same  name :  the  attributes 
of  eternity  and  ubiquity  are  in  themselves  enough 
to  place  such  a  Mind  in  a  category  sui  generis, 
wholly  different  from  anything  which  the  analogy 
furnished  by  our  own  mind  enables  us  even 
dimly  to  conceive.  And  this,  of  course,  is  no 
more  than  theologians  admit.     God's  thoughts  are 

1  Essays,  vol.  iii.  p,  246  et  seq.  The  whole  passage  ought  to  be 
consulted,  being  too  long  to  quote  here. 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    75 

above  our  thoughts,  and  a  God  who  would  be 
comprehensible  to  our  intelligence  would  be  no 
God  at  all,  they  say.  Which  may  be  true 
enough,  only  we  must  remember  that  in  what- 
ever measure  we  are  thus  precluded  from  under- 
standing the  Divine  Mind,  in  that  measure  are  we 
precluded  from  founding  any  conclusions  as  to  its 
nature  upon  analogies  furnished  by  the  human 
mind.  The  theory  ceases  to  be  anthropomorphic:  it 
ceases  to  be  even  '  anthropopsychic '  :  it  is  affiliated 
with  the  conception  of  mind  only  in  virtue  of  the 
one  fact  that  it  serves  to  give  the  best  provisional 
account  of  the  order  of  Nature,  by  supposing  an 
infinite  extension  of  some  of  the  faculties  of  the 
human  mind,  with  a  concurrent  obliteration  of  all 
the  essential  conditions  under  which  alone  these 
faculties  are  known  to  exist.  Obviously  of  such 
a  Mind  as  this  no  predication  is  logically  possible. 
If  such  a  Mind  exists,  it  is  not  conceivable  as 
existing,  and  we  are  precluded  from  assigning  to  it 
any  attributes. 

Thus  much  on  general  grounds.  Descending 
now  to  matters  of  more  detail,  let  us  assume  with 
the  natural  theologians  that  such  a  Mind  does  exist, 
that  it  so  far  resembles  the  human  mind  as  to 
be  a  conscious,  personal  intelligence,  and  that  the 
care  of  such  a  Mind  is  over  all  its  works.  Even 
upon  the  grounds  of  this  supposition  we  meet  with 
a  number  of  large  and  general  facts  which  indicate 
that  this  Mind  ought  still  to  be  regarded  as  ap- 
parently very  unlike  its  { image '  in  the  mind  of 
man.     I  will  not  here  dwell  upon  the  argument  of 


76  Thoughts  on  Religion 

seeming  waste  and  purposeless  action  in  Nature, 
because   I  think  that  this  may  be  fairly  met  by 
the  ulterior  argument  already  drawn  from  Nature 
as    a   whole  — viz.    that   as   a   whole,    Nature   is  a 
cosmos,   and   therefore   that    what   to   us  appears 
wasteful  and  purposeless  in  matters  of  detail  may 
not   be  so   in    relation    to    the   scheme  of  things 
as   a   whole.      But    I    am    doubtful   whether   this 
ulterior  argument  can  fairly  be  adduced  to    meet 
the  apparent  absence  in  Nature  of  that  which  in 
man  we  term  morality.     For  in  the   human  mind 
the    sense    of    right    and    wrong  —  with     all    its 
accompanying   or   constituting   emotions    of    love, 
sympathy,   justice,  &c—  is   so  important  a  factor, 
that   however   greatly   we    may    imagine    the    in- 
tellectual side  of  the  human  mind  to  be  extended, 
we  can  scarcely  imagine  that  the  moral  side  could 
ever  become  so  apparently  eclipsed  as  to  end  in  the 
authorship  of  such  a  work  as  we  find  in  terrestrial 
nature.     It  is  useless  to  hide  our  eyes  to  the  state 
of  matters  which  meets  us  here.     Most  of  the  in- 
stances of  special  design  which  are  relied  upon  by 
the   natural    theologian    to   prove   the    intelligent 
nature  of   the  First  Cause,  have   as   their  end  or 
object  the  infliction  of  painful  death  or  the  escape 
from  remorseless  enemies  ;  and  so  far  the  argument 
in  favour  of  the  intelligent  nature  of  the  First  Cause 
is  an  argument  against  its  morality.     Again,  even 
if  we  quit  the  narrower  basis  on  which  teleological 
argument  has   rested  in   the  past,  and  stand  that 
argument  upon  the  broader  ground  of  Nature  as 
a  whole,  it  scarcely  becomes  less  incompatible  with 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    77 

any  inference  to  the  morality  of  that  Cause,  seeing 
that  the  facts  to  which  I  have  alluded  are  not  merely 
occasional  and,  as  it  were,  outweighed  by  contrary 
facts  of  a  more  general  kind,  but  manifestly  con- 
stitute the  leading  feature  of  the  scheme  of  organic 
nature  as  a  whole :  or,  if  this  were  held  to  be 
questionable,  it  could  only  follow  that  we  are  not 
entitled  to  infer  that  there  is  any  such  scheme 
at  all. 

Nature,  as  red  in  tooth  and  claw  with  ravin,  is 
thus  without  question  a  large  and  general  fact  that 
must  be  considered  by  any  theory  of  teleology 
which  can  be  propounded.  I  do  not  think  that 
this  aspect  of  the  matter  could  be  conveyed  in 
stronger  terms  than  it  is  by  '  Physicus 1,'  whom 
I  shall  therefore  quote  : — 

'  Supposing  the  Deity  to  be,  what  Professor  Flint 
maintains  that  he  is — viz.  omnipotent,  and  there 
can  be  no  inference  more  transparent  than  that 
such  wholesale  suffering,  for  whatever  ends  de- 
signed, exhibits  an  incalculably  greater  deficiency 
of  beneficence  in  the  divine  character  than  that 
which  we  know  in  any,  the  very  worst,  of  human 
characters.  For  let  us  pause  for  one  moment  to 
think  of  what  suffering  in  Nature  means.  Some 
hundreds  of  millions  of  years  ago  some  millions 
of  millions  of  animals  must  be  supposed  to  have 
become  sentient.  Since  that  time  till  the  present, 
there  must  have  been  millions  and  millions  of 
generations  of  millions  and  millions  of  individuals. 

1  In  an  essa 
Examination. 


78  Thoughts  on  Religion 

And  throughout  all  this  period  of  incalculable 
duration,  this  inconceivable  host  of  sentient  organ- 
isms have  been  in  a  state  of  unceasing  battle, 
dread,  ravin,  pain.  Looking  to  the  outcome,  we 
find  that  more  than  one  half  of  the  species  which 
have  survived  the  ceaseless  struggle  are  parasitic 
in  their  habits,  lower  and  insentient  forms  of  life 
feasting  on  higher  and  sentient  forms ;  we  find 
teeth  and  talons  whetted  for  slaughter,  hooks  and 
suckers  moulded  for  torment — everywhere  a  reign 
of  terror,  hunger,  sickness,  with  oozing  blood  and 
quivering  limbs,  with  gasping  breath  and  eyes 
of  innocence  that  dimly  close  in  deaths  of  cruel 
torture  !  Is  it  said  that  there  are  compensating 
enjoyments  ?  I  care  not  to  strike  the  balance ; 
the  enjoyments  I  plainly  perceive  to  be  as  physically 
necessary  as  the  pains,  and  this  whether  or  not 
evolution  is  due  to  design.  .  .  .  Am  I  told  that 
I  am  not  competent  to  judge  the  purposes  of  the 
Almighty?  I  answer  that  if  there  are  purposes, 
I  am  able  to  judge  of  them  so  far  as  I  can  see ; 
and  if  I  am  expected  to  judge  of  His  purposes 
when  they  appear  to  be  beneficent,  I  am  in  con- 
sistency obliged  also  to  judge  of  them  when  they 
appear  to  be  malevolent.  And  it  can  be  no  possible 
extenuation  of  the  latter  to  point  to  the  "  final 
result "  as  "  order  and  beauty,"  so  long  as  the 
means  adopted  by  the  "  Omnipotent  Designer"  are 
known  to  have  been  so  [terrible].  All  that  we 
could  legitimately  assert  in  this  case  would  be  that, 
so  far  as  observation  can  extend,  fs  He  cares  for 
animal    perfection "    to    the    exclusion   of  "  animal 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    79 

enjoyment/'  and  even  to  the  total  disregard  of 
animal  suffering.  But  to  assert  this  would  merely 
be  to  deny  beneficence  as  an  attribute  of  God  V 

The  reasoning  here  appears  as  unassailable  as 
it  is  obvious.  If,  as  the  writer  goes  on  to  say,  we 
see  a  rabbit  panting  in  the  iron  jaws  of  a  spring 
trap,  and  in  consequence  abhor  the  devilish  nature 
of  the  being  who,  with  full  powers  of  realizing  what 
pain  means,  can  deliberately  employ  his  whole 
faculties  of  invention  in  contriving  a  thing  so 
hideously  cruel  ;  what  are  we  to  think  of  a  Being 
who.  with  yet  higher  faculties  of  thought  and 
knowledge,  and  with  an  unlimited  choice  of  means 
to  secure  His  ends,  has  contrived  untold  thousands 
of  mechanisms  no  less  diabolical  ?  In  short,  so 
far  as  Nature  can  teach  us,  or  '  observation  can 
extend,'  it  does  appear  that  the  scheme,  if  it  is 
a  scheme,  is  the  product  of  a  Mind  which  differs 
from  the  more  highly  evolved  type  of  human  mind 
in  that  it  is  immensely  more  intellectual  without 
being  nearly  so  moral.  And  the  same  thing  is 
indicated  by  the  rough  and  indiscriminate  manner 
in  which  justice  is  allotted — even  if  it  can  be  said 
to  be  allotted  at  all.  When  we  contrast  the 
certainty  and  rigour  with  which  any  offence  against 
'  physical  law  '  is  punished  by  Nature  (no  matter 
though  the  sin  be  but  one  of  ignorance),  with 
the  extreme  uncertainty  and  laxity  with  which 
she  meets  any  offence  against  '  moral  law/  we  are 
constrained  to  feel  that  the  system  of  legislation 
(if  we  may  so  term  it)  is  conspicuously  different 

1  A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  pp.  171-2. 


80  Thoughts  on  Religion 

from  that  which  would  have  been  devised  by  any 
intelligence  which  in  any  sense  could  be  called 
'  anthropopsychic/ 

The  only  answer  to  these  difficulties  open  to 
the  natural  theologian  is  that  which  is  drawn  from 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  argued 
that  the  fact  of  this  mind  having  so  large  an 
ingredient  of  morality  in  its  constitution  may  be 
taken  as  proof  that  its  originating  source  is  like- 
wise of  a  moral  character.  This  argument,  however, 
appears  to  me  of  a  questionable  character,  seeing 
that,  for  anything  we  can  tell  to  the  contrary,  the 
moral  sense  may  have  been  given  to.  or  developed 
in,  man  simply  on  account  of  its  utility  to  the 
species — just  in  the  same  way  as  teeth  in  the  shark 
or  poison  in  the  snake.  If  so,  the  occurrence  of 
the  moral  sense  in  man  would  merely  furnish  one 
other  instance  of  the  intellectual,  as  distinguished 
from  the  moral,  nature  of  God  ;  and  there  seems 
to  be  in  itself  no  reason  why  we  should  take  any 
other  view.  The  mere  fact  that  to  us  the  moral 
sense  seems  such  a  great  and  holy  thing,  is  doubt- 
less (under  any  view)  owing  to  its  importance  to 
the  well-being  of  our  species.  In  itself,  or  as  it  . 
appears  to  other  possible  beings  intellectual  like 
ourselves,  but  existing  under  unlike  conditions, 
the  moral  sense  of  man  may  be  regarded  as  of  no 
more  significance  than  the  social  instincts  of  bees. 
More  particularly  may  this  consideration  apply 
to  the  case  of  a  Mind  existing,  according  to  the 
theological  theory  of  things,  wholly  beyond  the 
pale  of  anything  analogous  to  those  social  relations 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion   81 

out  of  which,  according  to  the  scientific  theory  of 
evolution,  the  moral  sense  has  been  developed  in 
ourselves 1. 

The  truth  is  that  in  this  matter  natural  theo- 
logians begin  by  assuming  that  the  First  Cause, 
if  intelligent,  must  be  moral ;  and  then  they  are 
blinded  to  the  strictly  logical  weakness  of  the 
argument  whereby  they  endeavour  to  sustain  their 
assumption.  For  aught  that  we  can  tell  to  the 
contrary,  it  may  be  quite  as  '  anthropomorphic ' 
a  notion  to  attribute  morality  to  God  as  it  would 
be  to  attribute  those  capacities  for  sensuous  en- 
joyment with  which  the  Greeks  endowed  their 
divinities.  The  Deity  may  be  as  high  above  the 
one  as  the  other — or  rather  perhaps  we  may  say  as 
much  external  to  the  one  as  to  the  other.  Without 
being  supra-moral,  and  still  less  immoral,  He  may 
be  un-moral :  our  ideas  of  morality  may  have  no 
meaning  as  applied  to  Him. 

But  if  we  go  thus  far  in  one  direction,  I  think, 
per  contra,  it  must  in  consistency  be  allowed  that 
the  argument  from  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind  acquires  more  weight  when  it  is  shifted  from 
the  moral  sense  to  the  religious  instincts.  For,  on 
the  one  hand,  these  instincts  are  not  of  such  obvious 


1  [I  have,  as  Editor,  resisted  a  temptation  to  intervene  in  the  above 
argument.  But  I  think  I  may  intervene  on  a  matter  of  fact,  and 
point  out  that  '  according  to  the  theological  theory  of  things,'  i.e. 
according  to  the  Trinitarian  doctrine,  God's  Nature  consists  in 
what  is  strictly  '  analogous  to  social  relations,'  and  He  not  merely 
exhibits  in  His  creation,  but  Himself  is  Love.  See,  on  the 
subject,  especially,  R.  H.  Hutton's  essay  on  the  Incarnation,  in  his 
Theological  Essays  (Macmillan). — Ed.] 

F 


82  Thoughts  on  Religion 

use  to  the  species  as  are  those  of  morality;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  while  they  are  unquestionably 
very  general,  very  persistent,  and  very  powerful, 
they  do  not  appear  to  serve  any  '  end  '  or  '  purpose ' 
in  the  scheme  of  things,  unless  we  accept  the  theory 
which  is  given  of  them  by  those  in  whom  they  are 
most  strongly  developed.  Here  I  think  we  have 
an  argument  of  legitimate  force,  although  it  does 
not  appear  that  such  was  the  opinion  entertained 
of  it  by  Mill.  I  think  the  argument  is  of  legiti- 
mate force,  because  if  the  religious  instincts  of  the 
human  race  point  to  no  reality  as  their  object,  they 
are  out  of  analogy  with  all  other  instinctive  endow- 
ments. Elsewhere  in  the  animal  kingdom  we 
never  meet  with  such  a  thing  as  an  instinct  pointing 
aimlessly,  and  therefore  the  fact  of  man  being, 
as  it  is  said,  '  a  religious  animal ' — i.  e.  presenting 
a  class  of  feelings  of  a  peculiar  nature  directed  to 
particular  ends,  and  most  akin  to,  if  not  identical 
with,  true  instinct — is  so  far,  in  my  opinion,  a  legiti- 
mate argument  in  favour  of  the  reality  of  some 
object  towards  which  the  religious  side  of  this 
animal's  nature  is  directed.  And  I  do  not  think 
that  this  argument  is  invalidated  by  such  facts  as 
that  widely  different  intellectual  conceptions  touch- 
ing the  character  of  this  object  are  entertained 
by  different  races  of  mankind  ;  that  the  force  of 
the  religious  instincts  differs  greatly  in  different 
individuals  even  of  the  same  race;  that  these 
instincts  admit  of  being  greatly  modified  by  educa- 
tion ;  that  they  would  probably  fail  to  be  developed 
in  any  individual  without  at  least  so  much  education 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    83 

as  is  required  to  furnish  the  needful  intellectual 
conceptions  on  which  they  are  founded  ;  or  that 
we  may  not  improbably  trace  their  origin,  as 
Mr.  Spencer  traces  it,  to  a  primitive  mode  of  inter- 
preting dreams.  For  even  in  view  of  all  these 
considerations  the  fact  remains  that  these  instincts 
exist,  and  therefore,  like  all  other  instincts,  may  be 
supposed  to  have  a  definite  meaning,  even  though, 
like  all  other  instincts,  they  may  be  supposed  to 
have  had  a  natural  eause,  which  both  in  the  in- 
dividual and  in  the  race  requires,  as  in  the  natural 
development  of  all  other  instincts,  the  natural 
conditions  for  its  occurrence  to  be  supplied.  In 
a  word,  if  animal  instincts  generally,  like  organic 
structures  or  inorganic  systems,  are  held  to 
betoken  purpose,  the  religious  nature  of  man 
would  stand  out  as  an  anomaly  in  the  general 
scheme  of  things  if  it  alone  were  purposeless. 
Hence  we  have  here  what  seems  to  me  a  valid 
inference,  so  far  as  it  goes,  to  the  effect  that,  if 
the  general  order  of  Nature  is  due  to  Mind,  the 
character  of  that  Mind  is  such  as  it  is  conceived  to 
be  by  the  most  highly  developed  form  of  religion. 
A  conclusion  which  is  no  doubt  the  opposite  of 
that  which  we  reached  by  contemplating  the  phe- 
nomena of  biology  ;  and  a  contradiction  which  can 
only  be  overcome  by  supposing,  either  that  Nature 
conceals  God,  while  man  reveals  Him,  or  that 
Nature  reveals  God  while  man  misrepresents  Him. 
There  is  still  one  other  fact  of  a  very  wide  and 
general  kind  presented  by  Nature,  which,  if  the 
order  of  Nature  is  taken  to  be  the  expression  of 
F  z 


84  Thoughts  on  Religion 

intelligent  purpose,  ought  in  my  opinion  to  be 
regarded  as  of  great  weight  in  furnishing  evidence 
upon  the  ethical  quality  of  that  purpose.  It  is  a 
fact  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  not  been  considered 
by  any  other  writer ;  but  from  its  being  one  of 
the  most  general  of  all  the  facts  relating  to  the 
sentient  creation,  and  from  its  admitting  of  no  one 
single  exception,  I  feel  that  I  am  not  able  too 
strongly  to  emphasize  its  argumentative  import- 
ance. This  fact  is,  as  I  have  stated  it  on  a  former 
occasion,  'that  amid  all  the  millions  of  mechanisms 
and  instincts  in  the  animal  kingdom,  there  is  no 
one  instance  of  a  mechanism  or  instinct  occurring 
in  one  species  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  another 
species,  although  there  are  a  few  cases  in  which 
a  mechanism  or  instinct  that  is  of  benefit  to  its 
possessor  has  come  also  to  be  utilized  by  other 
species.  Now,  on  the  beneficent  design  theory 
it  is  impossible  to  explain  why,  when  all  the 
mechanisms  in  the  same  species  are  invariably 
correlated  for  the  benefit  of  that  species,  there 
should  never  be  any  such  correlation  between 
mechanisms  in  different  species,  or  why  the  same 
remark  should  apply  to  instincts.  For  how  mag- 
nificent a  display  of  Divine  beneficence  would 
organic  nature  have  afforded,  if  all,  or  even  some, 
species  had  been  so  inter-related  as  to  minister 
to  each  other's  necessities.  Organic  species  might 
then  have  been  likened  to  a  countless  multitude 
of  voices  all  singing  in  one  harmonious  psalm 
of  praise.  But,  as  it  is,  we  see  no  vestige  of  such 
co-ordination  ;  every  species  is  for  itself,  and  for 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    85 

itself  alone — an  outcome  of  the  always  and  every- 
where fiercely  raging  struggle  for  life  V 

The  large  and  general  fact  thus  stated  constitutes, 
in  my  opinion,  the  strongest  of  all  arguments  in 
favour  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection, 
and  therefore  we  can  see  the  probable  reason  why 
it  is  what  it  is,  so  far  as  the  question  of  its  physical 
causation  is  concerned.  But  where  the  question  is, 
Supposing  the  physical  causation  ultimately  due  to 
Mind,  what  are  we  to  infer  concerning  the  character 
of  the  Mind  which  has  adopted  this  method  of 
causation? — then  we  again  reach  the  answer  that, 
so  far  as  we  can  judge  from  a  conscientious  ex- 
amination of  these  facts,  this  Mind  does  not  show 
that  it  is  of  a  nature  which  in  man  we  should  call 
moral.  Of  course  behind  the  physical  appearances 
there  may  be  a  moral  justification,  so  that  from 
these  appearances  we  are  not  entitled  to  say  more 
than  that  from  the  fact  of  its  having  chosen 
a  method  of  physical  causation  leading  to  these 
results,  it  has  presented  to  us  the  appearance,  as 
before  observed,  of  caring  for  animal  perfection 
to  the  exclusion  of  animal  enjoyment,  and  even 
to  the  total  disregard  of  animal  suffering. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  of  importance  to  insist  upon 
a  truth  which  in  discussions  of  this  kind  is  too  often 
disregarded — viz.  that  all  our  reasonings  being  of 
a  character  relative  to  our  knowledge,  our  in- 
ferences are  uncertain  in  a  degree  proportionate 
to  the  extent  of  our  ignorance  ;  and  that  as  with 
reference  to  the  topics  which  we  have  been  con- 

1  Scientific  Evidences  of  Organic  Evolution,  pp.  76-7. 


86  Thoughts  on  Religion 

sidering  our  ignorance  is  of  immeasurable  extent, 
any  conclusions  that  we  may  have  formed  are,  as 
Bishop  Butler  would  say,  '  infinitely  precarious.' 
Or,  as  I  have  previously  presented  this  formal 
aspect  of  the  matter  while  discussing  the  teleological 
argument  with  Professor  Asa  Gray, — '  I  suppose  it 
will  be  admitted  that  the  validity  of  an  inference 
depends  upon  the  number,  the  importance,  and 
the  definiteness  of  the  things  or  ratios  known,  as 
compared  with  the  number,  importance,  and 
definiteness  of  the  things  or  ratios  unknown,  but 
inferred.  If  so,  we  should  be  logically  cautious  in 
drawing  inferences  from  the  natural  to  the  super- 
natural :  for  although  we  have  the  entire  sphere  of 
experience  from  which  to  draw  an  inference,  we 
are  unable  to  gauge  the  probability  of  the  inference 
when  drawn — the  unknown  ratios  being  confessedly 
of  unknown  number,  importance,  and  degree  of 
definiteness  :  the  whole  orbit  of  human  knowledge 
is  insufficient  to  obtain  a  parallax  whereby  to 
institute  the  required  measurements  or  to  deter- 
mine the  proportion  between  the  terms  known  and 
the  terms  unknown.  Otherwise  phrased,  we  may 
say — as  our  knowledge  of  a  part  is  to  our 
knowledge  of  a  whole,  so  is  our  inference  from 
that  part  to  the  reality  of  that  whole.  Who, 
therefore,  can  say,  even  upon  the  hypothesis  of 
Theism,  that  our  inferences  or  (t  idea  of  design " 
would  have  any  meaning  if  applied  to  the  "  All- 
Upholder,"  whose  thoughts  are  not  as  our 
thoughts  ? 1 '     And  of  course,  mutatis  mutandis,  the 

1  Nature,  April  5,  1833. 


Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion    87 

same  remarks  apply  to  all  inferences  having  a  nega- 
tive tendency. 

As  an  outcome  of  the  whole  of  this  discussion, 
then,  I  think  it  appears  that  the  influence  of  Science 
upon  Natural  Religion  has  been  uniformly  of  a 
destructive  character.  Step  by  step  it  has  driven 
back  the  apparent  evidence  of  direct  or  special 
design  in  Nature,  until  now  this  evidence  resides 
exclusively  in  the  one  great  and  general  fact  that 
Nature  as  a  whole  is  a  Cosmos.  Further  than  this 
it  is  obviously  impossible  that  the  destructive  in- 
fluence of  Science  can  extend,  because  Science  can 
only  exist  upon  the  basis  of  this  fact.  But  when 
we  allow  that  this  great  and  universal  fact — which 
but  for  the  effects  of  unremitting  familiarity  could 
scarcely  fail  to  be  intellectually  overwhelming — 
does  betoken  mental  agency  in  Nature,  we  imme- 
diately find  it  impossible  to  determine  the  probable 
character  of  such  a  mind,  even  supposing  that  it 
exists.  We  cannot  conceive  of  it  as  presenting 
any  one  of  the  qualities  which  essentially  charac- 
terize what  we  know  as  mind  in  ourselves ;  and 
therefore  the  word  Mind,,  as  applied  to  the  supposed 
agency,  stands  for  a  blank.  Further,  even  if  we 
disregard  this  difficulty,  and  assume  that  in  some 
way  or  other  incomprehensible  to  us  a  Mind  does 
exist  as  far  transcending  the  human  mind  as  the 
human  mind  transcends  mechanical  motion  ;  still 
we  are  met  by  some  very  large  and  general  facts 
in  Nature  which  seem  strongly  to  indicate  that 
this  Mind,  if  it  exists,  is  either  deficient  in,  or 
wholly   destitute   of,  that  class  of  feelings  which 


88  Thoughts  on  Religion 

in  man  we  term  moral ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  religious  aspirations  of  man  himself  may  be 
taken  to  indicate  the  opposite  conclusion.  And, 
lastly,  with  reference  to  the  whole  course  of  such 
reasonings,  we  have  seen  that  any  degree  of 
measurable  probability,  as  attaching  to  the  con- 
clusions, is  unattainable.  From  all  which  it  appears 
that  Natural  Religion  at  the  present  time  can 
only  be  regarded  as  a  system  full  of  intellectual 
contradictions  and  moral  perplexities  ;  so  that  if 
we  go  to  her  with  these  greatest  of  all  questions : 
'  Is  there  knowledge  with  the  Most  High  ?  '  '  Shall 
not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  do  right?'  the  only 
clear  answer  which  we  receive  is  the  one  that 
comes  back  to  us  from  the  depths  of  our  own 
heart — '  When  I  thought  upon  this  it  was  too 
painful  for  me.' 


PART  II. 


Introductory  Note  by  the  Editor. 

LITTLE  more  requires  to  be  said  by  way  of 
introduction  to  the  Notes  which  are  all  that 
George  Romanes  was  able  to  write  of  a  work  that 
was  to  have  been  entitled  A  Candid  Examina- 
tion of  Religion.  What  little  does  require  to  be 
said  must  be  by  way  of  bridging  the  interval  of 
thought  which  exists  between  the  Essays  which 
have  just  preceded  and  the  Notes  which  represent 
more  nearly  his  final  phase  of  mind. 

The  most  anti-theistic  feature  in  the  Essays 
is  the  stress  laid  in  them  on  the  evidence  which 
Nature  supplies,  or  is  supposed  to  supply,  antago- 
nistic to  the  belief  in  the  goodness  of  God. 

On  this  mysterious  and  perplexing  subject  George 
Romanes  appears  to  have  had  more  to  say  but  did 
not  live  to  say  it  \     We  may  notice  however  that 

1  See  below  p.  142,  and  note.  I  find  also  the  following  note  of  a 
date  subsequent  to  1889.  'It  is  a  fact  that  pessimism  is  illogical, 
simply  because  we  are  inadequate  judges  of  the  world,  and  pessimism 
would  therefore  be  opposed  to  agnosticism.  We  may  know  that 
there  is  something  out  of  joint  between  the  world  and  ourselves;  but 
we  cannot  know  how  far  this  is  the  fault  of  the  world  or  of  ourselves.' 


92  Thoughts  on  Religion 

in  1889,  in  a  paper  read  before  the  Aristotelian 
Society,  on  'the  Evidence  of  Design  in  Nature1,' 
he  appears  to  allow  more  weight  than  before  to 
the  argument  that  the  method  of  physical  de- 
velopment must  be  judged  in  the  light  of  its 
result.  This  paper  was  part  of  a  Symposium. 
Mr.  S.  Alexander  has  argued  in  a  previous  paper 
against  the  hypothesis  of  '  design '  in  Nature  on 
the  ground  that  '  the  fair  order  of  Nature  is  only 
acquired  by  a  wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice.' 
This  argument  was  developed  by  pointing  to  the 
obvious  '  mal-adjustments,'  '  aimless  destructions,' 
&c,  which  characterize  the  processes  of  Nature. 
But  these,  Romanes  replies,  necessarily  belong  to 
the  process  considered  as  one  of  'natural  selec- 
tion.' The  question  is  only :  Is  such  a  process 
per  se  incompatible  with  the  hypothesis  of  design  ? 
And  he  replies  in  the  negative. 

1 "  The  fair  order  of  Nature  is  only  acquired  by 
a  wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice."  Granted.  But 
if  the  "  wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice,"  as  ante- 
cedent, leads  to  a  "  fair  order  of  Nature "  as  its 
consequent,  how  can  it  be  said  that  the  "  wholesale 
waste  and  sacrifice "  has  been  a  failure  ?  Or 
how  can  it  be  said  that,  in  point  of  fact,  there 
has  been  a  waste,  or  has  been  a  sacrifice?    Clearly 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  (Williams  &  Norgate), 
vol.  i.  no.  3,  pp.  72,  73. 


Introductory  Note  93 

such  things   can    only    be    said    when    our    point 
of  view  is  restricted  to  the  means  (i.  e.  the  whole- 
sale   destruction   of  the    less    fit)  ;    not  when    we 
extend     our     view     to     what,     even     within     the 
limits    of   human    observation,    is    unquestionably 
the    end    (i.e.    the   causal    result    in    an  ever   im- 
proving   world    of    types).      A   candidate    who    is 
plucked    in   a   Civil   Service  examination   because 
he  happens  to  be  one  of  the  less  fitted  to  pass, 
is   no   doubt  an  instance  of  failure   so   far  as   his 
own   career   is  concerned  ;    but  it  does  not  there- 
fore  follow   that   the    system    of    examination    is 
a   failure    in    its    final    end    of    securing   the    best 
men   for   the    Civil    Service.     And    the   fact   that 
the  general  outcome  of  all  the  individual  failures 
in  Nature  is  that  of  securing  what  Mr.  Alexander 
calls  "the  fair  order  of  Nature,"  is  assuredly  evi- 
dence that  the  modus  operandi  has  not  been  a  failure 
in    relation   to   what,    if  there  be  any  Design   in 
Nature   at   all     must   be   regarded    as  the  higher 
purpose   of  such   Design.     Therefore,  cases  of  in- 
dividual   or   otherwise   relative   failure   cannot   be 
quoted  as  evidence  against  the  hypothesis  of  there 
being   such    Design.     The   fact   that    the   general 
system  of  natural   causation  has  for  its   eventual 
result  "a  fair  order  of  Nature,"   cannot   of  itself 
be  a  fact  inimical  to  the  hypothesis  of  Design  in 
Nature,  even  though  it  be  true  that  such  causation 
entails  the  continual  elimination  of  the  less  efficient 
types. 

'  To  the  best  of  my  judgement,  then,  this  argu- 
ment from  failure,  random  trial,  blind  blundering,  or 


94  Thoughts  on  Religion 

in  whatever  other  terminology  the  argument  may 
be  presented,  is  only  valid  as  against  the  theory 
of  what  Mr.  Alexander  alludes  to  as  a  "  Carpenter- 
God,"  i.e.  that  if  there  be  Design  in  Nature  at 
all,  it  must  everywhere  be  special  Design  ;  so  that 
the  evidence  of  it  may  as  well  be  tested  by  any 
given  minute  fragment  of  Nature — such  as  one 
individual  organism  or  class  of  organisms — as  by 
having  regard  to  the  whole  Cosmos.  The  evidence 
of  Design  in  this  sense  I  fully  allow  has  been 
totally  destroyed  by  the  proof  of  natural  selection. 
But  such  destruction  has  only  brought  into  clearer 
relief  the  much  larger  question  that  rises  behind, 
viz.  as  before  phrased,  Is  there  anything  about 
the  method  of  natural  causation,  considered  as 
a  whole,  that  is  inimical  to  the  theory  of  Design 
in  Nature,  considered  as  a  whole  ? ' 

It  is  true  that  this  argument  does  not  bear 
directly  upon  the  character  of  the  God  whose 
'design'  Nature  exhibits:  but  indirectly  it  does1. 
For  instance,  such  an  argument  as  that  found 
above  (on  p.  79  :  'we  see  a  rabbit,  &c.')  seems  to 
be  only  valid  on  the  postulate  here  described  as 
that  of  the  '  Carpenter-God.' 

:  I  ought  also  to  mention  that  Romanes  on  the  Sunday  before 
his  death  expressed  to  me  verbally  his  entire  agreement  with  the 
argument  of  Professor  Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism  (Macmillan,  1893); 
in  which  on  this  subject  see  pp.  184-186,  '  A  larger  good  is  evolved 
through  the  winnowing  process  by  which  physical  nature  casts  its 
weaker  products  aside,'  &c. 


Introductory  Note  95 

It  is  also  probable  that  Romanes  felt  the  diffi- 
culty arising  from  the  cruelty  of  nature  less,  as  he 
was  led  to  dwell  more  on  humanity  as  the  most 
important  part  of  nature,  and  perceived  the  function 
of  suffering  in  the  economy  of  human  life  (pp.  142, 
154) :  and  also  as  he  became  more  impressed  with 
the  positive  evidences  for  Christianity  as  at  once  the 
religion  of  sorrow  and  the  revelation  of  God  as 
Love  (pp.  163,  ff.).  The  Christian  Faith  supplies 
believers  not  only  with  an  argument  against  pes- 
simism from  general  results,  but  also  with  such  an 
insight  into  the  Divine  character  and  method  as 
enables  them  at  least  to  bear  hopefully  the  awful 
perplexities  which  arise  from  the  spectacle  of 
individuals  suffering. 

In  the  last  year  or  two  of  his  life  he  read  very 
attentively  a  great  number  of  books  on  '  Christian 
Evidences,'  from  Pascal's  Pensees  downwards,  and 
studied  carefully  the  appearance  of  '  plan '  in  the 
Biblical  Revelation  considered  as  a  whole.  The 
fact  of  this  study  appears  in  fragmentary  remarks, 
indices  and  references,  which  George  Romanes  left 
behind  him  in  note-books.  The  results  of  it  will 
not  be  unapparent  in  the  following  Notes,  which, 
I  need  to  remind  my  readers,  are,  in  spite  of  their 
small  bulk,  the  sole  reason  for  the  existence  of  this 
volume. 


96  Thoughts  on  Religion 

In  reading  these  I  can  hardly  conceive  any  one 
not  being  possessed  with  a  profound  regret  that 
the  author  was  not  allowed  to  complete  his  work. 
And  it  is  only  fair  to  ask  every  reader  of  the 
following  pages  to  remember  that  he  is  reading, 
in  the  main,  incomplete  notes  and  not  finished 
work.  This  will  account  for  a  great  deal  that 
may  seem  sketchy  and  unsatisfactory  in  the  treat- 
ment of  different  points,  and  also  for  repetitions  and 
traces  of  inconsistency.  But  I  can  hardly  think 
any  one  can  read  these  notes  to  the  end  without 
agreeing  with  me  that  if  I  had  withheld  them  from 
publication,  the  world  would  have  lost  the  witness 
of  a  mind,  both  able  and  profoundly  sincere,  feeling 


after  God  and  finding  Him. 


C.  G. 


NOTES  FOR  A  WORK  ON 
A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION. 

By  METAPHYSICUS. 


Proposed  Mottoes. 

•  I  quite  admit  the  difficulty  of  believing  that  in  every  man  there 
is  an  eye  of  the  soul  which,  when  by  other  pursuits  lost  and  dimmed, 
is  by  this  purified  and  re-illumined  ;  and  is  more  precious  far  than 
ten  thousand  bodily  eyes,  for  by  this  alone  is  truth  seen.  Now 
there  are  two  classes  of  persons,  one  class  who  will  agree  with  you 
and  will  take  your  words  as  a  revelation  ;  another  class  who  have 
no  understanding  of  them  and  to  whom  they  will  naturally  be  as 
idle  tales. 

'  And  you  had  better  decide  at  once  with  which  of  the  two  you 
are  arguing ;  or,  perhaps,  you  will  say  with  neither,  and  that  your 
chief  aim  in  carrying  on  the  argument  is  your  own  improvement ;  at 
the  same  time  not  grudging  to  either  any  benefit  which  they  may 
derive.' — Plato. 

'  If  we  would  reprove  with  success,  and  show  another  his  mistake, 
we  must  see  from  what  side  he  views  the  matter,  for  on  that  side  it 
is  generally  true :  and,  admitting  this  truth,  show  him  the  side  on 
which  it  is  false.' — PASCAL. 


, 


§  i.   Introductory. 


Many  years  ago  I  published  in  Messrs.  Triib- 
ner's  '  Philosophical  Series,'  a  short  treatise  entitled 
A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism  by  '  Physicus.' 
Although  the  book  made  some  stir  at  the  time, 
and  has  since  exhibited  a  vitality  never  anticipated 
by  its  author,  the  secret  of  its  authorship  has  been 
well  preserved1.  This  secret  it  is  my  intention, 
if  possible,  still  to  preserve ;  but  as  it  is  desirable 
(on  several  accounts  which  will  become  apparent 
in  the  following  pages)  to  avow  identity  of  author- 
ship, the  present  essay  appears  under  the  same 
pseudonym2  as  its  predecessor.  The  reason  why 
the  first  essay  appeared  anonymously  is  truthfully 
stated  in  the  preface  thereof,  viz.  in  order  that  the 

1  The  first  edition,  which  was  published  in  1878,  was  rapidly 
exhausted,  but,  as  my  object  in  publishing  was  solely  that  of 
soliciting  criticism  for  my  own  benefit,  I  arranged  with  the  pub- 
lishers not  to  issue  any  further  edition.  The  work  has  therefore 
been  out  of  print  for  many  years. 

[This  '  arrangement '  was  however  not  actually  made,  or  at  least 
was  unknown  to  the  present  publishing  firm  of  Kegan  Paul,  Trench, 
Trubner  &  Co.  Thus  a  new  edition  of  the  book  was  published  in 
1892,  to  the  author's  surprise. — Ed.] 

2  [Or  rather  it  was  intended  that  it  should  appear  under  the 
pseudonym  of  '  Metaphysicus.' — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion     99 

reasoning  should  be  judged  on  its  own  merits, 
without  the  bias  which  is  apt  to  arise  on  the  part 
of  a  reader  from  a  knowledge  of  the  authority — 
or  absence  of  authority — on  the  part  of  a  writer. 
This  reason,  in  my  opinion,  still  holds  good  as 
regards  A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  and 
applies  in  equal  measure  to  the  present  sequel  in 
A  Candid  Examination  of  Religion. 

It  will  be  shown  that  in  many  respects  the 
negative  conclusions  reached  in  the  former  essay 
have  been  greatly  modified  by  the  results  of 
maturer  thought  as  now  presented  in  the  second. 
Therefore  it  seems  desirable  to  state  at  the  outset 
that,  as  far  as  I  am  capable  of  judging,  the  modi- 
fications in  question  have  not  been  due  in  any 
measure  to  influence  from  without.  They  appear 
to  have  been  due  exclusively  to  the  results  of 
my  own  further  thought,  as  briefly  set  out  in  the 
following  pages,  with  no  indebtedness  to  private 
friends  and  but  little  to  published  utterances  in  the 
form  of  books,  &c.  Nevertheless,  no  very  original 
ideas  are  here  presented.  Indeed,  I  suppose  it 
would  nowadays  be  impossible  to  present  any  idea 
touching  religion,  which  has  not  at  some  time 
or  another  been  presented  previously.  Still  much 
may  be  done  in  the  furthering  of  one's  thought 
by  changing  points  of  view,  selecting  and  arranging 
ideas  already  more  or  less  familiar,  so  that  they 
may  be  built  into  new  combinations  ;  and  this, 
I  think,  I  have  in  no  small  degree  accomplished 
as  regards  the  microcosm  of  my  own  mind.  But 
I  state  this  much  only  for  the  sake  of  adding 
G  2 


ioo  Thoughts  on  Religion 

a  confession  that,  as  far  as  introspection  can  carry 
one,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the  modifications 
which   my  views  have  undergone  since  the  pub- 
lication  of  my  previous   Candid  Examination  are 
due  so   much   to  purely   logical   processes  of  the 
intellect,  as  to    the   sub-conscious    (and  therefore 
more  or  less  unanalyzable)  influences  due  to   the 
ripening  experience  of  life.     The  extent  to  which 
this  is  true  [i.  e.  the  extent  to   which  experience 
modifies  logic]  x  is  seldom,  if  ever,  realized,  although 
it    is   practically    exemplified    every    day   by   the 
sobering   caution  which  advancing    age   exercises 
upon  the  mind.     Not  so  much  by  any  above-board 
play  of  syllogism  as  by  some  underhand  cheating 
of  consciousness,  do  the  accumulating  experiences 
of  life  and  of  thought  slowly  enrich  the  judgement. 
And  this,  one  need  hardly  say,  is  especially  true 
in  such  regions   of  thought   as  present  the  most 
tenuous  media  for  the  progress  of  thought  by  the 
comparatively  clumsy  means   of   syllogistic   loco- 
motion.    For  the  further  we  ascend  from  the  solid 
ground  of  verification,  the  less  confidence  should 
we  place   in  our  wings   of  speculation,  while   the 
more   do  we    find    the   practical  wisdom    of  such 
intellectual    caution,    or    distrust   of  ratiocination, 
as    can    be   given    only   by   experience.      There- 
fore,  most   of  all    is   this   the   case    in    those   de- 
partments   of   thought    which    are    furthest   from 
the  region  of  our  sensuous  life — viz.  metaphysics 

1  [Words  in  square  brackets  have  been  added  by  me.  But  I  have 
not  introduced  the  brackets  when  I  have  simply  inserted  single 
unimportant  words  obviously  necessary  for  the  sense. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion   101 

and  religion.  And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  just 
in  these  departments  of  thought  that  we  find 
the  rashness  of  youth  most  amenable  to  the 
discipline  in  question  by  the  experience  of  age. 

However,  in  spite  of  this  confession,  I  have  no 
doubt  that  even  in  the  matter  of  pure  and  conscious 
reason  further  thought  has  enabled  me  to  detect 
serious  errors,  or  rather  oversights,  in  the  very 
foundations  of  my  Candid  Examination  of  Theism. 
I  still  think,  indeed,  that  from  the  premises  there 
laid  down  the  conclusions  result  in  due  logical 
sequence,  so  that,  as  a  matter  of  mere  ratiocination, 
I  am  not  likely  ever  to  detect  any  serious  flaws, 
especially  as  this  has  not  been  done  by  anybody 
else  during  the  many  years  of  its  existence.  But  I 
now  clearly  perceive  two  wellnigh  fatal  oversights 
which  I  then  committed.  The  first  was  undue 
confidence  in  merely  syllogistic  conclusions,  even 
when  derived  from  sound  premises,  in  regions 
of  such  high  abstraction.  The  second  was,  in 
not  being  sufficiently  careful  in  examining  the 
foundations  of  my  criticism,  i.  e.  the  validity  of 
its  premises.  I  will  here  briefly  consider  these 
two  points  separately, 

As  regards  the  first  point,  never  was  any  one 
more  arrogant  in  his  claims  for  pure  reason  than  I 
was — more  arrogant  in  spirit  though  not  in  letter, 
this  being  due  to  contact  with  science  ;  without  ever 
considering  how  opposed  to  reason  itself  is  the 
unexpressed  assumption  of  my  earlier  argument 
as  to  God  Himself,  as  if  His  existence  were  a 
merely  physical  problem   to  be  solved   by   man's 


102  Thoughts  on  Religion 

reason  alone,  without  reference  to  his  other  and 
higher  faculties  \ 

The  second  point  is  of  still  more  importance, 
because  so  seldom,  if  ever,  recognized. 

At  the  time  of  writing  the  Candid  Examination 
I  perceived  clearly  how  the  whole  question  of  Theism 
from  the  side  of  reason  turned  on  the  question  as 
to  the  nature  of  natural  causation.  My  theory  of 
natural  causation  obeyed  the  Law  of  Parsimony, 
resolving  all  into  Being  as  such ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  erred  in  not  considering  whether  '  higher 
causes  '  are  not '  necessary '  to  account  for  spiritual 
facts— i.e.  whether  the  ultimate  Being  must  not 
be  at  least  as  high  as  the  intellectual  and  spiritual 
nature  of  man,  i.  e.  higher  than  anything  merely 
physical  or  mechanical.  The  supposition  that  it 
must  does  not  violate  the  Law  of  Parsimony. 

Pure  agnostics  ought  to  investigate  the  religious 
consciousness  of  Christians  as  a  phenomenon  which 
may  possibly  be  what  Christians  themselves  believe 
it  to  be,  i.  e.  of  Divine  origin.  And  this  may  be 
done  without  entering  into  any  question  as  to  the 
objective  validity  of  Christian  dogmas.  The  meta- 
physics of  Christianity  may  be  all  false  in  fact,  and 
yet  the  spirit  of  Christianity  may  be  true  in  sub- 
stance— i.e.  it  may  be  the  highest  'good  gift  from 
above'  as  yet  given  to  man. 


1  [See  p.  29,  quotation  from  Preface  of  'Physicus.'  The  state  of 
mind  expressed  in  the  above  Note  is  a  return  to  the  earlier  frame 
of  mind  of  the  Burney  Essay,  e.g.  p.  20.  That  essay  was  fuU 
of  the  thought  that  Christian  evidences  are  very  manifold  and 
largely  '  extra-scientific' — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  103 

My  present  object,  then,  like  that  of  Socrates, 
is  not  to  impart  any  philosophical  system,  or  even 
positive  knowledge,  but  a  frame  of  mind,  what 
I  may  term,  pure  agnosticism,  as  distinguished 
from  what  is  commonly  so  called. 


§  2.  Definition  of  Terms  and  Purpose  of 
this  Treatise. 


[To  understand  George  Romanes'  mind  close 
attention  must  be  paid  to  the  following  section. 
Also  to  the  fact,  not  explicitly  noticed  by  him, 
that  he  uses  the  word  '  reason  '  (see  p.  I J  x)  in 
a  sense  closely  resembling  that  in  which  Mr.  Kidd 
has  recently  used  it  in  his  Social  Evolution.  He 
uses  it,  that  is,  in  a  restricted  sense  as  equivalent 
to  the  process  of  scientific  ratiocination.  His  main 
position  is  therefore  this :  Scientific  ratiocination 
cannot  find  adequate  grounds  for  belief  in  God. 
But  the  pure  agnostic  must  recognize  that  God 
may  have  revealed  Himself  by  other  means  than 
that  of  scientific  ratiocination.  As  religion  is  for  the 
whole  man,  so  all  human  faculties  may  be  required 
to  seek  after  God  and  find  Him — emotions  and  ex- 
periences of  an  extra-'  rational '  kind.  The  '  pure 
agnostic '  must  be  prepared  to  welcome  evidence  of 
all  sorts. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  105 

It  is  desirable  to  be  clear  at  the  outset  as  to 
the  meaning  which  I  shall  throughout  attach  to 
certain  terms  and  phrases. 


Theism. 

It  will  frequently  be  said,  'on  the  theory  of 
Theism,'  'supposing  Theism  true,'  &c.  By  such 
phrase  my  meaning  will  always  be  equivalent  to — 
'supposing,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the 
nearest  approach  which  the  human  mind  can  make 
to  a  true  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum,  is  that 
of  an  inconceivably  magnified  image  of  itself  at 
its  best' 

Christianity. 

Similarly,  when  it  is  said, '  supposing  Christianity 
true,'  what  will  be  meant  is — '  supposing  for  the  sake 
of  argument,  that  the  Christian  system  as  a  whole, 
from  its  earliest  dawn  in  Judaism,  to  the  phase 
of  its  development  at  the  present  time,  is  the 
highest  revelation  of  Himself  which  a  personal 
Deity  has  vouchsafed  to  mankind.'  This  I  intend 
to  signify  an  attitude  of  pure  agnosticism  as 
regards  any  particular  dogma  of  Christianity — even 
that  of  the  Incarnation. 

Should  it  be  said  that  by  holding  in  suspense 
any  distinctive  dogma  of  Christianity,  I  am  not 
considering  Christianity  at  all,  I  reply,  Not  so  ; 
I  am  not  writing  a  theological,  but  a  philosophical 
treatise,  and  shall  consider  Christianity  merely  as 


106  Thoughts  on  Religion 

one  of  many  religions,  though,  of  course,  the 
latest.  &c.  Thus  considered,  Christianity  takes  its 
place  as  the  highest  manifestation  of  evolution  in 
this  department  of  the  human  mind  ;  but  I  am  not 
concerned  even  with  so  important  an  ecclesiastical 
dogma  as  that  of  the  Incarnation  of  God  in  Christ. 
As  far  as  this  treatise  has  to  go,  that  dogma 
may  or  may  not  be  true.  The  important  question 
for  us  is,  Has  God  spoken  through  the  medium  of 
our  religious  instincts?  And  although  this  will 
necessarily  involve  the  question  whether  or  how 
far  in  the  case  of  Christianity  there  is  objective 
evidence  of  His  having  spoken  by  the  mouth  of 
holy  men  [of  the  Old  Testament]  which  have  been 
since  the  world  began,  such  will  be  the  case  only 
because  it  is  a  question  of  objective  evidence 
whether  or  how  far  the  religious  instincts  of  these 
men,  or  this  race  of  men,  have  been  so  much  superior 
to  those  of  other  men,  or  races  of  men,  as  to  have 
enabled  them  to  predict  future  events  of  a  religious 
character.  And  whether  or  not  in  these  latter 
days  God  has  spoken  by  His  own  Son  is  not 
a  question  for  us,  further  than  to  investigate  the 
higher  class  of  religious  phenomena  which  un- 
questionably have  been  present  in  the  advent  and 
person  of  Jesus.  The  question  whether  Jesus  was 
the  Son  of  God,  is,  logically  speaking,  a  question 
of  ontology,  which,  qua  pure  agnostics,  we  are 
logically  forbidden  to  touch. 

But  elsewhere  I  ought  to  show  that,  from  my 
point  of  view  as  to  the  fundamental  question  being 
whether     God    has    spoken    at    all    through    the 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  107 

religious  instincts  of  mankind,  it  may  very  well 
be  that  Christ  was  not  God,  and  yet  that  He  gave 
the  highest  revelation  of  God.  If  the  '  first  Man  ' 
was  allegorical,  why  not  the  '  second '  ?  It  is, 
indeed,  an  historical  fact  that  the  '  second  Man  ' 
existed,  but  so  likewise  may  the  '  first.'  And, 
as  regards  the  '  personal  claims '  of  Christ,  all 
that  He  said  is  not  incompatible  with  His  having 
been  Gabriel,  and  His  Holy  Ghost,  Michael  \  Or 
He  may  have  been  a  man  deceived  as  to  His 
own  personality,  and  yet  the  vehicle  of  highest 
inspiration. 

Religion. 

By  the  term  '  religion,'  I  shall  mean  any  theory 
of  personal  agency  in  the  universe,  belief  in  which 
is  strong  enough  in  any  degree  to  influence  conduct. 
No  term  has  been  used  more  loosely  of  late  years, 
or  in  a  greater  variety  of  meanings.  Of  course 
anybody  may  use  it  in  any  sense  he  pleases, 
provided  he  defines  exactly  in  what  sense  he 
does  so.  The  above  seems  to  be  most  in  accordance 
with  traditional  usage. 


Agnosticism  ' pure '  and  '  impure' 

The  modern  and  highly  convenient  term  '  Agnos- 
ticism,' is  used  in  two  very  different  senses.     By 

1  [I.e.    supernatural    but    not    strictly    Divine   Persons.     Surely, 
however,  the  proposition  is  not  maintainable. — Ed.] 


108  Thoughts  on  Religion 

its  originator,  Professor  Huxley,  it  was  coined  to 
signify  an  attitude  of  reasoned  ignorance  touching 
everything  that  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense- 
perception — a  professed  inability  to  found  valid 
belief  on  any  other  basis.  It  is  in  this  its  original 
sense — and  also,  in  my  opinion,  its  only  philoso- 
phically justifiable  sense — that  I  shall  understand 
the  term.  But  the  other,  and  perhaps  more  popular 
sense  in  which  the  word  is  now  employed,  is  as 
the  correlative  of  Mr.  H.  Spencer's  doctrine  of  the 
Unknowable. 

This  latter  term  is  philosophically  erroneous, 
implying  important  negative  knowledge  that  if 
there  be  a  God  we  know  this  much  about  Him  — 
that  He  cannot  reveal  Himself  to  man 1.  Pure 
agnosticism  is  as  defined  by  Huxley. 

Of  all  the  many  scientific  men  whom  I  have 
known,  the  most  pure  in  his  agnosticism — not  only 
in  profession  but  in  spirit  and  conduct — was 
Darwin.  (What  he  says  in  his  autobiography 
about  Christianity 2  shows  no  profundity  of  thought 
in  the  direction  of  philosophy  or  religion.  His 
mind  was  too  purely  inductive  for  this.  But,  on 
this  very  account,  it  is  the  more  remarkable  that 
his  rejection  of  Christianity  was  due,  not  to  any 
a  priori  bias  against  the  creed  on  grounds  of 
reason  as  absurd,  but  solely  on  the  ground  of  an 
apparent  moral  objection  a  posteriori*?)     Faraday 

1  [This  is  another  instance  of  recurrence  to  an  earlier  thought ;  see 
Burney  Essay,  p.  25. — En.] 

2  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  i.  30S. 

3  [See  further,  p.  182 — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  109 

and  many  other  first-rate  originators  in  science 
were  like  Darwin. 

As  an  illustration  of  impure  agnosticism  take 
Hume's  a  priori  argument  against  miracles,  lead- 
ing on  to  the  analogous  case  of  the  attitude  of 
scientific  men  towards  modern  spiritualism.  Not- 
withstanding that  they  have  the  close  analogy 
of  mesmerism  as  an  object-lesson  to  warn  them, 
scientific  men  as  a  class  are  here  quite  as  dogmatic 
as  the  straightest  sect  of  theologians.  I  may  give 
examples  which  can  cause  no  offence,  inasmuch 
as   the    men   in   question   have    themselves   made 

the  facts  public,  viz  refusing  to  go  to  [a  famous 

spiritualist]  ; refusing  to  try in  thought- 
reading  1.  These  men  all  professed  to  be  agnostics 
at  the  very  time  when  thus  so  egregiously  violating 
their  philosophy  by  their  conduct. 

Of  course  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that,  even  to 
a  pure  agnostic,  reason  should  not  be  guided  in 
part  by  antecedent  presumption — e.  g.  in  ordinary 
life,  the  prima  facie  case,  motive,  &c,  counts  for 
evidence  in  a  court  of  law — and  where  there  is 
a  strong  antecedent  improbability  a  proportionately 
greater  weight  of  evidence  a  posteriori  is  needed 
to  counterbalance  it :  so  that,  e.  g.  better  evidence 
would  be  needed  to  convict  the  Archbishop  of 
Canterbury  than  a  vagabond  of  pocket- picking. 
And  so  it  is  with  speculative  philosophy.  But 
in  both  cases  our  only  guide  is  known  analogy; 
therefore,  the  further  we  are  removed  from  possible 
experience — i.  e.  the  more  remote  from  experience 

1  [On  the  whole  I  have  thought  it  best  to  omit  the  names. — Ed.] 


no  Thoughts  on  Religion 

the  sphere  contemplated — the  less  value  attaches 
to  antecedent  presumptions1.  Maximum  remote- 
ness from  possible  experience  is  reached  in  the 
sphere  of  the  final  mystery  of  things  with  which 
religion  has  to  do ;  so  that  here  all  presumption 
has  faded  away  into  a  vanishing  point,  and  pure 
agnosticism  is  our  only  rational  attitude.  In  other 
words,  here  we  should  all  alike  be  pure  agnostics 
as  far  as  reason  is  concerned  ;  and,  if  any  of  us 
are  to  attain  to  any  information,  it  can  only  be  by 
means  of  some  super-added  faculty  of  our  minds. 
The  questions  as  to  whether  there  are  any  such 
super-added  faculties ;  if  so,  whether  they  ever 
appear  to  have  been  acted  upon  from  without ; 
if  they  have,  in  what  manner  they  have ;  what 
is  their  report ;  how  far  they  are  trustworthy 
in  that  report,  and  so  on — these  are  the  ques- 
tions with  which  this  treatise  is  to  be  mainly 
concerned. 


1  [The  MS.  note  here  continues  :  '  Here  introduce  all  that  I  say 
on  the  subject  in  my  Burney  Prize.'  I  have  not,  however,  introduced 
any  quotation  into  the  text  because  (i)  I  think  Romanes  makes  his 
meaning  plain  in  the  text  as  it  stands ;  (2)  I  cannot  find  in  the  essay 
in  question  any  exactly  appropriate  passage  of  reasonable  length  to 
quote.  The  greater  part  of  the  essay  is,  however,  directed  to  meet 
the  scientific  objection  to  the  doctrine  that  prayer  is  answered  in  the 
physical  region,  by  showing  that  this  objection  consists  in  an  argu- 
ment from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  i.  e.  from  the  known  sphere 
of  invariable  physical  laws  to  the  unknown  sphere  of  God's  relation 
to  all  such  laws  ;  and  is,  therefore,  weak  in  proportion  as  the  unknown 
sphere  is  remote  from  possible  experience  of  a  scientific  kind,  and 
admits  of  an  indefinite  number  of  possibilities,  more  or  less  con- 
ceivable to  our  imagination,  which  would  or  might  prevent  the 
scientific  argument  from  having  legitimate  application  to  the  question 
in  hand. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  in 

My  own  attitude  may  be  here  stated.  I  do  not 
claim  any  [religious]  certainty  of  an  intuitive  kind 
myself;  but  am  nevertheless  able  to  investigate  the 
abstract  logic  of  the  matter.  And,  although  this 
may  seem  but  barren  dialectic,  it  may,  I  hope,  be  of 
practical  service  if  it  secures  a  fair  hearing  to  the 
reports  given  by  the  vast  majority  of  mankind  who 
unquestionably  believe  them  to  emanate  from  some 
such  super-added  faculties — numerous  and  diverse 
though  their  religions  be.  Besides,  in  my  youth 
I  published  an  essay  (the  Candid  Examination) 
which  excited  a  good  deal  of  interest  at  the  time, 
and  has  been  long  out  of  print.  In  that  treatise 
I  have  since  come  to  see  that  I  was  wrong  touching 
what  I  constituted  the  basal  argument  for  my 
negative  conclusion.  Therefore  I  now  feel  it 
obligatory  on  me  to  publish  the  following  results 
of  my  maturer  thought,  from  the  same  stand-point 
of  pure  reason.  Even  though  I  have  obtained  no 
further  light  from  the  side  of  intuition,  I  have  from 
that  of  intellect.  So  that,  if  there  be  in  truth  any 
such  intuition,  I  occupy  with  regard  to  the  organ 
of  it  the  same  position  as  that  of  the  blind  lecturer 
on  optics.  But  on  this  very  account  I  cannot  be 
accused  of  partiality  towards  it. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  when  a  man  has 
clearly  perceived  agnosticism  to  be  the  only  legiti- 
mate attitude  of  reason  to  rest  in  with  regard  to 
religion  (as  I  will  subsequently  show  that  it  is),  he 
has  thereby  finished  with  the  matter ;  he  can  go 
no  further.  The  main  object  of  this  treatise  is  to 
show  that  such  is  by  no  means  the  case.     He  has 


ii2  Thoughts  on  Religion 

then  only  begun  his  enquiry  into  the  grounds  and 
justification  of  religious  belief.  For  reason  is  not 
the  only  attribute  of  man,  nor  is  it  the  only  faculty 
which  he  habitually  employs  for  the  ascertainment 
of  truth.  Moral  and  spiritual  faculties  are  of  no 
less  importance  in  their  respective  spheres  even 
of  everyday  life ;  faith,  trust,  taste,  &c,  are  as 
needful  in  ascertaining  truth  as  to  character,  beauty, 
&c,  as  is  reason.  Indeed  we  may  take  it  that 
reason  is  concerned  in  ascertaining  truth  only 
where  causation  is  concerned  ;  the  appropriate 
organs  for  its  ascertainment  where  anything  else 
is  concerned  belong  to  the  moral  and  spiritual 
region. 


As  Herbert  Spencer  says, c  men  of  science  may 
be  divided  into  two  classes,  of  which  the  one,  well 
exemplified  by  Faraday,  keeping  their  religion  and 
their  science  absolutely  separate,  are  unperplexed 
by  any  incongruities  between  them,  and  the  other 
of  which,  occupying  themselves  exclusively  with 
the  facts  of  science,  never  ask  what  implications 
they  have.  Be  it  trilobite  or  be  it  double  star, 
their  thought  about  it  is  much  like  the  thought 
of  Peter  Bell  about  the  primrose1.'  Now,  both 
these  classes  are  logical,  since  both,  as  to  their 
religion,  adopt  an  attitude  of  pure  agnosticism,  not 
only  in  theory,  but  also  in  practice.  What,  how- 
ever,  have  we  to    say    of   the   third    class,  which 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Feb.  1894. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  113 

Spencer  does  not  mention,  although  it  is,  I  think, 
the  largest,  viz.  of  those  scientific  men  who 
expressly  abstain  from  drawing  a  line  of  division 
between  science  and  religion  [and  then  judge 
of  religion  purely  on  the  principles  and  by  the 
method  of  science *]  ? 


There  are  two  opposite  casts  of  mind — the 
mechanical  (scientific,  &c.)  and  the  spiritual  (artistic, 
religious,  &c).  These  may  alternate  even  in  the 
same  individual.  An  '  agnostic  '  has  no  hesitation 
— even  though  he  himself  keenly  experience  the 
latter — that  the  former  only  is  worthy  of  trust. 
But  a  pure  agnostic  must  know  better,  as  he  will 
perceive  that  there  is  nothing  to  choose  between 
the  two  in  point  of  trustworthiness.  Indeed,  if 
choice  has  to  be  made  the  mystic  might  claim 
higher  authority  for  his  direct  intuitions. 


Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  well  said,  in  the  opening 
section  of  his  Synthetic  Philosophy,  that  wherever 
human  thought  appears  to  be  radically  divided, 
[there  must  be  truth  on  both  sides  and  that  the] 
1  reconciliation '  of  opposing  views  is  to  be  found 
by  emphasizing  that  ultimate  element  of  truth  which 
on  each  side  underlies  manifold  differences.  More 
than  is  generally  supposed  depends  on  points  of 
view,  especially  where  first  principles  of  a  subject  are 
in  dispute.     Opposite  sides  of  the  same  shield  may 

1  [Some  such  phrase  is  necessary  to  complete  the  sentence. — Ed.] 
H 


ii4  Thoughts  on  Religion 

present  wholly  different  aspects  \     Spencer  alludes 
to  this  with  special  reference  to  the  conflict  between 
science  and  religion ;    and  it  is  in  this  same  con- 
nexion that  I  also  allude  to  it.     For  it  seems  to 
me,  after  many  years  of  thought  upon  the  subject, 
that  the   '  reconciliation '  admits   of  being  carried 
much  further  than  it  has  been  by  him.     For   he 
effects   this   reconciliation  only   to    the   extent    of 
showing  that  religion  arises  from  the  recognition  of 
fundamental    mystery — which    it    may   be   proved 
that  science  also  recognizes  in  all  her  fundamental 
ideas.     This,  however,  is  after  all  little  more  than 
a    platitude.      That   our   ultimate    scientific   ideas 
(i.  e.  ultimate  grounds  of  experience)  are  inexplic- 
able, is  a  proposition  which  is  self-evident  since  the 
dawn  of  human  thought.     My  aim  is  to  carry  the 
1  reconciliation '   into    much    more   detail   and    yet 
without   quitting   the   grounds  of  pure  reason.     I 
intend  to  take  science  and  religion  in  their  present 
highly  developed    states   as   such,  and    show  that 
on  a  systematic  examination  of  the  latter  by  the 
methods  of  the  former,  the  '  conflict '  between  the 
two  may  be  not  merely  '  reconciled '  as  regards  the 
highest  generalities  of  each,  but  entirely  abolished 
in  all  matters  of  detail  which  can  be  regarded  as  of 
any  great  importance. 

In  any  methodical  enquiry  the  first  object  should 
be  to  ascertain  the  fundamental  principles  with 
which  the  enquiry  is  concerned.    In  actual  research, 

1  First  Principles,  Part  I,  ch.  I. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  115 

however,  it  is  by  no  means  always  the  case  that  the 
enquirer  knows,  or  is  able  at  first  to  ascertain  what 
those  principles  are.  In  fact,  it  is  often  only  at  the 
end  of  a  research,  that  they  are  discovered  to  be 
the  fundamental  principles.  Such  has  been  my 
own  experience  with  regard  to  the  subject  of  the 
present  enquiry.  Although  all  my  thinking  life 
has  been  concerned,  off  and  on,  in  contemplating 
the  problem  of  our  religious  instincts,  the  sundry 
attempts  which  have  been  made  by  mankind  for 
securing  their  gratification,  and  the  important 
question  as  to  their  objective  justification,  it  is  only 
in  advanced  years  that  I  have  clearly  perceived 
wherein  the  first  principles  of  such  a  research  must 
consist.  And  I  doubt  whether  any  one  has  hitherto 
clearly  defined  this  point.  The  principles  in  ques- 
tion are  the  nature  of  causation  and  the  nature  of 
faith. 


My  objects  then  in  this  treatise  are,  mainly, 
three:  1st,  to  purify  agnosticism;  2nd,  to  consider 
more  fully  than  heretofore,  and  from  the  stand-point 
of  pure  agnosticism,  the  nature  of  natural  causation, 
or,  more  correctly,  the  relation  of  what  we  know  on 
the  subject  of  such  causation  to  the  question  of 
Theism ;  and,  3rd,  again  starting  from  the  same 
stand-point,  to  consider  the  religious  conscious- 
nesses of  men  as  phenomena  of  experience  (i.  e.  as 
regarded  by  us  from  without),  and  especially  in  their 
highest  phase  of  development  as  exhibited  in 
Christianity. 

H    % 


§  3.   Causality. 

Only  because  we  are  so  familiar  with  the  great 
phenomenon  of  causality  do  we  take  it  for  granted, 
and  think  that  we  reach  an  ultimate  explanation 
of  anything  when  we  have  succeeded  in  finding 
the  '  cause  '  thereof:  when,  in  point  of  fact,  we  have 
only  succeeded  in  merging  it  in  the  mystery  of 
mysteries.  I  often  wish  we  could  have  come  into 
the  world,  like  the  young  of  some  other  mam- 
mals, with  all  the  powers  of  intellect  that  we  shall 
ever  subsequently  attain  already  developed,  but 
without  any  individual  experience,  and  so  without 
any  of  the  blunting  effects  of  custom.  Could  we 
have  done  so,  surely  nothing  in  the  world  would 
more  acutely  excite  our  intelligent  astonish- 
ment than  the  one  universal  fact  of  causation. 
That  everything  which  happens  should  have  a  cause, 
that  this  should  invariably  be  proportioned  to  its 
effect,  so  that,  no  matter  how  complex  the  inter- 
action of  causes,  the  same  interaction  should  always 
produce  the  same  result ;  that  this  rigidly  exact 
system  of  energizing  should  be  found  to  present  all 
the  appearances  of  universality  and  of  eternity,  so 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  117 

that,  e.  g.,  the  motion  of  the  solar  system  in  space 
is  being  determined  by  some  causes  beyond  human 
ken,  and  that  we  are  indebted  to  billions  of  cellular 
unions,  each  involving  billions  of  separate  causes, 
for  our  hereditary  passage  from  an  invertebrate 
ancestry, — that  such  things  should  be,  would  surely 
strike  us  as  the  most  wonderful  fact  in  this 
wonderful  universe.  • 

Now,  although  familiarity  with  this  fact  has  made 
us  forget  its  wonder  to  the  extent  of  virtually 
assuming  that  we  know  all  about  it,  philosophical 
enquiry  shows  that,  besides  empirically  knowing  it  J 
to  be  a  fact,  we  only  know  one  other  thing  about  it, 
viz. — that  our  knowledge  of  it  is  derived  from  our 
own  activity  when  we  ourselves  are  causes.  No 
result  of  psychological  analysis  seems  to  me  more 
certain  than  this1.  If  it  were  not  for  our  own 
volitions,  we  should  be  ignorant  of  what  we  can 
now  not  doubt,  on  pain  of  suicidal  scepticism,  to  be 
the  most  general  fact  of  nature.  Such,  at  least, 
seems  to  me  by  far  the  most  reasonable  theory  of 
our  idea  of  causality,  and  is  the  one  now  most 
generally  entertained  by  philosophers  of  every 
school.  ■ 

Now,  to  the  plain  man  it  will  always  seem  that 
if  our  very  notion  of  causality  is  derived  from  our 
own  volition — as  our  very  notion  of  energy  is 
derived  from  our  sense  of  effort  in  overcoming 
resistance  by  our  volition — presumably  the  truest 

1  [Here  it  was  intended  to  insert  further  explanation  '  showing  that 
mere  observation  of  causality  in  external  nature  would  not  have 
yielded  idea  of  anything  further  than  time  and  space  relations.' — Ed.] 


n8  Thoughts  on  Religion 

notion  we  can  form  of  that  in  which  causation 
objectively  consists  is  the  notion  derived  from  that 
known  mode  of  existence  which  alone  gives  us  the 
notion  of  causality  at  all.  Hence  the  plain  man 
will  always  infer  that  all  energy  is  of  the  nature  of 
will-energy,  and  all  objective  causation  of  the  nature 
of  subjective.  Nor  is  this  inference  confined  to  the 
plain  man ;  the  deepest  philosophical  thinkers 
have  arrived  at  substantially  the  same  opinion, 
e.  g.  Hegel,  Schopenhauer.  So  that  the  direct 
and  most  natural  interpretation  of  causality  in 
external  nature  which  is  drawn  by  primitive 
thought  in  savages  and  young  children,  seems 
destined  to  become  also  the  ultimate  deliverance  of 
human  thought  in  the  highest  levels  of  its  culture1. 
But,  be  this  as  it  may,  we  are  not  concerned  with 
any  such  questions  of  abstract  philosophical  specu- 
lation. As  pure  agnostics  they  lie  beyond  our 
sphere.  Therefore,  I  allude  to  them  only  for  the 
sake  of  showing  that  there  is  nothing  either  in  the 
science  or  philosophy  of  mankind  inimical  to  the 
theory  of  natural  causation  being  the  energizing  of 
a  will  objective  to  us.  And  we  can  plainly  see 
that  if  such  be  the  case,  and  if  that  will  be  self- 
consistent,  its  operations,  as  revealed  in  natural 
causation,  must  appear  to  us  when  considered  en 
bloc  (or  not  piece-meal  as  by  savages),  non- 
volitional,  or  mechanical. 

1  [This  theory  was  suggested  in  the  Burney  Essay,  p.  136, 
and  ridiculed  in  the  Candid  Examination ;  see  above,  p.  11. 
Romanes  intended  at  this  point  to  consider  at  greater  length  his 
old  views  '  on  causation  as  due  to  being  qua  being.' — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion   119 

Of  all  philosophical  theories  of  causality  the  most 
repugnant  to  reason  must  be  those  of  Hume,  Kant 
and  Mill,  which  while  differing  from  one  another 
agree  in  this — that  they  attribute  the  principle  of 
causality  to  a  creation  of  our  own  minds,  or  in  other 
words  deny  that  there  is  anything  objective  in  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect— i.  e.  in  the  very  thing 
which  all  physical  science  is  engaged  in  discovering 
in  particular  cases  of  it. 


The  conflict  of  Science  and  Religion  has  always 
arisen  from  one  common  ground  of  agreement, 
or  fundamental  postulate  of  both  parties — with- 
out which,  indeed,  it  would  plainly  have  been 
impossible  that  any  conflict  could  have  arisen, 
inasmuch  as  there  would  then  have  been  no  field 
for  battle.  Every  thesis  must  rest  on  some 
hypothesis ;  therefore,  in  cases  where  two  or  more 
rival  theses  rest  on  a  common  hypothesis,  the 
disputes  must  needs  collapse  so  soon  as  the 
common  hypothesis  is  proved  erroneous.  And 
proportionably,  in  whatever  degree  the  previously 
common  hypothesis  is  shown  to  be  dubious,  in  that 
degree  are  the  disputations  shown  to  be  possibly 
unreal.  Now,  it  is  one  of  the  main  objects  of  this 
treatise  to  show  that  the  common  hypothesis  on 
which  all  the  disputes  between  Science  and  Religion 
have  arisen,  is  highly  dubious.  And  not  only  so. 
but  that  quite  apart  from  modern  science  all  the 
difficulties  on  the  side  of  intellect  (or  reason)  which 
religious  belief  has  ever  encountered    in  the  past, 


120  Thoughts  on  Religion 

or  can  ever  encounter  in  the  future,  whether  in  the 
individual  or  the  race,  arise,  and  arise  exclusively, 
from  the  self-same  ground  of  this  highly  dubious 
hypothesis. 

The  hypothesis,  or  fundamental  postulate,  in 
question  is,  If  titer e  be  a  personal  God,  He  is  not 
immediately  concerned  with  natural  causation.  It 
is  assumed  that  qua  '  first  cause,'  He  can  in  no 
way  be  concerned  with  '  second  causes,'  further 
than  by  having  started  them  in  the  first  instance 
as  a  great  machinery  of  '  natural  causation,'  work- 
ing under  '  general  laws.'  True  the  theory  of 
Deism,  which  entertains  more  or  less  expressly  this 
hypothesis  of  '  Deus  ex  machina,'  has  during  the 
present  century  been  more  and  more  superseded 
by  that  of  Theism,  which  entertains  also  in  some 
indefinable  measure  the  doctrine  of  'immanence'; 
as  well  as  by  that  of  Pantheism,  which  expressly 
holds  this  doctrine  to  the  exclusion  in  toto  of  its 
rival.  But  Theism  'has  never  yet  entertained  it 
sufficiently  or  up  to  the  degree  required  by  the  pure 
logic  of  the  case,  while  Pantheism  has  but  rarely 
considered  the  rival  doctrine  of  personality — or  the 
possible  union  of  immanence  with  personality  \ 

Now  it  is  the  object  of  this  book  to  go  much 
further  than  any  one  has  hitherto  gone  in  proving 
the  possibility  of  this  union.  For  I  purpose  to 
show  that,  provided  only  we  lay  aside  all  prejudice, 

1  See,  however,  Aubrey  Moore  in  Lux  Mundi,  pp.  94-96,  and  Le 
Conte,  Evolution  in  its  Relation  to  Religious  Thought,  pp.  335,  ff. 
[N.li.  The  references  not  enclosed  in  brackets  are  the  author's,  not 
mine. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  121 

sentiment,  &c,  and  follow  to  its  logical  termination 
the  guidance  of  pure  reason,  there  are  no  other 
conclusions  to  be  reached  than  these.  Namely, 
(A)  That  if  there  be  a  personal  God,  no  reason  can 
be  assigned  why  He  should  not  be  immanent  in 
nature,  or  why  all  causation  should  not  be  the 
immediate  expression  of  His  will.  (B)  That  every 
available  reason  points  to  the  inference  that  He 
probably  is  so.  (C)  That  if  He  is  so,  and  if  His 
will  is  self-consistent,  all  natural  causation  must 
needs  appear  to  us  '  mechanical.'  Therefore  (D) 
that  it  is  no  argument  against  the  divine  origin  of 
a  thing,  event,  &c,  to  prove  it  due  to  natural 
causation. 

After  having  dealt  briefly  with  (A),  (B)  and  (C), 
I  would  show  that  (D)  is  the  most  practically  impor- 
tant of  these  four  conclusions.  For  the  fundamental 
hypothesis  which  I  began  by  mentioning  is  just  the 
opposite  of  this.  Whether  tacitly  or  expressly,  it 
has  always  been  assumed  by  both  sides  in  the 
controversy  between  Science  and  Religion,  that  as 
soon  as  this  that  and  the  other  phenomenon  has  been 
explained  by  means  of  natural  causation,  it  has 
thereupon  ceased  to  be  ascribable  [directly]  to  God. 
The  distinction  between  the  natural  and  the  super- 
natural has  always  been  regarded  by  both  sides  as 
indisputably  sound,  and  this  fundamental  agree- 
ment as  to  ground  of  battle  has  furnished  the  only 
possible  condition  to  fighting.  It  has  also  furnished 
the  condition  of  all  the  past,  and  may  possibly 
furnish  the  condition  of  all  the  future,  discomfitures 
of  religion.     True  religion  is  indeed   learning  her 


122  Thoughts  on  Religion 

lesson  that  something  is  wrong  in  her  method  of 
fighting,  and  many  of  her  soldiers  are  now  waking 
up  to  the  fact  that  it  is  here  that  her  error  lies—  as  in 
past  times  they  woke  up  to  see  the  error  of  denying 
the  movement  of  the  earth,  the  antiquity  of  the 
earth,  the  origin  of  species  by  evolution,  &c  But 
no  one,  even  of  her  captains  and  generals,  has  so 
far  followed  up  their  advantage  to  its  ultimate 
consequences.  And  this  is  what  I  want  to  do.  The 
logical  advantage  is  clearly  on  their  side  ;  and  it  is 
their  own  fault  if  they  do  not  gain  the  ultimate 
victory, — not  only  as  against  science,  but  as 
against  intellectual  dogmatism  in  every  form. 
This  can  be  routed  all  along  the  line.  For  science 
is  only  the  organized  study  of  natural  causation, 
and  the  experience  of  every  human  being,  in  so  far 
as  it  leads  to  dogmatism  on  purely  intellectual 
grounds,  does  so  on  account  of  entertaining  the 
fundamental  postulate  in  question.  The  influence 
of  custom  and  want  of  imagination  is  here  very 
great.  But  the  answer  always  should  be  to  move 
the  ulterior  question — what  is  the  nature  of  natural 
causation  ? 

Now  I  propose  to  push  to  its  full  logical  con- 
clusion the  consequence  of  this  answer.  For  no  one, 
even  the  most  orthodox,  has  as  yet  learnt  this 
lesson  of  religion  to  anything  like  fullness.  God  is 
still  grudged  His  own  universe,  so  to  speak,  as  far 
and  as  often  as  He  can  possibly  be.  As  examples 
we  may  take  the  natural  growth  of  Christianity  out 
of  previous  religions  ;  the  natural  spread  of  it  ;  the 
natural  conversion  of  St.  Paul,  or  of  anybody  else. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  123 

It  is  still  assumed  on  both  sides  that  there  must  be 
something  inexplicable  or  miraculous  about  a  phe- 
nomenon in  order  to  its  being  divine. 

What  else  have  science  and  religion  ever  had  to 
fight  about  save  on  the  basis  of  this  common 
hypothesis,  and  hence  as  to  whether  the  causation 
of  such  and  such  a  phenomenon  has  been  '  natural ' 
or  '  super-natural.'  For  even  the  disputes  as  to 
science  contradicting  scripture,  ultimately  turn  on 
the  assumption  of  inspiration  (supposing  it  genuine) 
being  '  super-natural '  as  to  its  causation.  Once 
grant  that  it  is  '  natural 5  and  all  possible  ground  of 
dispute  is  removed. 

I  can  well  understand  why  infidelity  should 
make  the  basal  assumption  in  question,  because  its 
whole  case  must  rest  thereon.  But  surely  it  is 
time  for  theists  to  abandon  this  assumption. 

The  assumed  distinction  between  causation  as 
natural  and  super-natural  no  doubt  began  in  super- 
stition in  prehistoric  time,  and  throughout  the 
historical  period  has  continued  from  a  vague 
feeling  that  the  action  of  God  must  be  mysterious, 
and  hence  that  the  province  of  religion  must  be 
within  the  super-sensuous.  Now,  it  is  true  enough 
that  the  finite  cannot  comprehend  the  infinite, 
and  hence  the  feeling  in  question  is  logically  sound. 
But  under  the  influence  of  this  feeling,  men  have 
always  committed  the  fallacy  of  concluding  that  if 
a  phenomenon  has  been  explained  in  terms  of 
natural  causation,  it  has  thereby  been  explained  in 
toto — forgetting  that  it  has  only  been  explained  up 
to  the  point  where  such  causation  is  concerned,  and 


124  Thoughts  on  Religion 

that  the  real  question  of  ultimate  causation  has 
merely  been  thus  postponed.  And  assuredly 
beyond  this  point  there  is  an  infinitude  of  mystery 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  most  exacting  mystic.  For 
even  Herbert  Spencer  allows  that  in  ultimate 
analysis  all  natural  causation  is  inexplicable. 

Logically  regarded  the  advance  of  science,  far 
from  having  weakened  religion,  has  immeasurably 
strengthened  it.  For  it  has  proved  the  uniformity 
of  natural  causation.  The  so-called  natural  sphere 
has  increased  at  the  expense  of  the  '  super-natural.' 
Unquestionably.  But  although  to  lower  grades  of 
culture  this  always  seems  a  fact  inimical  to  religion, 
we  may  now  perceive  it  is  quite  the  reverse,  since 
it  merely  goes  to  abolish  the  primitive  or  un- 
cultured distinction  in  question. 

It  is  indeed  most  extraordinary  how  long  this 
distinction  has  held  sway,  or  how  it  is  the  ablest 
men  of  all  generations  have  quietly  assumed  that 
when  once  we  know  the  natural  causation  of  any 
phenomenon,  we  therefore  know  all  about  it — or,  as 
it  were,  have  removed  it  from  the  sphere  of  mystery 
altogether,  when,  in  point  of  fact,  we  have  only 
merged  it  in  a  much  greater  mystery  than  ever. 

But  the  answer  to  our  astonishment  how  this 
distinction  has  managed  to  survive  so  long  lies  in 
the  extraordinary  effect  of  custom,  which  here 
seems  to  slay  reason  altogether ;  and  the  more 
a  man  busies  himself  with  natural  causes  (e.  g.  in 
scientific  research)  the  greater  does  this  slavery  to 
custom  become,  till  at  last  he  seems  positively  un- 
able to    perceive    the    real    state    of  the   case — 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  125 

regarding  any  rational  thinking  thereon  as  chi- 
merical, so  that  the  term  '  meta-physical, '  even  in 
its  etymological  sense  as  super-sensuous  or  beyond 
physical  causation,  becomes  a  term  of  rational  re- 
proach. Obviously  such  a  man  has  written  himself 
down,  if  not  an  ass,  at  all  events  a  creature  wholly 
incapable  of  rationally  treating  any  of  the  highest 
problems  presented  either  by  nature  or  by  man. 

On  any  logical  theory  of  Theism  there  can  be 
no  such  distinction  between  '  natural '  and  '  super- 
natural '  as  is  usually  drawn,  since  on  that  theory 
all  causation  is  but  the  action  of  the  Divine  Will. 
And  if  we  draw  any  distinction  between  such  action 
as  '  immediate  '  or  '  mediate/  we  can  only  mean 
this  as  valid  in  relation  to  mankind — i.  e.  in 
relation  to  our  experience.  For,  obviously,  it 
would  be  wholly  incompatible  with  pure  agnosti- 
cism to  suppose  that  we  are  capable  of  drawing  any 
such  distinction  in  relation  to  the  Divine  activity 
itself.  Even  apart  from  the  theory  of  Theism, 
pure  agnosticism  must  take  it  that  the  real  distinc- 
tion is  not  between  natural  and  supernatural,  but 
between  the  explicable  and  the  inexplicable — 
meaning  by  those  terms  that  which  is  and  that 
which  is  not  accountable  by  such  causes  as  fall 
within  the  range  of  human  observation.  Or,  in 
other  words,  the  distinction  is  really  between  the 
observable  and  the  unobservable  causal  processes  of 
the  universe. 

Although  science  is  essentially  engaged  in 
explaining,  her  work  is  necessarily  confined  to  the 
sphere  of  natural  causation  ;   beyond  that  sphere 


126  Thoughts  on  Religion 

(i.  e.  the  sensuous)  she  can  explain  nothing.  In 
other  words,  even  if  she  were  able  to  explain  the 
natural  causation  of  everything,  she  would  be 
unable  to  assign  the  ultimate  raison  d'etre  of 
anything. 


It  is  not  my  intention  to  write  an  essay  on  the 
nature  of  causality,  or  even  to  attempt  a  survey  of 
the  sundry  theories  which  have  been  propounded 
on  this  subject  by  philosophers.  Indeed,  to 
attempt  this  would  be  little  less  than  to  write 
a  history  of  philosophy  itself.  Nevertheless  it  is 
necessary  for  my  purpose  to  make  a  few  remarks 
touching  the  main  branches  of  thought  upon  the 
matter1. 

The  remarkable  nature  of  the  facts.  These  are 
remarkable,  since  they  are  common  to  all  human 
experience.  Everything  that  happens  has  a  cause. 
The  same  happening  has  always  the  same  cause 
— or  the  same  consequent  the  same  antecedent. 
It  is  only  familiarity  with  this  great  fact  that 
prevents  universal  wonder  at  it,  for,  notwithstanding 
all  the  theories  upon  it,  no  one  has  ever  really 
shown  why  it  is  so.  That  the  same  causes  always 
produce  the  same  effects  is  a  proposition  which 
expresses  a  fundamental  fact  of  our  knowledge,  but 
the  knowledge  of  this  fact  is  purely  empirical  ; 
we  can  show  no  reason  why  it  should  be  a  fact. 
Doubtless,  if  it  were  not  a  fact,  there  could  be  no 

1  [Nothing  more  however  was  written  than  what  follows  im- 
mediately.— Ed.] 


A    Candid  Examination  of  Religion  127 

so-called  '  Order  of  Nature.'  and  consequently  no 
science,  no  philosophy,  or  perhaps  (if  the  irregularity 
were  sufficiently  frequent)  no  possibility  of  human 
experience.  But  although  this  is  easy  enough  to 
show,  it  in  no  wise  tends  to  show  why  the  same 
causes  should  always  produce  the  same  effects. 

So  manifest  is  it  that  our  knowledge  of  the  fact 
in  question  is  only  empirical,  that  some  of  our 
ablest  thinkers,  such  as  Hume  and  Mill,  have 
failed  to  perceive  even  so  much  as  the  intellectual 
necessity  of  looking  beyond  our  empirical  know- 
ledge of  the  fact  to  gain  any  explanation  of  the 
fact  itself.  Therefore  they  give  to  the  world  the 
wholly  vacuous,  or  merely  tautological  theory  of 
causation — viz.  that  of  constancy  of  sequence 
within  human  observation 1. 


If  it  be  said  of  my  argument  touching  causality, 
that  it  is  naturalizing  or  materializing  the  super- 
natural or  spiritual  (as  most  orthodox  persons 
will  feel),  my  reply  is  that  deeper  thought  will 
show  it  to  be  at  least  as  susceptible  of  the  oppo- 
site view — viz.  that  it  is  subsuming  the  natural 
into  the  super-natural,  or  spiritualizing  the  material  : 
and  a  pure  agnostic,  least  of  all,  should  have  any- 
thing to  say  as  against  either  of  these  alternative 
points  of  view.  Or  we  may  state  the  matter  thus  : 
in  as  far  as  pure  reason  can  have  anything  to  say 

1  [The  author  intended  further  to  show  the  vacuity  of  this  theory 
and  point  out  how  Mill  himself  appears  to  perceive  it  by  his  introduc- 
tion after  the  term  '  invariably  '  of  the  term  '  unconditionally  ' ;  he 
refers  also  to  Martineau,  Study  of  Religion,  i.  pp.  152,  3.  — Ed.] 


128  Thoughts  on  Religion 

in  the  matter,  she  ought  to  incline  towards  the  view 
of  my  doctrine  spiritualizing  the  material,  because 
it  is  pretty  certain  that  we  could  know  nothing 
about  natural  causation — even  so  much  as  its 
existence — but  for  our  own  volitions. 

t       Free  Will1. 

Having  read  all  that  is  said  to  be  worth  read- 
ing on  the  Free  Will  controversy,  it  appears  to  me 
that  the  main  issues  and  their  logical  conclusions 
admit  of  being  summed  up  in  a  very  few  words, 
thus : — 

i.  A  writer,  before  he  undertakes  to  deal  with 
this  subject  at  all,  should  be  conscious  of  fully 
perceiving  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
responsibility  as  merely  legal  and  as  also  moral  ; 
otherwise  he  cannot  but  miss  the  very  essence  of 
the  question  in  debate.  No  one  questions  the 
patent  fact  of  responsibility  as  legal  ;  the  only 
question  is  touching  responsibility  as  moral.  Yet 
the  principal  bulk  of  literature  on  Free  Will  and 
Necessity  arises  from  disputants  on  both  sides 
failing  to  perceive  this  basal  distinction.  Even 
such  able  writers  as  Spencer,  Huxley  and  Clifford 
are  in  this  position. 

2.  The  root  question  is  as  to  whether  the  will 
is  caused  or  un-caused.  For  however  much  this 
root-question  may  be  obscured  by  its  own  abundant 

1  [This  Note  on  Free  Will  is  exceedingly  incomplete  and  conse- 
quently obscure.  But  it  seemed  to  me  on  the  whole  to  be  sufficiently 
intelligible  to  admit  of  publication. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  129 

foliage,  the  latter  can  have  no  existence  but  that 
which  it  derives  from  the  former. 

3.  Consequently,  if  libertarians  grant  causality 
as  appertaining  to  the  will,  however  much  they 
may  beat  about  the  bush,  they  are  surrendering 
their  position  all  along  the  line,  unless  they  fall 
back  upon  the  more  ultimate  question  as  to  the 
nature  of  natural  causation.  Now  it  can  be 
proved  that  this  more  ultimate  question  is  [scien- 
tifically] unanswerable.  Therefore  both  sides  may 
denominate  natural  causation  x — an  unknown 
quantity. 

4.  Hence  the  whole  controversy  ought  to  be 
seen  by  both  sides  to  resolve  itself  into  this — is 
or  is  not  the  will  determined  by  x?  And,  if  this 
seems  but  a  barren  question  to  debate,  I  do  not 
undertake  to  deny  the  fact.  At  the  same  time 
there  is  clearly  this  real  issue  remaining — viz.  Is 
the  will  self-determining,  or  is  it  determined — i.e. 
from  without} 

5.  If  determined  from  without,  is  there  any  room 
for  freedom,  in  the  sense  required  for  saving  the 
doctrine  of  moral  responsibility  ?  And  I  think  the 
answer  to  this  must  be  an  unconditional  negative. 

6.  But,  observe,  it  is  not  one  and  the  same 
thing  to  ask,  Is  the  will  entirely  determined  from 
without?  and  Is  the  will  entirely  determined  by 
natural  causation  (x)  ?  For  the  unknown  quantity 
x  may  very  well  include  x,  if  by  x  we  under- 
stand all  the  unknown  ingredients  of  personality. 

7.  Hence,  determinists  gain   no  advantage  over 

I 


130  Thoughts  on  Religion 

their  adversaries  by  any  possible  proof  (at  present 
impossible)  that  all  acts  of  will  are  due  to  natural 
causation,  unless  they  can  show  the  nature  of  the 
latter,  and  that  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as  supports 
their  conclusion.  For  aught  we  at  present  know,  the 
will  may  very  well  be  free  in  the  sense  required, 
even  though  all  its  acts  are  due  to  x. 

8.  In  particular,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  con- 
trary, all  may  be  due  to  x\  i.e.  all  causation  may  be 
of  the  nature  of  will  (as,  indeed,  many  systems 
of  philosophy  maintain),  with  the  result  that  every 
human  will  is  of  the  nature  of  a  First  Cause.  In 
support  of  which  possibility  it  may  be  remarked 
that  most  philosophies  are  led  to  the  theory  of 
a  causa  cansarum  as  regards  x. 

9.  To  the  obvious  objection  that  with  a 
plurality  of  first  causes— each  the  fons  et  origo  of 
a  new  and  never-ending  stream  of  causality — the 
cosmos  must  sooner  or  later  become  a  chaos  by 
cumulative  intersection  of  the  streams,  the  answer 
is  to  be  found  in  the  theory  of  monism  \ 

10.  Nevertheless,  the  ultimate  difficulty  remains 
which  is  depicted  in  my  essay  on  the  '  World  as  an 
Eject  V  But  this,  again,  is  merged  in  the  mystery 
of  Personality,  which  is  only  known  as  an  inex- 
plicable, and  seemingly  ultimate,  fact. 

11.  So  that  the  general  conclusion  of  the  whole 
matter  must  be — pure  agnosticism. 

1  [See  above,  p.  31. — Ed.] 

2  Contemporary  Review,  July  1886.  [But  the  '  ultimate  difficulty' 
referred  to  above  would  seem  to  be  the  relation  of  manifold  dependent 
human  wills  to  the  One  Ultimate  and  All-embracing  Will. — Ed.] 


§  4-    Faith. 


Faith  in  its  religious  sense  is  distinguished  not 
only  from  opinion  (or  belief  founded  on  reason 
alone),  in  that  it  contains  a  spiritual  element :  it 
is  further  distinguished  from  belief  founded  on 
the  afTections,  by  needing  an  active  co-operation 
of  the  will.  Thus  all  parts  of  the  human  mind 
have  to  be  involved  in  faith — intellect,  emotions, 
will.  We  '  believe'  in  the  theory  of  evolution  on 
grounds  of  reason  alone  ;  we  '  believe '  in  the 
affection  of  our  parents,  children,  &c,  almost  (or 
it  may  be  exclusively)  on  what  I  have  called 
spiritual  grounds — i.e.  on  grounds  of  spiritual  ex- 
perience ;  for  this  we  need  no  exercise  either  of 
reason  or  of  will.  But  no  one  can  '  believe '  in 
God,  or  a  fortiori  in  Christ,  without  also  a 
severe  effort  of  will.  This  I  hold  to  be  a  matter 
of  fact,  whether  or  not  there  be  a  God  or  a 
Christ. 

Observe  will  is  to  be  distinguished  from  desire. 
It  matters  not  what  psychologists  may  have  to 
say  upon  this  subject.  Whether  desire  differs  from 
will    in    kind  or  only  in  degree — whether  will    is 

I    2 


132  Thoughts  on  Religion 

desire  in  action,  so  to  speak,  and  desire  but  in- 
cipient will — are  questions  with  which  we  need 
not  trouble  ourselves.  For  it  is  certain  that  there 
are  agnostics  who  would  greatly  prefer  being 
theists,  and  theists  who  would  give  all  they  pos- 
sess to  be  Christians,  if  they  could  thus  secure 
promotion  by  purchase — i.e.  by  one  single  act  of 
will  But  yet  the  desire  is  not  strong  enough  to 
sustain  the  will  in  perpetual  action,  so  as  to  make 
the  continual  sacrifices  which  Christianity  entails. 
Perhaps  the  hardest  of  these  sacrifices  to  an  in- 
telligent man  is  that  of  his  own  intellect.  At 
least  I  am  certain  that  this  is  so  in  my  own  case. 
I  have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  constitute  my 
reason  my  sole  judge  of  truth,  that  even  while 
reason  itself  tells  me  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
expect  that  the  heart  and  the  will  should  be  re- 
quired to  join  with  reason  in  seeking  God  (for 
religion  is  for  the  whole  man),  I  am  too  jealous 
of  my  reason  to  exercise  my  will  in  the  direction 
of  my  most  heart-felt  desires.  For  assuredly  the 
strongest  desire  of  my  nature  is  to  find  that  that 
nature  is  not  deceived  in  its  highest  aspirations. 
Yet  I  cannot  bring  myself  so  much  as  to  make 
a  venture  in  the  direction  of  faith.  For  instance, 
regarded  from  one  point  of  view  it  seems  reason- 
able enough  that  Christianity  should  have  enjoined 
the  doing  of  the  doctrine  as  a  necessary  condition 
to  ascertaining  (i.  e.  '  believing ')  its  truth.  But 
from  another,  and  my  more  habitual  point  of  view, 
it  seems  almost  an  affront  to  reason  to  make 
any  such    'fool's    experiment' — just    as    to    some 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  133 

scientific  men  it  seems  absurd  and  childish  to  ex- 
pect them  to  investigate  the  '  superstitious  '  follies 
of  modern  spiritualism.  Even  the  simplest  act 
of  will  in  regard  to  religion — that  of  prayer — 
has  not  been  performed  by  me  for  at  least  a 
quarter  of  a  century,  simply  because  it  has  seemed 
so  impossible  to  pray,  as  it  were,  hypothetically, 
that  much  as  I  have  always  desired  to  be  able 
to  pray,  I  cannot  will  the  attempt.  To  justify 
myself  for  what  my  better  judgement  has  often 
seen  to  be  essentially  irrational,  I  have  ever  made 
sundry  excuses.  The  chief  of  them  has  run  thus. 
Even  supposing  Christianity  true,  and  even  sup- 
posing that  after  having  so  far  sacrificed  my  reason 
to  my  desire  as  to  have  satisfied  the  supposed 
conditions  to  obtaining  'grace'  or  direct  illumin- 
ation from  God, — even  then  would  not  my  reason 
turn  round  and  revenge  herself  upon  me  ?  For 
surely  even  then  my  habitual  scepticism  would 
make  me  say  to  myself — 'this  is  all  very  sublime 
and  very  comforting ;  but  what  evidence  have 
you  to  give  me  that  the  whole  business  is  any- 
thing more  than  self-delusion  ?  The  wish  was 
probably  father  to  the  thought,  and  you  might 
much  better  have  performed  your  "  act  of  will  "  by 
going  in  for  a  course  of  Indian  hemp.'  Of  course 
a  Christian  would  answer  to  this  that  the  internal 
light  would  not  admit  of  such  doubt,  any  more 
than  seeing  the  sun  does — that  God  knows  us  well 
enough  to  prevent  that,  &c,  and  also  that  it  is 
unreasonable  not  to  try  an  experiment  lest  the 
result  should  prove  too  good  to  be  credible,  and 


134  Thoughts  on  Religion 

so  on.  And  I  do  not  dispute  that  the  Christian 
would  be  justified  in  so  answering,  but  I  only 
adduce  the  matter  as  an  illustration  of  the  dif- 
ficulty which  is  experienced  in  conforming  to  all 
the  conditions  of  attaining  to  Christian  faith — even 
supposing  it  to  be  sound.  Others  have  doubtless 
other  difficulties,  but  mine  is  chiefly,  I  think, 
that  of  an  undue  regard  to  reason,  as  against 
heart  and  will — undue.  I  mean,  if  so  it  be  that 
Christianity  is  true,  and  the  conditions  to  faith 
in  it  have  been  of  divine  ordination. 

This  influence  of  will  on  belief,  even  in  matters 
secular,  is  the  more  pronounced  the  further  re- 
moved these  matters  may  be  from  demonstration  (as 
already  remarked) ;  but  this  is  most  of  all  the  case 
where  our  personal  interests  are  affected — whether 
these  be  material  or  intellectual,  such  as  credit  for 
consistency,  &c.  See,  for  example,  how  closely, 
in  the  respects  we  are  considering,  political  beliefs 
resemble  religious.  Unless  the  points  of  difference 
are  such  that  truth  is  virtually  demonstrable  on 
one  side,  so  that  adhesion  to  the  opposite  is  due 
to  conscious  sacrifice  of  integrity  to  expediency, 
we  always  find  that  party-spectacles  so  colour 
the  view  as  to  leave  reason  at  the  mercy  of 
will,  custom,  interest,  and  all  the  other  circum- 
stances which  similarly  operate  on  religious  beliefs. 
It  seems  to  make  but  little  difference  in  either 
case  what  level  of  general  education,  mental  power, 
special  training,  &c,  is  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
question  under  judgement.  From  the  Premier  to 
the  peasant  we  find  the  same  difference  of  opinion 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  135 

in  politics  as  we  do  in  religion.  And  in  each 
case  the  explanation  is  the  same.  Beliefs  are  so 
little  dependent  on  reason  alone  that  in  such 
regions  of  thought — i.  e.  where  personal  interests 
are  affected  and  the  evidences  of  truth  are  not  in 
their  nature  demonstrable — it  really  seems  as  if 
reason  ceases  to  be  a  judge  of  evidence  or  guide 
to  truth,  and  becomes  a  mere  advocate  of  opinion 
already  formed  on  quite  other  grounds.  Now 
these  other  grounds  are,  as  we  have  seen,  mainly 
the  accidents  of  habit  or  custom,  wish  being  father 
to  the  thought,  &c. 

Now  this  may  be  all  deplorable  enough  in 
politics,  and  in  all  other  beliefs  secular ;  but  who 
shall  say  it  is  not  exactly  as  it  ought  to  be  in 
the  matter  of  beliefs  religious?  For,  unless  we 
beg  the  question  of  a  future  life  in  the  negative, 
we  must  entertain  at  least  the  possibility  of  our 
being  in  a  state  of  probation  in  respect  of  an 
honest  use  not  only  of  our  reason,  but  probably 
still  more  of  those  other  ingredients  of  human 
nature  which  go  to  determine  our  beliefs  touch- 
ing this  most  important  of  all  matters. 

It  is  remarkable  how  even  in  politics  it  is  the 
moral  and  spiritual  elements  of  character  which 
lead  to  success  in  the  long  run,  even  more  than 
intellectual  ability — supposing,  of  course,  that  the 
latter  is  not  below  the  somewhat  high  level  of 
our  Parliamentary  assemblies. 

As  regards  the  part  that  is  played  by  will  in 
the  determining  of  belief,  one  can  show  how  un- 
consciously large  this  is  even  in  matters  of  secular 


136  Thoughts  on  Religion 

interest.  Reason  is  very  far  indeed  from  being 
the  sole  guide  of  judgement  that  it  is  usually 
taken  to  be — so  far,  indeed,  that,  save  in  matters 
approaching  down-right  demonstration  (where  of 
course  there  is  no  room  for  any  other  ingredient) 
it  is  usually  hampered  by  custom,  prejudice, 
dislike,  &c ,  to  a  degree  that  would  astonish  the 
most  sober  philosopher  could  he  lay  bare  to 
himself  all  the  mental  processes  whereby  the 
complex  act  of  assent  or  dissent  is  eventually 
determined 1. 

As  showing  how  little  reason  alone  has  to  do 
with  the  determining  of  religious  belief,  let  us 
take  the  case  of  mathematicians.  This  I  think 
is  the  fairest  case  we  can  take,  seeing  that  of  all 

1  Cf.  Pascal,  Petisees.  '  For  we  must  not  mistake  ourselves,  we  have 
as  much  that  is  automatic  in  us  as  intellectual,  and  hence  it  comes  that 
the  instrument  by  which  persuasion  is  brought  about  is  not  demon- 
stration alone.  How  few  things  are  demonstrated  !  Proofs  can  only 
convince  the  mind;  custom  makes  our  strongest  proofs  and  those 
which  we  hold  most  firmly,  it  sways  the  automaton,  which  draws 
the  unconscious  intellect  after  it.  .  .  .  It  is  then  custom  that  makes 
so  many  men  Christians,  custom  that  makes  them  Turks,  heathen, 
artisans,  soldiers,  &c.  Lastly,  we  must  resort  to  custom  when  once 
the  mind  has  seen  where  truth  is,  in  order  to  slake  our  thirst  and 
steep  ourselves  in  that  belief  which  escapes  us  at  every  hour,  for  to 
have  proofs  always  at  hand  were  too  onerous.  We  must  acquire  a 
more  easy  belief,  that  of  custom,  which  without  violence,  without  art, 
without  argument,  causes  our  assent  and  inclines  all  our  powers  to 
this  belief,  so  that  our  soul  naturally  falls  into  it.  .  .  . 

'  It  is  not  enough  to  believe  only  by  force  of  conviction  if  the 
automaton  is  inclined  to  believe  the  contrary.  Both  parts  of  us  then 
must  be  obliged  to  believe,  the  intellect  by  arguments  which  it  is 
enough  to  have  admitted  once  in  our  lives,  the  automaton  by  custom, 
and  by  not  allowing  it  to  incline  in  the  contrary  direction.  Inclina 
cor  meum  Deus.'  See  also  Newman's  Grammar  of  Assent,  chap.  vi. 
and  Church's  Human  Life  and  its  Conditions,  pp.  67-9. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  137 

intellectual  pursuits  that  of  mathematical  research 
is  the  most  exact,  as  well  as  the  most  exclusive 
in  its  demand  upon  the  powers  of  reason,  and 
hence  that,  as  a  class,  the  men  who  have  achieved 
highest  eminence  in  that  pursuit  may  be  fairly 
taken  as  the  fittest  representatives  of  our  species 
in  respect  of  the  faculty  of  pure  reason.  Yet 
whenever  they  have  turned  their  exceptional  powers 
in  this  respect  upon  the  problems  of  religion,  how 
suggestively  well  balanced  are  their  opposite  con- 
clusions— so  much  so  indeed  that  we  can  only 
conclude  that  reason  counts  for  very  little  in  the 
complex  of  mental  processes  which  here  determine 
judgement. 

Thus,  if  we  look  to  the  greatest  mathematicians 
in  the  world's  history,  we  find  Kepler  and  Newton 
as  Christians  ;  La  Place,  on  the  other  hand,  an 
infidel.  Or,  coming  to  our  own  times,  and  confining 
our  attention  to  the  principal  seat  of  mathematical 
study: — when  I  was  at  Cambridge,  there  was  a 
galaxy  of  genius  in  that  department  emanating 
from  that  place  such  as  had  never  before  been 
equalled.  And  the  curious  thing  in  our  present 
connexion  is  that  all  the  most  illustrious  names 
were  ranged  on  the  side  of  orthodoxy.  Sir  W. 
Thomson,  Sir  George  Stokes,  Professors  Tait, 
Adams,  Clerk-Maxwell,  and  Cayley — not  to  men- 
tion a  number  of  lesser  lights,  such  as  Routh, 
Todhunter,  Ferrers,  &c. — were  all  avowed  Chris- 
tians. Clifford  had  only  just  moved  at  a  bound 
from  the  extreme  of  asceticism  to  that  of  infidelity — 
an  individual  instance  which  I  deem  of  particular 


138  Thoughts  on  Religion 

interest  in  the  present  connexion,  as  showing  the 
dominating  influence  of  a  forcedly  emotional  char- 
acter even  on  so  powerful  an  intellectual  one,  for 
the  rationality  of  the  whole  structure  of  Christian 
belief  cannot  have  so  reversed  its  poles  within  a  few 
months. 

Now  it  would  doubtless  be  easy  to  find  elsewhere 
than  in  Cambridge  mathematicians  of  the  first 
order  who  in  our  own  generation  are,  or  have 
been,  professedly  anti-Christian  in  their  beliefs, — 
although  certainly  not  so  great  an  array  of  such 
extraordinary  powers.  But,  be  this  as  it  may, 
the  case  of  Cambridge  in  my  own  time  seems 
to  me  of  itself  enough  to  prove  that  Christian 
belief  is  neither  made  nor  marred  by  the  highest 
powers  of  reasoning,  apart  from  other  and  still 
more  potent  factors. 


Faith  and  Superstition. 

Whether  or  not  Christianity  is  true,  there  is 
a  great  distinction  between  these  two  things.  For 
while  the  main  ingredient  of  Christian  faith  is 
the  moral  element,  this  has  no  part  in  superstition. 
In  point  of  fact,  the  only  point  of  resemblance 
is  that  both  present  the  mental  state  called  belief. 
It  is  on  this  account  they  are  so  often  confounded 
by  anti-Christians,  and  even  by  non-Christians ; 
the  much  more  important  point  of  difference  is  not 
noted,  viz.  that  belief  in  the  one  case  is  purely 
intellectual,  while  in  the  other  it  is  chiefly  moral. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  139 

Qua  purely  intellectual,  belief  may  indicate  nothing 
but  sheer  credulity  in  absence  of  evidence  ;  but 
where  a  moral  basis  is  added,  the  case  is  clearly 
different ;  for  even  if  it  appears  to  be  sheer  cre- 
dulity to  an  outsider,  that  may  be  because  he 
does  not  take  into  account  the  additional  evidence 
supplied  by  the  moral  facts. 


Faith  and  superstition  are  often  confounded, 
or  even  identified.  And,  unquestionably,  they 
are  identical  up  to  a  certain  point — viz.  they  both 
present  the  mental  state  of  belief.  All  people 
can  see  this  ;  but  not  all  people  can  see  further, 
or  define  the  differentiae.  These  are  as  follows : 
First,  supposing  Christianity  true,  there  is  the 
spiritual  verification.  Second,  supposing  Chris- 
tianity false,  there  is  still  the  moral  ingredient, 
which  ex  hypothesi  is  absent  in  superstition.  In 
other  words,  both  faith  and  superstition  rest  on 
an  intellectual  basis  (which  may  be  pure  credulity); 
but  faith  rests  also  on  a  moral,  even  if  not  like- 
wise on  a  spiritual.  Even  in  human  relations  there 
is  a  wide  difference  between  'belief  in  a  scientific 
theory  and  'faith'  in  a  personal  character.  And 
the  difference  is  in  the  latter  comprising  a  moral 
element. 

'Faith-healing,'  therefore,  has  no  real  point  of 
resemblance  with  'thy  faith  hath  saved  thee' 
of  the  New  Testament,  unless  we  sink  the  personal 
differences  between  a  modern  faith-healer  and 
Jesus  Christ  as  objects  of  faith. 


140  Thoughts  on  Religion 

Belief  is  not  exclusively  founded  on  objective 
evidence  appealing  to  reason  (opinion),  but  mainly 
on  subjective  evidence  appealing  to  some  altogether 
different  faculty  (faith).  Now,  whether  Christians 
are  right  or  wrong  in  what  they  believe,  I  hold  it  as 
certain  as  anything  can  be  that  the  distinction  which 
I  have  just  drawn,  and  which  they  all  implicitly 
draw  for  themselves,  is  logically  valid.  For  no 
one  is  entitled  to  deny  the  possibility  of  what 
may  be  termed  an  organ  of  spiritual  discernment. 
In  fact  to  do  so  would  be  to  vacate  the  position 
of  pure  agnosticism  in  toto — and  this  even  if  there 
were  no  objective,  or  strictly  scientific,  evidences 
in  favour  of  such  an  organ,  such  as  we  have  in 
the  lives  of  the  saints,  and,  in  a  lower  degree,  in 
the  universality  of  the  religious  sentiment.  Now, 
if  there  be  such  an  organ,  it  follows  from  preceding 
paragraphs,  that  not  only  will  the  main  evidences 
for  Christianity  be  subjective,  but  that  they  ought 
to  be  so  :  they  ought  to  be  so,  I  mean,  on  the 
Christian  supposition  of  the  object  of  Christianity 
being  moral  probation,  and  '  faith  '  both  the  test 
and  the  reward. 

From  this  many  practical  considerations  ensue. 
E.  g.  the  duty  of  parents  to  educate  their  children 
in  what  they  believe  as  distinguished  from  what 
they  knozv.  This  would  be  unjustifiable  if  faith  were 
the  same  as  opinion.  But  it  is  fully  justifiable 
if  a  man  not  only  knows  that  he  believes  (opinion) 
but  believes  that  he  knows  (faith).  Whether  or 
not  the  Christian  differs  from  the  '  natural  man '  in 
having    a   spiritual    organ   of   cognition,   provided 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  141 

he  honestly  believes  such  is  the  case,  it  would  be 
immoral  in  him  not  to  proceed  in  accordance 
with  what  he  thus  believes  to  be  his  knowledge. 
This  obligation  is  recognized  in  education  in  every 
other  case.  He  is  morally  right  even  if  mentally 
deluded. 


Huxley,  in  Lay  Sermons,  says  that  faith  has 
been  proved  a  '  cardinal  sin '  by  science.  Now,  this 
is  true  enough  of  credulity,  superstition,  &c,  and 
science  has  done  no  end  of  good  in  developing  our 
ideas  of  method,  evidence,  &c.  But  this  is  all  on 
the  side  of  intellect.  '  Faith  '  is  not  touched  by  such 
facts  or  considerations.  And  what  a  terrible  hell 
science  would  have  made  of  the  world,  if  she  had 
abolished  the  '  spirit  of  faith '  even  in  human  rela- 
tions. The  fact  is,  Huxley  falls  into  the  common 
error  of  identifying  '  faith  '  with  opinion. 


Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  very  reasonable 
that  faith  in  the  sense  already  explained  should  be 
constituted  the  test  of  divine  acceptance.  If  there 
be  such  a  thing  as  Christ's  winnowing  fan,  the  quality 
of  sterling  weight  for  the  discovery  of  which  it  is 
adapted  cannot  be  conceived  as  anything  other  than 
this  moral  quality.  No  one  could  suppose  a  reve- 
lation appealing  to  the  mere  intellect  of  man, 
since  acceptance  would  thus  become  a  mere  matter 
of  prudence  in  subscribing  to  a  demonstration  made 
by  higher  intellects. 


142  Thoughts  on  Religion 

/  It  is  also  a  matter  of  fact  that  if  Christianity 
is  truthful  in  representing  this  world  as  a  school 
of  moral  probation,  we  cannot  conceive  a  system 
better  adapted  to  this  end  than  is  the  world,  or 
a  better  schoolmaster  than  Christianity.  This  is 
proved  not  only  by  general  reasoning,  but  also 
by  the  work  of  Christianity  in  the  world,  its 
adaptation  to  individual  needs,  &c.  Consider  also 
the  extraordinary  diversity  of  human  characters 
in  respect  both  of  morality  and  spirituality 
though  all  are  living  in  the  same  world.  Out  of 
the  same  external  material  or  environment  such 
astonishingly  diverse  products  arise  according  to 
the  use  made  of  it.  Even  human  suffering  in 
its  worst  forms  can  be  welcome  if  justified  by  faith 
in  such  an  object.  '  Ills  have  no  weight,  and  tears 
no  bitterness,'  but  are  rather  to  be  '  gloried  in  V 

It  is  a  further  fact  that  only  by  means  of  this 
theory  of  probation  is  it  possible  to  give  any  mean- 
ing to  the  world,  i.  e.  any  raison  d'etre  of  human 
existence. 

Supposing  Christianity  true,  every  man  must 
stand  or  fall  by  the  results  of  his  own  conduct,  as 
developed  through  his  own  moral  character.  (This 
could  not  be  so  if  the  test  were  intellectual  ability.) 
Yet  this  does  not  hinder  that  the  exercise  of  will 
in  the  direction  of  religion  should  need  help  in 
order  to  attain  belief.  Nor  does  it  hinder  that 
some  men  should  need  more  help  and  others  less. 
Indeed,  it  may  well  be  that  some  men  are  inten- 

1  [The  author  has  added,  "For  suffering  in  brutes  see  further  on," 
but  nothing  further  on  the  subject  appears  to  have  been  written. — Ed. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion   143 

tionally  precluded  from  receiving  any  help,  so  as 
not  to  increase  their  responsibility,  or  receive  but 
little,  so  as  to  constitute  intellectual  difficulties 
a  moral  trial.  But  clearly,  if  such  things  are  so, 
we  are  inadequate  judges. 


It  is  a  fact  that  we  all  feel  the  intellectual  part 
of  man  to  be  '  higher '  than  the  animal,  whatever 
our  theory  of  his  origin.  It  is  a  fact  that  we  all 
feel  the  moral  part  of  man  to  be  '  higher '  than  the 
intellectual,  whatever  our  theory  of  either  may  be. 
It  is  also  a  fact  that  we  all  similarly  feel  the 
spiritual  to  be  ' higher'  than  the  moral,  whatever 
our  theory  of  religion  may  be.  It  is  what  we 
understand  by  man's  moral,  and  still  more  his 
spiritual,  qualities  that  go  to  constitute  '  character.' 
And  it  is  astonishing  how  in  all  walks  of  life  it 
is  character  that  tells  in  the  long  run. 

It  is  a  fact  that  these  distinctions  are  all  well 
marked  and  universally  recognized — viz. 

Animality. 
Intellectuality. 
Morality. 
Spirituality. 

Morality  and  spirituality  are  to  be  distinguished 
as  two  very  different  things.  A  man  may  be 
highly  moral  in  his  conduct  without  being  in  any 
degree  spiritual  in  his  nature,  and,  though  to 
a  lesser  extent,  vice  versa.  And,  objectively,  we  see 
the  same  distinction  between  morals  and  religion. 
By  spirituality  I  mean  the  religious  temperament, 


Human 


J 


144  Thoughts  on  Religion 

whether  or  not  associated  with  any  particular  creed 
or  dogma. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  intellectual  pleasures  are 
more  satisfying  and  enduring  than  sensual — or  even 
sensuous.  And,  to  those  who  have  experienced 
them,  so  it  is  with  spiritual  over  intellectual,  artistic, 
&c.  This  is  an  objective  fact,  abundantly  testified 
to  by  every  one  who  has  had  experience :  and  it 
seems  to  indicate  that  the  spiritual  nature  of  man 
is  the  highest  part  of  man — the  [culminating] 
point  of  his  being. 


It  is  probably  true,  as  Renan  says  in  his 
posthumous  work,  that  there  will  always  be 
materialists  and  spiritualists,  inasmuch  as  it  will 
always  be  observable  on  the  one  hand  that  there 
is  no  thought  without  brain,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  instincts  of  man  will  always  aspire  to  higher 
beliefs.  But  this  is  just  what  ought  to  be  if 
religion  is  true,  and  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation. 
And  is  it  not  probable  that  the  materialistic 
position  (discredited  even  by  philosophy)  is  due 
simply  to  custom  and  want  of  imagination  ?  Else 
why  the  inextinguishable  instincts  ? 


It  is  much  more  easy  to  disbelieve  than  to 
believe.  This  is  obvious  on  the  side  of  reason, 
but  it  is  also  true  on  that  of  spirit,  for  to  disbelieve 
is  in  accordance  with  environment  or  custom,  while 
to  believe  necessitates  a  spiritual  use  of  the  imagina- 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  145 

tion.  For  both  these  reasons,  very  few  unbelievers 
have  any  justification,  either  intellectual  or  spiritual, 
for  their  own  unbelief. 

Unbelief  is  usually  due  to  indolence,  often   to 
prejudice,  and  never  a  thing  to  be  proud  of. 


'  Why  should  it  be  thought  a  thing  incredible 
with  you  that  God  should  raise  the  dead  ?  '  Clearly 
no  answer  can  be  given  by  the  pure  agnostic. 
But  he  will  naturally  say  in  reply,  'the  question 
rather  is,  why  should  it  be  thought  credible  with 
you  that  there  is  a  God,  or,  if  there  is,  that 
he  should  raise  the  dead  ? '  And  I  think  the  wise 
Christian  will  answer,  '  I  believe  in  the  resurrection 
of  the  dead,  partly  on  grounds  of  reason,  partly 
on  those  of  intuition,  but  chiefly  on  both  combined  ; 
so  to  speak,  it  is  my  whole  character  which  accepts 
the  whole  system  of  which  the  doctrine  of  personal 
immortality  forms  an  essential  part'  And  to  this 
it  may  be  fairly  added  that  the  Christian  doctrine 
of  the  resurrection  of  our  bodily  form  cannot  have 
been  arrived  at  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  modern 
materialistic  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  personal 
immortality  ;  hence  it  is  certainly  a  strange  doctrine 
to  have  been  propounded  at  that  time,  together 
with  its  companion,  and  scarcely  less  distinctive, 
doctrine  of  the  vileness  of  the  body.  Why  was 
it  not  said  that  the  '  soul '  alone  should  survive 
as  a  disembodied  '  spirit '  ?  Or  if  form  were  sup- 
posed necessary  for  man  as  distinguished  from 
God,  that  he  was  to  be  an  angel?     But,  be  this 

K 


146  Thoughts  on  Religion 

as  it  may,  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  seems 
to  have  fully  met  beforehand  the  materialistic 
objection  to  a  future  life,  and  so  to  have  raised  the 
ulterior  question  with  which  this  paragraph  opens. 


We  have  seen  in  the  Introduction  that  all  first 
principles  even  of  scientific  facts  are  known  by 
intuition  and  not  by  reason.  No  one  can  deny 
this.  Now,  if  there  be  a  God,  the  fact  is  certainly 
of  the  nature  of  a  first  principle  ;  for  it  must  be 
the  first  of  all  first  principles.  No  one  can  dispute 
this.  No  one  can  therefore  dispute  the  necessary 
conclusion,  that,  if  there  be  a  God,  He  is  knowable, 
(if  knowable  at  all)  by  intuition  and  not  by  reason. 

Indeed  a  little  thought  is  enough  to  show  that 
from  its  very  nature  as  such,  reason  must  be 
incapable  of  adjudicating  on  the  subject,  for  it 
is  a  process  of  inferring  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown. 

Or  thus.  It  would  be  against  reason  itself  to 
suppose  that  God,  even  if  He  exists,  can  be  known 
by  reason;  He  must  be  known,  if  knowable  at  all, 
by  intuition  \ 


Observe,  although  God  might  give  an  objective 
revelation  of  Himself,  e.g.  as  Christians  believe  He 

1  [In  this  connexion  I  may  again  notice  that  two  days  before  his 
death  George  Romanes  expressed  his  cordial  approval  of  Professor 
Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism— &  work  in  which  great  stress  is  laid  on 
the  argument  from  intuition  in  different  forms. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  147 

has,  even  this  would  not  give  knowledge  of  Him 
save  to  those  who  believe  the  revelations  genuine  ; 
and  I  doubt  whether  it  is  logically  possible  for  any 
form  of  objective  revelation  of  itself  to  compel  belief 
in  it.  Assuredly  one  rising  from  the  dead  to  testify 
thereto  would  not,  nor  would  letters  of  fire  across 
the  sky  do  so.  But,  even  if  it  were  logically 
possible,  we  need  not  consider  the  abstract  possi- 
bility, seeing  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  such 
demonstrative  revelation  has  been  eiven. 

Hence,  the  only  legitimate  attitude  of  pure 
reason  is  pure  agnosticism.  No  one  can  deny 
this.  But,  it  will  be  said,  there  is  this  vast  differ- 
ence between  our  intuitive  knowledge  of  all  other 
first  principles  and  that  alleged  of  the  'first  of 
all  first  principles,'  viz.  that  the  latter  is  confessedly 
not  known  to  all  men.  Now,  assuredly,  there  is 
here  a  vast  difference.  But  so  there  ought  to  be, 
if  we  are  here  in  a  state  of  probation,  as  before 
explained.  And  that  we  are  in  such  a  state  is  not 
only  the  hypothesis  of  religion,  but  the  sole  rational 
explanation  as  well  as  moral  justification  of  our 
existence  as  rational  beings  and  moral  agents1. 


It  is  not  necessarily  true,  as  J.  S.  Mill  and  all 
other  agnostics  think,  that  even  if  internal  intuition 
be  of  divine  origin,  the  illumination  thus  furnished 
can  only  be  of  evidential  value  to  the  individual 
subject  thereof.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  be  studied 
objectively,  even  if  not  experienced  subjectively  ; 
1  On  this  subject  see  Pascal,  Pensies  (Kegan  Paul's  trans.)  p.  103. 
K    % 


* 


148  Thoughts  on  Religion 

and  ought  to  be  so  studied  by  a  pure  agnostic  de- 
sirous of  light  from  any  quarter.  Even  if  he  does 
not  know  it  as  a  noumenon  he  can  investigate  it 
as  a  phenomenon.  And,  supposing  it  to  be  of  divine 
origin,  as  its  subjects  believe  and  he  has  no  reason 
to  doubt,  he  may  gain  much  evidence  against  its 
being  a  mere  psychological  illusion  from  identical 
reports  of  it  in  all  ages.  Thus,  if  any  large  section 
of  the  race  were  to  see  flames  issuing  from  mag- 
nets, there  would  be  no  doubt  as  to  their  objective 
reality. 


The  testimony  given  by  Socrates  to  the  occur- 
rence in  himself  of  an  internal  Voice,  having  all 
the  defmiteness  of  an  auditory  hallucination,  has 
given  rise  to  much  speculation  by  subsequent 
philosophers. 

Many  explanations  are  suggested,  but  if  we 
remember  the  critical  nature  of  Socrates'  own 
mind,  the  literal  nature  of  his  mode  of  teaching, 
and  the  high  authority  which  attaches  to  Plato's 
opinion  on  the  subject,  the  probability  seems  to 
incline  towards  the  '  Demon '  having  been,  in 
Socrates'  own  consciousness,  an  actual  auditory 
sensation.  Be  this  however  as.  it  may,  I  suppose 
there  is  no  question  that  we  may  adopt  this  view 
of  the  matter  at  least  to  the  extent  of  classifying 
Socrates  with  Luther,  Pascal,  &c,  not  to  mention 
all  the  line  of  Hebrew  and  other  prophets,  who 
agree  in  speaking  of  a  Divine  Voice. 

If  so,   the   further  question    arises   whether   we 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  149 

are  to  classify  all  these  with  lunatics  in  whom  the 
phenomena  of  auditory  hallucination  are  habitual. 

Without  doubt  this  hypothesis  is  most  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  temper  of  our  age,  partly 
because  it  obeys  the  law  of  parsimony,  and  partly 
because  it  [negatives]  a  priori  the  possibility  of 
revelation. 

But  if  we  look  at  the  matter  from  the  point  of 
view  of  pure  agnosticism,  we  are  not  entitled  to 
adopt  so  rough  and  ready  an  interpretation. 

Suppose  then  that  not  only  Socrates  and  all 
great  religious  reformers  and  founders  of  religious 
systems  both  before  and  after  him  were  similarly 
stricken  with  mental  disease,  but  that  similar 
phenomena  had  occurred  in  the  case  of  all  scientific 
discoverers  such  as  Galileo,  Newton,  Darwin,  &c. 
— supposing  all  these  men  to  have  declared  that 
their  main  ideas  had  been  communicated  by 
subjective  sensations  as  of  spoken  language,  so  that 
all  the  progress  of  the  world's  scientific  thought  had 
resembled  that  of  the  world's  religious  thought,  and 
had  been  attributed  by  the  promoters  thereof  to 
direct  inspirations  of  this  kind — would  it  be  pos- 
sible to  deny  that  the  testimony  thus  afforded  to 
the  fact  of  subjective  revelation  would  have  been 
overwhelming  ?  Or  could  it  any  longer  have  been 
maintained  that  supposing  a  revelation  to  be 
communicated  subjectively  the  fact  thereof  could 
only  be  of  any  evidential  value  to  the  recipient 
himself?  To  this  it  will  no  doubt  be  answered, 
1  No,  but  in  the  case  supposed  the  evidence  arises 
not  from  the  fact  of  their  subjective  intuition  but 


150  Thoughts  on  Religion 

from  that  of  its  objective  verification  in  the  results 
of  science.'  Quite  so;  but  this  is  exactly  the  test 
appealed  to  by  the  Hebrew  prophets — the  test  of 
true  and  lying  prophets  being  in  the  fulfilment  or 
non-fulfilment  of  their  prophecies  and  '  By  their 
fruits  ye  shall  known*  them.' 

Therefore  it  is  as  absurd  to  say  that  the  religious 
consciousness  of  minds  other  than  our  own  can  be 
barred  antecedently  as  evidence,  as  it  is  to  say  that 
testimony  to  the  miraculous  is  similarly  barred. 
The  pure  agnostic  must  always  carefully  avoid  the 
'  high  priori  road.'  But,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
must  be  all  the  more  assiduous  in  estimating  fairly 
the  character,  both  as  to  quantity  and  quality,  of 
evidence  a  posteriori.  Now  this  evidence  in  the 
present  case  is  twofold,  positive  and  negative.  It 
will  be  convenient  to  consider  the  negative  first. 

The  negative  evidence  is  furnished  by  the 
nature  of  man  without  God.  It  is  thoroughly 
miserable,  as  is  well  shown  by  Pascal,  who  has 
devoted  the  whole  of  the  first  part  of  his  treatise  to 
this  subject.  I  need  not  go  over  the  ground  which 
he  has  already  so  well  traversed. 

Some  men  are  not  conscious  of  the  cause  of 
this  misery:  this,  however,  does  not  prevent  the 
fact  of  their  being  miserable.  For  the  most  part 
they  conceal  the  fact  as  well  as  possible  from 
themselves,  by  occupying  their  minds  with  society, 
sport,  frivolity  of  all  kinds,  or,  if  intellectually  dis- 
posed, with  science,  art.  literature,  business,  &c. 
This  however  is  but  to  fill  the  starving  belly  with 
husks.     I    know  from   experience  the  intellectual 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  151 

distractions  of  scientific  research,  philosophical 
speculation,  and  artistic  pleasures ;  but  am  also 
well  aware  that  even  when  all  are  taken  together 
and  well  sweetened  to  taste,  in  respect  of  consequent 
reputation,  means,  social  position,  &c,  the  whole 
concoction  is  but  as  high  confectionery  to  a  starving 
man.  He  may  cheat  himself  for  a  time— especially 
if  he  be  a  strong  man — into  the  belief  that  he  is 
nourishing  himself  by  denying  his  natural  appetite  ; 
but  soon  finds  he  was  made  for  some  altogether 
different  kind  of  food,  even  though  of  much  less 
tastefulness  as  far  as  the  palate  is  concerned. 

Some     men     indeed     never     acknowledge     this 
articulately  or  distinctly  even   to   themselves,  yet 
always  show  it  plainly   enough  to  others.     Take, 
e.  g., '  that  last  infirmity  of  noble  minds.'     I  suppose       ,   . 
the  most  exalted  and  least  'carnal'  of  worldly  joys  *j?t 
consists  in  the  adequate  recognition  by  the  world  of  u-r; 
high  achievement  by  ourselves.     Yet  it  is  notorious 

that  <It  is  by  God  decreed 

Fame  shall  not  satisfy  the  highest  need.' 

It  has  been  my  lot  to  know  not  a  few  of  the 
famous  men  of  our  generation,  and  I  have  always 
observed  that  this  is  profoundly  true.  Like  all 
other  '  moral '  satisfactions,  this  soon  palls  by 
custom,  and  as  soon  as  one  end  of  distinction  is 
reached,  another  is  pined  for.  There  is  no  finality 
to  rest  in,  while  disease  and  death  are  always 
standing  in  the  background.  Custom  may  even 
blind  men  to  their  own  misery,  so  far  as  not  to 
make  them  realize  what  is  wanting  ;  yet  the  want 
is  there. 


152  Thoughts  on  Religion 

I  take  it  then  as  unquestionably  true  that  this 
whole  negative  side  of  the  subject  proves  a  vacuum 
in  the  soul  of  man  which  nothing  can  fill  save 
faith  in  God. 

Now  take  the  positive  side.  Consider  the  happi- 
ness of  religious — and  chiefly  of  the  highest  religious, 
i.  e.  Christian — belief.  It  is  a  matter  of  fact  that 
besides  being  most  intense,  it  is  most  enduring, 
growing,  and  never  staled  by  custom.  In  short, 
according  to  the  universal  testimony  of  those  who 
have  it,  it  differs  from  all  other  happiness  not  only 
in  degree  but  in  kind.  Those  who  have  it  can 
usually  testify  to  what  they  used  to  be  without  it. 
It  has  no  relation  to  intellectual  status.  It  is 
a  thing  by  itself  and  supreme. 

So  much  for  the  individual.  But  positive  evidence 
does  not  end  here.  Look  at  the  effects  of  Christian 
belief  as  exercised  on  human  society — 1st,  by  indi- 
vidual Christians  on  the  family,  &c. ;  and,  2nd,  by 
the  Christian  Church  on  the  world. 

All  this  may  lead  on  to  an  argument  from  the 
adaptation  of  Christianity  to  human  higher  needs. 
All  men  must  feel  these  needs  more  or  less  in  pro- 
portion as  their  higher  natures,  moral  and  spiritual, 
are  developed.  Now  Christianity  is  the  only  religion 
which  is  adapted  to  meet  them,  and,  according  to 
those  who  are  alone  able  to  testify,  does  so  most 
abundantly.  All  these  men,  of  every  sect,  nation- 
ality, &c,  agree  in  their  account  of  their  subjective 
experience  ;  so  as  to  this  there  can  be  no  question. 
The  only  question  is  as  to  whether  they  are  all 
deceived. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  153 


PEU  DE  CHOSE. 

'  La  vie  est  vaine  : 

Un  pen  d'amour, 
Un  peu  de  haine  .  .  . 
Et  puis — bon  jour  ! 

La  vie  est  breve  : 

Un  peu  d'espoir, 
Un  peu  de  reve  .  .  . 

Et  puis — bon  soir  ! ' 

The  above  is  a  terse  and  true  criticism  of  this  life 
without  hope  of  a  future  one.  Is  it  satisfactory  ? 
But  Christian  faith,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  changes  it 
entirely. 

1  The  night  has  a  thousand  eyes, 
And  the  day  but  one ; 
Yet  the  light  of  a  whole  world  dies 
With  the  setting  sun. 

The  mind  has  a  thousand  eyes, 

And  the  heart  but  one  ; 
Yet  the  light  of  a  whole  life  dies 

When  love  is  done.' 

Love  is  known  to  be  all  this.  How  great,  then, 
is  Christianity,  as  being  the  religion  of  love,  and 
causing  men  to  believe  both  in  the  cause  of  love's 
supremacy  and  the  infinity  of  God's  love  to  man. 


§  5-  Faith  in  Christianity. 


Christianity  comes  up  for  serious  investigation 
in  the  present  treatise,  because  this  Examination  of 
Religion  [i.  e.  of  the  validity  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness] has  to  do  with  the  evidences  of  Theism 
presented  by  man,  and  not  only  by  nature  minus 
man.  Now  of  the  religious  consciousness  Chris- 
tianity is  unquestionably  the  highest  product. 

When  I  wrote  the  preceding  treatise  [the  Candid 
Examination},  I  did  not  sufficiently  appreciate  the 
immense  importance  of  human  nature,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  physical  nature,  in  any  enquiry 
touching  Theism.  But  since  then  I  have  seriously 
studied  anthropology  (including  the  science  of  com- 
parative religions),  psychology  and  metaphysics, 
with  the  result  of  clearly  seeing  that  human  nature 
is  the  most  important  part  of  nature  as  a  whole 
whereby  to  investigate  the  theory  of  Theism.  This  I 
ought  to  have  anticipated  on  merely  a  priori  grounds, 
and  no  doubt  should  have  perceived,  had  I  not  been 
too  much  immersed  in  merely  physical  research. 

Moreover,  in  those  days,  I  took  it  for  granted 
that  Christianity  was  played  out,  and  never  con- 
sidered   it   at  all  as  having   any  rational  bearing 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  155 

on  the  question  of  Theism.  And,  though  this  was 
doubtless  inexcusable,  I  still  think  that  the  rational 
standing  of  Christianity  has  materially  improved 
since  then.  For  then  it  seemed  that  Christianity 
was  destined  to  succumb  as  a  rational  system 
before  the  double  assault  of  Darwin  from  without 
and  the  negative  school  of  criticism  from  within. 
Not  only  the  book  of  organic  nature,  but  likewise 
its  own  sacred  documents,  seemed  to  be  declaring 
against  it.  But  now  all  this  has  been  very 
materially  changed.  We  have  all  more  or  less 
grown  to  see  that  Darwinism  is  like  Copernicanism, 
&c,  in  this  respect  *  ;  while  the  outcome  of  the 
great  textual  battle2  is  impartially  considered 
a  signal  victory  for  Christianity.  Prior  to  the  new 
[Biblical]  science,  there  was  really  no  rational 
basis  in  thoughtful  minds,  either  for  the  date  of 
any  one  of  the  New  Testament  books,  or,  con- 
sequently, for  the  historical  truth  of  any  one  of 
the  events  narrated  in  them.  Gospels,  Acts  and 
Epistles  were  all  alike  shrouded  in  this  uncertainty. 
Hence  the  validity  of  the  eighteenth-century  scepti- 
cism. But  now  all  this  kind  of  scepticism  has  been 
rendered  obsolete,  and  for  ever  impossible  ;  while 
the  certainty  of  enough  of  St.  Paul's  writings  for 
the  practical  purpose  of  displaying  the  belief  of  the 
apostles  has  been  established,  as  well  as  the  certainty 
of  the  publication  of  the  Synoptics  within  the  first 

1  [I.  e.  a  theory  which  comes  at  first  as  a  shock  to  the  current 
teaching  of  Christianity,  but  is  finally  seen  to  be  in  no  antagonism  to 
its  necessary  principles. — Ed.] 

2  [I.e.  the  battle  in  regard  to  the  Christian  texts  or  documents. 
—Ed.] 


156  Thoughts  on  Religion 

century.  An  enormous  gain  has  thus  accrued  to 
the  objective  evidences  of  Christianity.  It  is  most 
important  that  the  expert  investigator  should  be 
exact,  and,  as  in  any  other  science,  the  lay  public 
must  take  on  authority  as  trustworthy  only  what 
both  sides  are  agreed  upon.  But,  as  in  any  other 
science,  experts  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the  impor- 
tance of  the  main  results  agreed  upon,  in  their 
fighting  over  lesser  points  still  in  dispute.  Now  it 
is  enough  for  us  that  the  Epistles  to  the  Romans, 
Galatians,  and  Corinthians,  have  been  agreed  upon 
as  genuine,  and  that  the  same  is  true  of  the 
Synoptics  so  far  as  concerns  the  main  doctrine  of 
Christ  Himself. 


The  extraordinary  candour  of  Christ's  bio- 
graphers must  not  be  forgotten  1.  Notice  also  such 
sentences  as  '  but  some  doubted,'  and  (in  the  account 
of  Pentecost)  '  these  men  are  full  of  new  wine  V 
Such  observations  are  wonderfully  true  to  human 
nature;  but  no  less  wonderfully  opposed  to  any 
'  accretion '  theory. 

Observe,  when  we  become  honestly  pure  agnos- 
tics the  whole  scene  changes  by  the  change  in  our 
point  of  view.  We  may  then  read  the  records 
impartially,  or  on  their  own  merits,  without  any 
antecedent  conviction  that  they  must  be  false. 
It  is  then  an  open  question  whether  they  are 
not  true  as  history. 

1  See  Gore's  Bampton  Lectttres,  pp.  74  ft. 

2  Matt,  xxviii.  17;  Acts  ii.  13. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  157 

There  is  so  much  to  be  said  in  objective  evidence 
for  Christianity  that  were  the  central  doctrines 
thus  testified  to  anything  short  of  miraculous,  no 
one  would  doubt.  But  we  are  not  competent 
judges  a  priori  of  what  a  revelation  should  be.  If 
our  agnosticism  be  pure,  we  have  no  right  to  pre- 
judge the  case  on  prima  facie  grounds. 


One  of  the  strongest  pieces  of  objective  evidence 
in  favour  of  Christianity  is  not  sufficiently  enforced 
by  apologists.  Indeed,  I  am  not  aware  that  I  have  , 
ever  seen  it  mentioned.  It  is  the  absence  from 
the  biography  of  Christ  of  any  doctrines  which  the  ' 
subsequent  growth  of  human  knowledge — whether 
in  natural  science,  ethics,  political  economy,  or  else- 
where— has  had  to  discount.  This  negative  argu- 
ment is  really  almost  as  strong  as  is  the  positive 
one  from  what  Christ  did  teach.  For  when  we 
consider  what  a  large  number  of  sayings  are  recorded 
of — or  at  least  attributed  to  —  Him,  it  becomes  most 
remarkable  that  in  literal  truth  there  is  no  reason 
why  any  of  His  words  should  ever  pass  away  in  the 
sense  of  becoming  obsolete.  '  Not  even  now  could 
it  be  easy,'  says  John  Stuart  Mill,  '  even  for  an 
unbeliever,  to  find  a  better  translation  of  the 
rule  of  virtue  from  the  abstract  into  the  concrete, 
than  to  endeavour  so  to  live  that  Christ  would 
approve  our  life2.'  Contrast  Jesus  Christ  in  this 
respect  with  other  thinkers  of  like  antiquity. 
Even  Plato,  who,  though  some  400  years  B.  C.  in 

1   Three  Essays  on  Theism,  p.  255. 


158  Thoughts  on  Religion 

point  of  time,  was  greatly  in  advance  of  Him  in 
respect  of  philosophic  thought — not  only  because 
Athens  then  presented  the  extraordinary  pheno- 
menon which  it  did  of  genius  in  all  directions  never 
since  equalled,  but  also  because  he,  following 
Socrates,  was,  so  to  speak,  the  greatest  represen- 
tative of  human  reason  in  the  direction  of  spirituality 
— even  Plato,  I  say,  is  nowhere  in  this  respect  as 
compared  with  Christ.  Read  the  dialogues,  and  see 
how  enormous  is  the  contrast  with  the  Gospels  in 
respect  of  errors  of  all  kinds — reaching  even  to 
absurdity  in  respect  of  reason,  and  to  sayings 
shocking  to  the  moral  sense.  Yet  this  is  con- 
fessedly the  highest  level  of  human  reason  on  the 
lines  of  spirituality,  when  unaided  by  alleged  reve- 
lation. 

Two  things  may  be  said  in  reply.  First,  that  the 
Jews  (Rabbis)  of  Christ's  period  had  enunciated 
most  of  Christ's  ethical  sayings.  But,  even  so  far 
as  this  is  true,  the  sayings  were  confessedly 
extracted  or  deduced  from  the  Old  Testament,  and 
so  ex  hypothesi  due  to  original  inspiration.  Again, 
it  is  not  very  far  true,  because,  as  Ecce  Homo 
says,  the  ethical  sayings  of  Christ,  even  when 
anticipated  by  Rabbis  and  the  Old  Testament,  were 
selected  by  Him. 


It  is  a  general,  if  not  a  universal,  rule  that  those 
who  reject  Christianity  with  contempt  are  those 
who  care  not  for  religion  of  any  kind.  '  Depart 
from  us'  has  always  been  the  sentiment  of  such. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  159 

On  the  other  hand,  those  in  whom  the  religious 
sentiment  is  intact,  but  who  have  rejected  Chris- 
tianity on  intellectual  grounds,  still  almost  deify 
Christ.     These  facts  are  remarkable. 

If  we  estimate  the  greatness  of  a  man  by  the 
influence  which  he  has  exerted  on  mankind,  there  -^ 
can  be  no   question,  even  from  the  secular  point 
of  view,  that  Christ  is  much  the  greatest  man  who 
has  ever  lived. 

It  is  on  all  sides  worth  considering  (blatant  y 
ignorance  or  base  vulgarity  alone  excepted)  that 
the  revolution  effected  by  Christianity  in  human 
life  is  immeasurable  and  unparalleled  by  any  other 
movement  in  history ;  though  most  nearly  ap- 
proached by  that  of  the  Jewish  religion,  of  which, 
however,  it  is  a  development,  so  that  it  may  be 
regarded  as  of  a  piece  with  it.  If  thus  regarded,  this 
whole  system  of  religion  is  so  immeasurably  in 
advance  of  all  others,  that  it  may  fairly  be  said,  if 
it  had  not  been  for  the  Jews,  the  human  race 
would  not  have  had  any  religion  worth  our  serious 
attention  as  such.  The  whole  of  that  side  of  human 
nature  would  never  have  been  developed  in  civilized 
life.  And  although  there  are  numberless  in- 
dividuals who  are  not  conscious  of  its  development 
in  themselves,  yet  even  these  have  been  influenced 
to  an  enormous  extent  by  the  atmosphere  of 
religion  around  them. 

But  not  only  is  Christianity  thus  so  immeasurably 
in  advance  of  all  other  religions.  It  is  no  less  so 
of  every  other  system  of  thought  that  has  ever  been 
promulgated  in  regard   to  all   that  is   moral   and 


160  Thoughts  on  Religion 

spiritual.  Whether  it  be  true  or  false,  it  is  certain 
that  neither  philosophy,  science,  nor  poetry  has  ever 
produced  results  in  thought,  conduct,  or  beauty  in 
any  degree  to  be  compared  with  it.  This  I  think 
will  be  on  all  hands  allowed  as  regards  conduct. 
As  regards  thought  and  beauty  it  may  be  disputed. 
But,  consider,  what  has  all  the  science  or  all  the 
philosophy  of  the  world  done  for  the  thought  of 
mankind  to  be  compared  with  the  one  doctrine, 
1  God  is  love '  ?  Whether  or  not  true,  conceive  what 
belief  in  it  has  been  to  thousands  of  millions  of 
our  race — i.e.  its  influence  on  human  thought,  and 
thence  on  human  conduct.  Thus  to  admit  its 
incomparable  influence  in  conduct  is  indirectly  to 
admit  it  as  regards  thought.  Again,  as  regards 
beauty,  the  man  who  fails  to  see  its  incomparable 
excellence  in  this  respect  merely  shows  his  own 
deficiency  in  the  appreciation  of  all  that  is  noblest 
in  man.  True  or  not  true,  the  entire  Story  of  the 
Cross,  from  its  commencement  in  prophetic  aspira- 
tion to  its  culmination  in  the  Gospel,  is  by  far  the 
most  magnificent  [presentation]  in  literature.  And 
surely  the  fact  of  its  having  all  been  lived  does  not 
detract  from  its  poetic  value.  Nor  does  the  fact 
of  its  being  capable  of  appropriation  by  the  indi- 
vidual Christian  of  to-day  as  still  a  vital  religion 
detract  from  its  sublimity.  Only  to  a  man  wholly 
destitute  of  spiritual  perception  can  it  be  that 
Christianity  should  fail  to  appear  the  greatest  ex- 
hibition of  the  beautiful,  the  sublime,  and  of  all 
else  that  appeals  to  our  spiritual  nature,  which  has 
ever  been  known  upon  our  earth. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  161 

Yet  this  side  of  its  adaptation  is  turned  only 
towards  men  of  highest  culture.  The  most  re- 
markable thing-  about  Christianity  is  its  adaptation 
to  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men.  Are  you  highly 
intellectual?  There  is  in  its  problems,  historical 
and  philosophical,  such  worlds  of  material  as  you 
may  spend  your  life  upon  with  the  same  intermin- 
able interest  as  is  open  to  the  students  of  natural 
science.  Or  are  you  but  a  peasant  in  your  parish 
church,  with  knowledge  of  little  else  than  your 
Bible  ?    Still  are  you  .  .  ?■ 


Regeneration. 

How  remarkable  is  the  doctrine  of  Regeneration 
per  se,  as  it  is  stated  in  the  New  Testament 2,  and 
how  completely  it  fits  in  with  the  non-demonstrative 
character  of  Revelation  to  reason  alone,  with  the 
hypothesis  of  moral  probation,  &c.  Now  this 
doctrine  is  one  of  the  distinctive  notes  of  Chris- 
tianity. That  is,  Christ  foretold  repeatedly  and 
distinctly — as  did  also  His  apostles  after  Him — that 
while  those  who.  received  the  Holy  Ghost,  who 
came  to  the  Father  through  faith  in  the  Son,  who 
were  born  again  of  the  Spirit,  (and  many  other 
synonymous  phrases,)  would  be  absolutely  certain 
of  Christian  truth  as  it  were  by  direct  vision  or 
intuition,  the  carnally  minded  on  the  other  hand 

1  [Note  unfinished. — Ed.] 

3  [George  Romanes  began  to  make  a  collection  of  N.  T.  texts 
bearing  on  the  subject. — Ed.] 

L 


162  Thoughts  on  Religion 

Avould  not  be  affected  by  any  amount  of  direct 
evidence,  even  though  one  rose  from  the  dead — as 
indeed  Christ  shortly  afterwards  did,  with  fulfil- 
ment of  this  prediction.  Thus  scepticism  may  be 
taken  by  Christians  as  corroborating  Christianity. 

By  all  means  let  us  retain  our  independence  of 
judgement ;  but  this  is  pre-eminently  a  matter  in 
which  pure  agnostics  must  abstain  from  arrogance 
and  consider  the  facts  impartially  as  unquestionable 
phenomena  of  experience. 

Shortly  after  the  death  of  Christ,  this  phenomenon 
which  had  been  foretold  by  Him  occurred,  and 
appears  to  have  done  so  for  the  first  time.  It  has 
certainly  continued  to  manifest  itself  ever  since, 
and  has  been  attributed  by  professed  historians 
to  that  particular  moment  in  time  called  Pentecost, 
producing  much  popular  excitement  and  a  large 
number  of  Christian  believers. 

But,  whether  or  not  we  accept  this  account,  it  is 
unquestionable  that  the  apostles  were  filled  with 
faith  in  the  person  and  office  of  their  Master,  which 
is  enough  to  justify  His  doctrine  of  regeneration. 


Conversions. 

St.  Augustine  after  thirty  years  of  age,  and  other 
Fathers,  bear  testimony  to  a  sudden,  enduring  and 
extraordinary  change  in  themselves,  called  con- 
version1. 

Now   this   experience   has   been    repeated    and 

1  See  Pascal,  PensHs,  p.  245. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  163 

testified  to  by  countless  millions  of  civilized  men 
and  women  in  all  nations  and  all  degrees  of  culture. 
It  signifies  not  whether  the  conversion  be  sudden 
or  gradual,  though,  as  a  psychological  phenomenon, 
it  is  more  remarkable  when  sudden  and  there  is 
no  symptom  of  mental  aberration  otherwise.  But 
even  as  a  gradual  growth  in  mature  age,  its  evi- 
dential value  is  not  less.     (Cf.  Bunyan,  &c.) 

In  all  cases  it  is  not  a  mere  change  of  belief  or 
opinion  ;  this  is  by  no  means  the  point ;  the  point  is 
that  it  is  a  modification  of  character,  more  or  less 
profound. 

Seeing  what  a  complex  thing  is  character,  this 
change  therefore  cannot  be  simple.  That  it  may 
all  be  due  to  so-called  natural  causes  is  no  evidence 
against  its  so-called  supernatural  source,  unless  we 
beg  the  whole  question  of  the  Divine  in  Nature. 
To  pure  agnostics  the  evidence  from  conversions 
and  regeneration  lies  in  the  bulk  of  these  psycho- 
logical phenomena,  shortly  after  the  death  of  Christ, 
with  their  continuance  ever  since,  their  general 
similarity  all  over  the  world,  &c,  &c. 


Christianity  and  Pain. 

Christianity,  from  its  foundation  in  Judaism,  has 
throughout  been  a  religion  of  sacrifice  and  sorrow. 
It  has  been  a  religion  of  blood  and  tears,  and  yet 
of  profoundest  happiness  to  its  votaries.  The  ap- 
parent paradox  is  due  to  its  depth,  and  to  the  union 
of  these  seemingly  diverse  roots  in  Love.  It  has 
L  2 


164  Thoughts  on  Religion 

been  throughout  and  growingly  a  religion — or 
rather  let  us  say  the  religion — of  Love,  with  these 
apparently  opposite  qualities.  Probably  it  is  only 
those  whose  characters  have  been  deepened  by 
experiences  gained  in  this  religion  itself  who  are  so 
much  as  capable  of  intelligently  resolving  this 
paradox. 

Fakirs  hang  on  hooks,  Pagans  cut  themselves 
and  even  their  children,  sacrifice  captives,  &c,  for 
the  sake  of  propitiating  diabolical  deities.  The 
Jewish  and  Christian  idea  of  sacrifice  is  doubtless 
a  survival  of  this  idea  of  God  by  way  of  natural 
causation,  yet  this  is  no  evidence  against  the  com- 
pleted idea  of  the  Godhead  being  [such  as  the 
Christian  belief  represents  it],  for  supposing  the 
completed  idea  to  be  true,  the  earlier  ideals  would 
have  been  due  to  the  earlier  inspirations,  in  accor- 
dance with  the  developmental  method  of  Revelation 
hereafter  to  be  discussed  1. 

But  Christianity,  with  its  roots  in  Judaism,  is,  as 
I  have  said,  par  excellence  the  religion  of  sorrow, 
because  it  reaches  to  truer  and  deeper  levels  of 
our  spiritual  nature,  and  therefore  has  capabilities 
both  of  sorrow  and  joy  which  are  presumably 
non-existent  except  in  civilized  man.  I  mean  the 
sorrows  and  the  joys  of  a  fully  evolved  spiritual 
life — such  as  were  attained  wonderfully  early,  his- 
torically speaking,  in  the  case  of  the  Jews,  and  are 
now  universally  diffused  throughout  Christendom. 
In  short,  the  sorrows  and  the  joys  in  question  are 

1  [The  notes  on  this  subject  were  often  too  fragmentary  for  pub- 
lication.— Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  165 

those  which  arise  from  the  fully  developed  con- 
sciousness of  sin  against  a  God  of  Love,  as 
distinguished  from  propitiation  of  malignant  spirits. 
These  joys  and  sorrows  are  wholly  spiritual,  not 
merely  physical,  and  culminate  in  the  cry,  '  Thou 
desirest  no  sacrifice.  .  .  .  The  sacrifice  of  God  is 
a  troubled  spirit  V 


I  agree  with  Pascal2  that  there  is  virtually 
nothing  to  be  gained  by  being  a  theist  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  Christian.  Unitarianism  is  only 
an  affair  of  the  reason — a  merely  abstract  theory 
of  the  mind,  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  heart, 
or  the  real  needs  of  mankind.  It  is  only  when  it 
takes  the  New  Testament,  tears  out  a  few  of  its 
leaves  relating  to  the  divinity  of  Christ,  and  appro- 
priates all  the  rest,  that  its  system  becomes  in  any 
degree  possible  as  a  basis  for  personal  religion. 

If  there  is  a  Deity  it  seems  to  be  in  some  indefi- 
nite degree  more  probable  that  He  should  impart 
a  Revelation  than  that  He  should  not. 


Women,  as  a  class,  are  in  all  countries  much 
more  disposed  to  Christianity  than  men.  I  think 
the  scientific  explanation  of  this  is  to  be  found 
in  the  causes  assigned  in  my  essay  on  Mental 
differences  between  Men  and  Women 3.  But,  if  Chris- 
tianity be  supposed  true,  there  would,  of  course,  be 


Ps.  li.  2  Pensees,  pp.  91-93- 

See  Nineteenth  Century,  May  1887. 


166  Thoughts  on  Religion 

a  more  ultimate  explanation  of  a  religious  kind— as 
in  all  other  cases  where  causation  is  concerned.  And, 
in  that  case  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  largest  part 
of  the  explanation  would  consist  in  the  passions  of 
women  being  less  ardent  than  those  of  men,  and 
also  much  more  kept  under  restraint  by  social  condi- 
tions of  life.  This  applies  not  only  to  purity,  but  like- 
wise to  most  of  the  other  psychological  differentiae 
between  the  sexes,  such  as  ambition,  selfishness, 
pride  of  power,  and  so  forth.  In  short,  the  whole 
ideal  of  Christian  ethics  is  of  a  feminine  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  masculine  type  l.  Now  nothing 
is  so  inimical  to  Christian  belief  as  urTChristian 
conduct.  This  is  especially  the  case  as  regards 
impurity;  for  whether  the  fact  be  explained  on 
religious  or  non-religious  grounds,  it  has  more  to 
do  with  unbelief  than  has  the  speculative  reason. 
Consequently,  woman  is,  for  all  these  reasons, 
the  'fitter'  type  for  receiving  and  retaining  Christian 
belief. 


Modern  agnosticism  is  performing  this  great 
service  to  Christian  faith  ;  it  is  silencing  all  rational 
scepticism  of  the  a  priori  kind.  And  this  it  is  bound 
to  do  more  and  more  the  purer  it  becomes.  In 
every  generation  it  must  henceforth  become  more 

1  [The  essay  mentioned  above  should  be  read  in  explanation  of 
this  expression.  George  Romanes'  meaning  would  be  more  accurately 
expressed,  I  think,  hnd  he  said  :  «  The  ideal  of  Christian  character 
holds  in  prominence  the  elements  which  we  regard  as  characteris- 
tically feminine,  e.g.  development  of  affections,  readiness  of  trust,  love 
of  service,  readiness  to  suffer,  <Src'— Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion   167 

and  more  recognized  by  logical  thinking,  that  all 
antecedent  objections  to  Christianity  founded  on 
reason  alone  are  ipso  facto  nugatory.  Now,  all 
the  strongest  objections  to  Christianity  have  ever 
been  those  of  the  antecedent  kind  ;  hence  the 
effect  o(  modern  thinking  is  that  of  more  and  more 
diminishing  the  purely  speculative  difficulties,  such 
as  that  of  the  Incarnation,  &c.  In  other  words 
the  force  of  Butler's  argument  about  our  being 
incompetent  judges1  is  being  more  and  mere 
increased. 

And  the  logical  development  of  this  lies  in  the 
view  already  stated  about  natural  causation.  For, 
just  as  pure  agnosticism  must  allow  that  reason 
is  incompetent  to  adjudicate  a  priori  for  or  against 
Christian  miracles,  including  the  Incarnation,  so 
it  must  further  allow  that,  if  they  ever  took  place, 
reason  can  have  nothing  to  say  against  their  being 
all  of  one  piece  with  causation  in  general.  Hence, 
so  far  as  reason  is  concerned,  pure  agnosticism 
must  allow  that  it  is  only  the  event  which  can 
ultimately  prove  whether  Christianity  is  true  or 
false.  '  If  it  be  of  God  we  cannot  overthrow  it, 
lest  haply  we  be  found  even  to  fight  against  God.' 
But  the  individual  cannot  wait  for  this  empirical 
determination.  What  then  is  he  to  do?  The  un- 
biassed answer  of  pure  agnosticism  ought  reason- 
ably to  be,  in  the  words  of  John  Hunter,  '  Do 
not  think  ;  try.'  That  is,  in  this  case,  try  the 
only  experiment  available — the  experiment  of 
faith.  Do  the  doctrine,  and  if  Christianity  be 
1  See  Analogy  part  i.  ch.  7;  part  ii.  ch.  3,  4,  &c. 


168  Thoughts  on  Religion 

true,  the  verification  will  come,  not  indeed 
mediately  through  any  course  of  speculative 
reason,  but  immediately  by  spiritual  intuition. 
Only  if  a  man  has  faith  enough  to  make  this 
venture  honestly,  will  he  be  in  a  just  position  for 
deciding  the  issue.  Thus  viewed  it  would  seem 
that  the  experiment  of  faith  is  not  a  '  fool's  ex- 
periment ' ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  so  that  there  is 
enough  prima  facie  evidence  to  arrest  serious 
attention,  such  an  experimental  trial  would  seem 
to  be  the  rational  duty  of  a  pure  agnostic. 

It  is  a  fact  that  Christian  belief  is  much  more 
due  to  doing  than  to  thinking,  as  prognosticated 
by  the  New  Testament.  '  If  any  man  will  do  His 
will,  he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine,  whether  it  be 
of  God'  (St.  John  vii.  17).  And  surely,  even  on 
grounds  of  reason  itself,  it  should  be  allowed  that, 
supposing  Christianity  to  be  '  of  God,'  it  ongJit  to 
appeal  to  the  spiritual  rather  than  to  the  rational 
side  of  our  nature. 


Even  within  the  region  of  pure  reason  (or  the 
'prima  facie  case ')  modern  science,  as  directed  on 
the  New  Testament  criticism,  has  surely  done 
more  for  Christianity  than  against  it.  For,  after 
half  a  century  of  battle  over  the  text  by  the  best 
scholars,  the  dates  of  the  Gospels  have  been  fixed 
within  the  first  century,  and  at  least  four  of 
St.  Paul's  epistles  have  had  their  authenticity 
proved  beyond  doubt.  Now  this  is  enough  to  destroy 
all  eighteenth-century  criticism  as  to  the  doubtful- 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  169 

ness  of  the  historical  existence  of  Christ  and  His 
apostles,  '  inventions  of  priests,'  &c,  which  was  the 
most  formidable  kind  of  criticism  of  all.  There  is 
no  longer  any  question  as  to  historical  facts,  save 
the  miraculous,  which,  however,  are  ruled  out  by 
negative  criticism  on  merely  a  priori  grounds. 
This  remaining — and,  ex  hypothesis  necessary — 
doubt  is  of  very  different  importance  from  the 
other. 

Again,  the  Pauline  epistles  of  proved  authen- 
ticity are  enough  for  all  that  is  wanted  to  show 
the  belief  of  Christ's  contemporaries. 

These  are  facts  of  the  first  order  of  importance 
to  have  proved.  Old  Testament  criticism  is  as  yet 
too  immature  to  consider. 


Plan  in  Revelation, 

The  views  which  I  entertained  on  this  subject 
when  an  undergraduate  [i.  e.  the  ordinary  orthodox 
views]  were  abandoned  in  presence  of  the  theory 
of  Evolution — i.  e.  the  theory  of  natural  causation 
as  probably  furnishing  a  scientific  explanation  [of 
the  religious  phenomena  of  Judaism]  or,  which  is 
the  same  thing,  an  explanation  in  terms  of  ascer- 
tainable causes  up  to  some  certain  point ;  which 
however  in  this  particular  case  cannot  be  deter- 
mined within  wide  limits,  so  that  the  history  of 
Israel  will  always  embody  an  element  of  '  mystery ' 
much  more  than  any  other  history. 

It   was  not    until   twenty-five   years   later   that 


170  Thoughts  on  Religion 

I  saw  clearly  the  full  implications  of  my  present 
views  on  natural  causation.  As  applied  to  this 
particular  case  these  views  show  that  to  a  theist, 
at  all  events  (i.  e.  to  any  one  who  on  independent 
grounds  has  accepted  the  theory  of  Theism),  it 
ought  not  to  make  much  difference  to  the  evidential 
value  of  the  Divine  Plan  of  Revelation  as  exhibited 
in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  even  if  it  be 
granted  that  the  whole  has  been  due  to  so-called 
natural  causes  only.  I  say,  '  not  much  difference.' 
for  that  it  ought  to  make  some  difference  I  do  not 
deny.  Take  a  precisely  analogous  case.  The 
theory  of  evolution  by  natural  causes  is  often  said 
to  make  no  logical  difference  in  the  evidence  of 
plan  or  design  manifested  in  organic  nature — it 
being  only  a  question  of  modus  operandi  whether 
all  pieces  of  organic  machinery  were  produced 
suddenly  or  by  degrees  ;  the  evidence  of  design  is 
equally  there  in  either  case.  Now  I  have  shown 
elsewhere  that  this  is  wrong1.  It  may  not  make 
much  difference  to  a  man  who  is  already  a  theist, 
for  then  it  is  but  a  question  of  modus,  but  it  makes 
a  great  difference  to  the  evidence  of  Theism. 

So  it  is  in  evidence  of  plan  in  proof  of  a  reve- 
lation. If  there  had  been  no  alleged  revelation 
up  to  the  present  time,  and  if  Christ  were  now 
to  appear  suddenly  in  His  first  advent  in  all  the 
power  and  glory  which  Christians  expect  for  His 
second,  the  proof  of  His  revelation  would  be 
demonstrative.  So  that,  as  a  mere  matter  of 
evidence,  a  sudden  revelation  might  be  much  more 

1  See  Conclusion  of  Darwin  and  After  Darwin,  part  I. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  171 

convincing  than  a  gradual  one.  But  it  would 
be  quite  out  of  analogy  with  causation  in  nature 1. 
Besides,  even  a  gradual  revelation  might  be  given 
easily,  which  would  be  of  demonstrative  value — 
as  by  making  prophecies  of  historical  events, 
scientific  discoveries,  &c,  so  clear  as  to  be  un- 
mistakeable.  But  as  before  shown,  a  demonstrative 
revelation  has  not  been  made,  and  there  may  well 
be  good  reasons  why  it  should  not.  Now,  if  there 
are  such  reasons  (e.g.  our  state  of  probation),  we 
can  well  see  that  the  gradual  unfolding  of  a  plan 
of  revelation,  from  earliest  dawn  of  history  to  the 
end  of  the  world  ('  I  speak  as  a  fool ')  is  much 
preferable  to  a  sudden  manifestation  sufficiently  late 
in  the  world's  history  to  be  historically  attested 
for  all  subsequent  time.     For 

1st.  Gradual  evolution  is  in  analogy  with  God's 
other  work. 

2nd.  It  does  not  leave  Him  without  witness  at 
any  time  during  the  historical  period. 

3rd.  It  gives  ample  scope  for  persevering  research 
at  all  times — i.  e.  a  moral  test,  and  not  merely 
an  intellectual  assent  to  some  one  (ex  hypothesi) 
unequivocally  attested  event  in  history. 

The  appearance  of  plan  in  revelation  is,  in  fact, 
certainly  remarkable  enough  to  arrest  serious  at- 
tention. 

1  I  should  somewhere  show  how  much  better  a  treatise  Butler 
might  have  written  had  he  known  about  evolution  as  the  general  law 
of  nature. 


172  Thoughts  on  Religion 

If  revelation  has  been  of  a  progressive  character, 
then  it  follows  that  it  must  have  been  so,  not  only 
historically,  but  likewise  intellectually,  morally, 
and  spiritually.  For  thus  only  could  it  be  always 
adapted  to  the  advancing  conditions  of  the  human 
race.  This  reflection  destroys  all  those  numerous 
objections  against  Scripture  on  account  of  the 
absurdity  or  immorality  of  its  statements  or  pre- 
cepts, unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  modifications 
suggested  by  criticism  as  requisite  to  bring  the 
statements  or  precepts  into  harmony  with  modern 
advancement  would  have  been  as  well  adapted 
to  the  requirements  of  the  world  at  the  date  in 
question,  as  were  the  actual  statements  or  precepts 
before  us. 


Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  certain  that  the 
revelation  which  it  conveys  has  been  predetermined 
at  least  since  the  dawn  of  the  historical  period. 
This  is  certain  because  the  objective  evidences  of 
Christianity  as  a  revelation  have  their  origin  in 
that  dawn.  And  these  objective  evidences  are 
throughout  [evidence]  of  a  scheme,  in  which  the 
end  can  be  seen  from  the  beginning.  And  the 
very  methods  whereby  this  scheme  is  itself  revealed 
are  such  (still  supposing  that  it  is  a  scheme)  as 
present  remarkable  evidences  of  design.  These 
methods  are,  broadly  speaking,  miracles,  prophecy 
and  the  results  of  the  teaching,  &c,  upon  mankind. 
Now  one  may  show  that  no  better  methods  could 
conceivably  have  been  designed  for  the  purpose  of 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion   173 

latter-day  evidence,  combined  with  moral  and 
religious  teaching  throughout.  The  mere  fact  of 
it  being  so  largely  incorporated  with  secular  history 
renders  the  Christian  religion  unique :  so  to  speak, 
the  world,  throughout  its  entire  historical  period, 
has  been  constituted  the  canvas  on  which  this 
divine  revelation  has  been  painted — and  painted  so 
gradually  that  not  until  the  process  had  been  going 
on  for  a  couple  of  thousand  years  was  it  possible 
to  perceive  the  subject  thereof. 


Christian  Dogmas. 

Whether  or  not  Christ  was  Himself  divine  would 
make  no  difference  so  far  as  the  consideration  of 
Christianity  as  the  highest  phase  of  evolution  is 
concerned,  or  from  the  purely  secular  [scientific] 
point  of  view.  From  the  religious  point  of  view,  or 
that  touching  the  relation  of  God  to  man,  it  would 
of  course  make  a  great  difference;  but  the  differ- 
ence belongs  to  the  same  region  of  thought  as  that 
which  applies  to  all  the  previous  moments  of 
evolution.  Thus  the  passage  from  the  non-moral 
to  the  moral  appears,  from  the  secular  or  scientific 
point  of  view,  to  be  due,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  to 
mechanical  causes  in  natural  selection  or  what  not. 
But,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  passage  from  the 
non-mental  to  the  mental,  &c,  this  passage  may 
have  been  ultimately  due  to  divine  volition,  and 
must  have  been  so  dtie  on  the  theory  of  Theism. 
Therefore,    I    say,    it    makes    no    difference    from 


174  Thoughts  on  Religion 

a  secular  or  scientific  point  of  view  whether  or  not 
Christ  was  Himself  divine  ;  since,  in  either  case,  the 
movement  which  He  inaugurated  was  the  proximate 
or  phenomenal  cause  of  the  observable  results. 

Thus,  even  the  question  of  the  divinity  of  Christ 
ultimately  resolves  itself  into  the  question  of  all 
questions — viz.  is  or  is  not  mechanical  causation 
'  the  outward  and  visible  form  of  an  inward  and 
spiritual  grace  '  ?  Is  it  phenomenal  or  ontological ; 
ultimate  or  derivative  ? 

Similarly  as  regards  the  redemption.  Whether 
or  not  Christ  was  really  divine,  in  as  far  as  a  belief 
in  His  divinity  has  been  a  necessary  cause  of  the 
moral  and  religious  evolution  which  has  resulted 
from  His  life  on  earth,  it  has  equally  and  so  far 
'  saved  His  people  from  their  sins';  that  is,  of  course, 
it  has  saved  them  from  their  own  sense  of  sin  as 
an  abiding  curse.  Whether  or  not  He  has  effected 
any  corresponding  change  of  an  objective  character 
in  the  ontological  sphere,  again  depends  on  the 
'  question  of  questions  '  just  stated. 


Reasonableness  of  the  Doctrines  of  the  Incarnation 
and  the  Trinity. 

Pure  agnostics  and  those  who  search  for  God 
in  Christianity  should  have  nothing  to  do  with 
metaphysical  theology.  That  is  a  department  of 
enquiry  which,  ex  hypothesi,  is  transcendental,  and 
is  only  to  be  considered  after  Christianity  has  been 
accepted.     The  doctrines  of  the  Incarnation  and  the 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  i 


75 


Trinity  seemed  to  me  most  absurd  in  my  agnostic 
days.  But  now,  as  a  pure  agnostic,  I  see  in  them 
no  rational  difficulty  at  all.  As  to  the  Trinity,  the 
plurality  of  persons  is  necessarily  implied  in  the 
companion  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation.  So  that  at 
best  there  is  here  but  one  difficulty,  since,  duality 
being  postulated  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarna- 
tion, there  is  no  further  difficulty  for  pure  agnos- 
ticism in  the  doctrine  of  plurality.  Now  at  one 
time  it  seemed  to  me  impossible  that  any  proposi- 
tion, verbally  intelligible  as  such,  could  be  more 
violently  absurd  than  that  of  the  doctrine  [of  the 
Incarnation].  Now  I  see  that  this  standpoint  is 
wholly  irrational,  due  only  to  the  blindness  of  reason 
itself  promoted  by  [purely]  scientific  habits  of 
thought.  '  But  it  is  opposed  to  common  sense.' 
No  doubt,  utterly  so  ;  but  so  it  ought  to  be  if  true. 
Common  sense  is  merely  a  [rough]  register  of 
common  experience  ;  but  the  Incarnation,  if  it  ever 
took  place,  whatever  else  it  may  have  been,  at  all 
events  cannot  have  been  a  common  event.  '  But 
it  is  derogatory  to  God  to  become  man.'  How  do 
you  know?  Besides,  Christ  was  not  an  ordinary 
man.  Both  negative  criticism  and  the  historical 
effects  of  His  life  prove  this ;  while,  if  we  for 
a  moment  adopt  the  Christian  point  of  view  for 
the  sake  of  argument,  the  whole  raison  d^etre  of 
mankind  is  bound  up  in  Him.  Lastly,  there  are 
considerations  per  contra,  rendering  an  incarnation 
antecedently  probable1.  On  antecedent  grounds 
there  must  be  mysteries  unintelligible  to  reason  as 

1  See  Gore's  Bampton  Lectures,  lect.  ii. 


176  Thoughts  on  Religion 

to  the  nature  of  God,  &c,  supposing  a  revelation 
to  be  made  at  all.  Therefore  their  occurrence  in 
Christianity  is  no  proper  objection  to  Christianity. 
Why,  again,  stumble  a  priori  over  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity — especially  as  man  himself  is  a  triune  being, 
of  body,  mind  (i.e.  reason),  and  spirit  (i.e.  moral, 
aesthetic,  religious  faculties)?  The  unquestionable 
union  of  these  no  less  unquestionably  distinct  orders 
of  being  in  man  is  known  immediately  as  a  fact  of 
experience,  but  is  as  unintelligible  by  any  process 
of  logic  or  reason  as  is  the  alleged  triunity  of  God. 


Adam,  the  Fall,  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

These,  all  taken  together  as  Christian  dogmas, 
are  undoubtedly  hard  hit  by  the  scientific  proof  of 
evolution  (but  are  the  only  dogmas  which  can  fairly 
be  said  to  be  so),  and,  as  constituting  the  logical 
basis  of  the  whole  plan,  they  certainly  do  appear  at 
first  sight  necessarily  to  involve  in  their  destruction 
that  of  the  entire  superstructure.  But  the  question 
is  whether,  after  all,  they  have  been  destroyed  for 
a  pure  agnostic.  In  other  words,  whether  my  prin- 
ciples are  not  as  applicable  in  turning  the  flank  of 
infidelity  here  as  everywhere  else. 

First,  as  regards  Adam  and  Eve,  observe,  to 
begin  with,  that  long  before  Darwin  the  story  of 
man  in  Paradise  was  recognized  by  thoughtful 
theologians  as  allegorical.  Indeed,  read  with  un- 
prejudiced eyes,  the  first  chapters  of  Genesis  ought 
always  to  have  been  seen  to  be  a  poem  as  dis- 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  177 

tinguished  from  a  history  :  nor  could  it  ever  have 
been  mistaken  for  a  history,  but  for  preconceived 
ideas  on  the  matter  of  inspiration.  But  to  pure 
agnostics  there  should  be  no  such  preconceived 
ideas ;  so  that  nowadays  no  presumption  should 
be  raised  against  it  as  inspired,  merely  because  it 
has  been  proved  not  to  be  a  history — and  this  even 
though  we  cannot  see  of  what  it  is  allegorical. 
For,  supposing  it  inspired,  it  has  certainly  done 
good  service  in  the  past  and  can  do  so  likewise  in 
the  present,  by  giving  an  allegorical,  though  not 
a  literal,  starting  point  for  the  Divine  Plan  of 
Redemption. 


The  evidence  of  Natural  and  Revealed 
Religion  compared. 

It  is  often  said  that  evolution  of  organic  forms 
gives  as  good  evidence  of  design  as  would  their 
special  creation,  inasmuch  as  all  the  facts  of  adap- 
tation, in  which  the  evidence  consists,  are  there 
in  either  case.  But  here  it  is  overlooked  that  the 
very  question  at  issue  is  thus  begged.  The  question 
is,  Are  these  facts  of  adaptation  per  se  sufficient 
evidence  of  design  as  their  cause?  But  if  it  be 
allowed,  as  it  must  be,  that  under  hypothesis  of 
evolution  by  natural  causes  the  facts  of  adaptation 
belong  to  the  same  category  as  all  the  other  facts 
of  nature,  no  more  special  argument  for  design 
can  be  founded  on  these  facts  than  on  any  others 
in  nature.     So  that  the  facts  of  adaptation,  like 

M 


178  Thoughts  on  Religion 

all  other  facts,  are  only  available  as  arguments  for 
design  when  it  is  assumed  that  all  natural  causation 
is  of  a  mental  character :  which  assumption  merely 
begs  the  question  of  design  anywhere.  Or,  in 
other  words,  on  the  supposition  of  their  having 
been  due  to  natural  causes,  the  facts  of  adaptation 
are  only  then  available  as  per  se  good  evidence  of 
design,  when  it  has  already  been  assumed  that,  qua 
due  to  natural  causes,  they  are  due  to  design. 

Natural  religion  resembles  Revealed  religion 
in  this.  Supposing  both  divine,  both  have  been 
arranged  so  that,  as  far  as  reason  can  lead  us, 
there  is  only  enough  evidence  of  design  to  arouse 
serious  attention  to  the  question  of  it.  In  other 
words,  as  regards  both,  the  attitude  of  pure  reason 
ought  to  be  that  of  pure  agnosticism.  (Observe 
that  the  inadequacy  of  teleology,  or  design  in 
nature,  to  prove  Theism  has  been  expressly 
recognized  by  all  the  more  intellectual  Christians 
of  all  ages,  although  such  recognition  has  become 
more  general  since  Darwin.  On  this  point  I  may 
refer  to  Pascal  especially  \  and  many  other  authors.) 
This  is  another  striking  analogy  between  Nature 
and  Revelation,  supposing  both  to  have  emanated 
from  the  same  author— i.e.  quite  as  much  so  as 
identity  of  developmental  method  in  both. 

Stipposing  the  hypothesis  of  design  in  both  to  be 
true,  it  follows  that  in  both  this  hypothesis  can  be 
alike  verified  only  by  the  organ  of  immediate  intui- 
tion— i.  e.  that  other  mode  of  human  apprehension 
which  is  supplementary  to  the  rational.  Here 
1  Penstes,  pp.  205  ff. 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  179 

again  we  note  the  analogy.  And  if  a  man  has  this 
supplementary  mode  of  apprehending  the  highest 
truth  (by  hypothesis  such),  it  will  be  his  duty  to 
exercise  his  spiritual  eyesight  in  searching  for  God 
in  nature  as  in  revelation,  when  (still  on  our  present 
hypothesis  that  '  God  is,  and  is  the  rewarder  of 
them  who  seek  Him  diligently')  he  will  find  that 
his  subjective  evidence  of  God  in  Nature  and  in 
Revelation  will  mutually  corroborate  one  another — 
so  yielding  additional  evidence  to  his  reason. 

The  teleology  of  Revelation  supplements  that 
of  Nature,  and  so,  to  the  spiritually  minded  man, 
they  logically  and  mutually  corroborate  one 
another. 

Paley's  writings  form  an  excellent  illustration  of 
the   identity   of  the   teleological    argument  from 
Nature  and  from  Revelation  ;  though  a  very  imper- 
fect illustration  of  the  latter  taken  by  itself,  inasmuch 
as  he  treats  only  of  the  New  Testament,  and  even 
of    that    very    partially — ignoring   all    that    went 
before  Christ,  and  much  of  what  happened  after 
the  apostles.     Yet  Paley  himself  does  not  seem  to 
have  observed  the  similarity  of  the  argument,  as 
developed  in  his  Natural  Theology  and  Evidences 
of  Christianity  respectively.     But  no  one  has  de- 
veloped the  argument  better  in  both  cases.     His 
great  defect  was  in  not  perceiving  that  this  teleo- 
logical argument,  per  se,  is  not  in  either  case  enough 
to  convince,  but  only  to  arouse  serious  attention. 
Paley  everywhere  represents  that  such  an   appeal 
to  reason  alone  ought  to  be  sufficient.     He  fails 
to  see  that  if  it  were,  there  could  be  no  room  for 
M  2 


180  Thoughts  on  Religion 

faith.  In  other  words,  he  fails  to  recognize  the 
spiritual  organ  in  man,  and  its  complementary 
object,  grace  in  God.  So  far  he  fails  to  be  a 
Christian.  And,  whether  Theism  and  Christianity 
be  true  or  false,  it  is  certain  that  the  teleological 
argument  alone  ought  to  result,  not  in  conviction, 
but  in  agnosticism. 


The  antecedent  improbability  against  a  miracle 
being  wrought  by  a  man  without  a  moral  object  is 
apt  to  be  confused  with  that  of  its  being  done  by 
God  with  an  adequate  moral  object.  The  former 
is  immeasurably  great ;  the  latter  is  only  equal  to 
that  of  the  theory  of  Theism — i.  e.  nil. 


Christian  Demonology 1. 

It  will  be  said, '  However  you  may  seek  to  explain 
away  a  priori  objections  to  miracles  on  a  priori 
grounds,  there  remains  the  fact  that  Christ  accepted 
the  current  superstition  in  regard  to  diabolic  pos- 
session. Now  the  devils  damn  the  doctrine.  For 
you  must  choose  the  horn  of  your  dilemma,  either 

1  [Romanes'  line  of  argument  in  this  note  seems  to  me  impossible 
to  maintain.  The  emphasis  which  Jesus  Christ  lays  on  diabolic 
agency  is  so  great  that,  if  it  is  not  a  reality,  He  must  be  regarded 
either  as  seriously  misled  about  realities  which  concern  the  spiritual 
life,  or  else  as  seriously  misleading  others.  And  in  neither  case  could 
He  be  even  the  perfect  Prophet.  I  think  I  am  justified  in  explaining 
my  disagreement  with  Romanes'  argument  at  this  point  particularly. 
—Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  181 

the  current  theory  was  true  or  it  was  not.  If  you 
say  true,  you  must  allow  that  the  same  theory  is 
true  for  all  similar  stages  of  culture,  [but  not  for 
the  later  stages]  and  therefore  that  the  most  suc- 
cessful exorcist  is  Science,  albeit  Science  works 
not  by  faith  in  the  theory,  but  by  rejection  of  it. 
Observe,  the  diseases  are  so  well  described  by  the 
record,  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  mistaking 
them.  Hence  you  must  suppose  that  they  were 
due  to  devils  in  A.  D.  30,  and  to  nervous  disorders 
in  A.D.  1894.  On  the  other  hand,  if  you  choose  the 
other  horn,  you  must  accept  either  the  hypothesis 
of  the  ignorance  or  that  of  the  mendacity  of  Christ.' 
The  answer  is,  that  either  hypothesis  may  be 
accepted  by  Christianity.  For  the  sake  of  argument 
we  may  exclude  the  question  whether  the  acceptance 
of  the  devil  theory  by  Christ  was  really  historical,  or 
merely  attributed  to  Him  by  His  biographers  after 
His  death.  If  Christ  knew  that  the  facts  were  not 
due  to  devils,  He  may  also  have  known  it  was  best 
to  fall  in  with  current  theory,  rather  than  to  puzzle 
the  people  with  a  lecture  on  pathology.  If  He  did 
not  know,  why  should  He,  if  He  had  previously 
'emptied  Himself  of  omniscience ?  In  either  case, 
if  He  had  denied  the  current  theory,  He  would  have 
been  giving  evidence  of  scientific  knowledge  or  of 
scientific  intuition  beyond  the  culture  of  His  time, 
and  this,  as  in  countless  other  cases,  was  not  in 
accordance  with  His  method,  which,  whether  we 
suppose  it  divine  or  human,  has  nowhere  proved 
His  divine  mission  by  foreknowledge  of  natural 
science. 


1 82  Thoughts  on  Religion 

The  particular  question  of  Christ  and   demon- 
ology  is  but  part  of  a  much  larger  one. 


Darwin's  Difficulty^. 

The  answer  to  Darwin's  objection  about  so  small 
a  proportion  of  mankind  having  ever  heard  of 
Christ,  is  manifold : — 

1.  Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  the  highest 
and  final  revelation ;  i.  e.  the  scheme  of  revelation 
has  been  developmental.  Therefore,  it  follows 
from  the  very  method  that  the  larger  proportion  of 
mankind  should  never  hear  of  Christ,  i.  e.  all  who 
live  before  His  advent. 

2.  But  these  were  not  left  ( without  witness.' 
They  all  had  their  religion  and  their  moral  sense, 
each  at  its  appropriate  stage  of  development. 
Therefore  '  the  times  of  ignorance  God  winked  at ' 
(Acts  xvii.  30). 

3.  Moreover  these  men  were  not  devoid  of  benefit 
from  Christ,  because  it  is  represented  that  He  died 
for  all  men — i.  e.  but  for  Him  [i.  e.  apart  from  the 
knowledge  of  what  was  to  come]  God  would  not 
have  '  winked  at  the  times  of  ignorance.'  The  effi- 
cacy of  atonement  is  represented  as  transcendental, 
and  not  dependent  on  the  accident  of  hearing  about 
the  Atoner. 

1  [There  is  nothing  in  Darwin's  writings  which  seems  to  me  to 
justify  Romanes  in  attributing  this  difficulty  to  him  specially.  But 
he  knew  Darwin  so  intimately  and  reverenced  him  so  profoundly  that 
he  is  not  likely  to  have  been  in  error  on  the  subject. — Ed.] 


A   Candid  Examination  of  Religion  183 

4.  It  is  remarkable  that  of  all  men  Darwin  should 
have  been  worsted  by  this  fallacious  argument. 
For  it  has  received  its  death-blow  from  the  theory 
of  evolution  :  i.  e.  if  it  be  true  that  evolution  has 
been  the  method  of  natural  causation,  and  if  it  be 
true  that  the  method  of  natural  causation  is  due  to 
a  Divinity,  then  it  follows  that  the  lateness  of 
Christ's  appearance  on  earth  must  have  been 
designed.  For  it  is  certain  that  He  could  not 
have  appeared  at  any  earlier  date  without  having 
violated  the  method  of  evolution.  Therefore,  on 
the  theory  of  Theism,  He  ought  to  have  appeared 
when  He  did — i.e.  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
in  history. 

So  as  to  the  suitability  of  the  moment  of  Christ's 
appearance  in  other  respects.  Even  secular  his- 
torians are  agreed  as  to  the  suitability  of  the 
combinations,  and  deduce  the  success  of  His  system 
of  morals  and  religion  from  this  fact.  So  with 
students  of  comparative  religions. 


184  Thoughts  on  Religion. 


Concluding  Note  by  the  Editor:— 

THE  intellectual  attitude  towards  Christianity 
expressed  in  these  notes  may  be  described  as— 
(1)  '  pure  agnosticism'  in  the  region  of  the  scientific 
'  reason,'  coupled  with  (2)  a  vivid  recognition  of  the 
spiritual  necessity  of  faith  and  of  the  legitimacy 
and  value  of  its  intuitions  ;  (3)  a  perception  of  the 
positive  strength  of  the  historical  and  spiritual 
evidences  of  Christianity. 

George  Romanes  came  to  recognize,  as  in  these 
written  notes  so  also  in  conversation,  that  it  was 
6  reasonable  to  be  a  Christian  believer '  before  the 
activity  or  habit  of  faith  had  been  recovered.  His 
life  was  cut  short  very  soon  after  this  point  was 
reached ;  but  it  will  surprise  no  one  to  learn  that 
the  writer  of  these  '  Thoughts '  returned  before  his 
death  to  that  full,  deliberate  communion  with 
the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  which  he  had  for  so 
many  years  been  conscientiously  compelled  to 
forego.  In  his  case  the  '  pure  in  heart '  was  after 
a  long  period  of  darkness  allowed,  in  a  measure 
before  his  death,  to  '  see  God.' 

Fecisti  nos  ad  te,  D amine  ;  et  inqnietimi  est  cor 

nostrum  donee  requiescat  in  te. 

C.  G'. 


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